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Abstract: The dissertation explores the role of human capital, education, and politi-
cal institutions in the process of economic and political development. The first chap-
ter shows that economic development such as secondary school enrollment rates
during the democratization period exerts long-lasting effects on growth, possibly by
giving permanent birthmarks to newly minted democratic institutions. Specifically,
democracies born in weak development tend to have weak institutions and slow
growth, while in contrast, those with adequate development at the political transition
time establish strong institutions and achieve faster growth. The second chapter
explores the effect of curriculum control in schooling on national innovation and
individual creativity. The evidence suggests that a more centralized curriculum
control, as indicated by more centralized official curriculum design together with
more frequent high-stakes achievement exams, tends to reduce individual creativity
and weaken national innovation. The third chapter studies how state capacity affects
the investment in human capital, economic growth and democratization. It shows
that autocracy may not necessarily inhibit economic growth when a country is poor
but the state capacity is strong, while democracy facilitates growth more when
a country is rich. In particular, the relationship between state development and
democratization follows an inverted U-shape.
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1. Is Democracy Good for
Growth? — Institutional
Quality Matters1
1.1. Introduction
While most people around the world believe that democracy improves living stan-
dards2, experts in social sciences are not so sure. Theoretical debates on whether
democracy enhances or hinders economic growth have been very extensive.3 Sub-
stantial controversies also exist on the empirical side. For example, after analyzing
470 regressions from 81 studies, Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) find most
1We thank Madhav Aney, Shou Chen, Chris Doucouliagos, Steven Durlauf, Jan Klingelhöfer,
Zhenxiong Li, Jiaming Mao, Paul Raschky, Paul Schweinzer, Yang Xie, Chenggang Xu, and
workshop participants at SMU, the 5th International Workshop on Economic Analysis of Institutions
at Xiamen University, the 2017 Conference of the Society for Institutional and Organizational
Economics (SIOE) at Columbia University, the 2017 Annual Australasian Public Choice Conference
(APCC) at Deakin University, the 2018 China Meeting of the Econometric Society at Fudan
University, and the 2018 International Conference on Economic Theory and Applications at
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics for helpful comments and suggestions. All
remaining errors are ours.
2Evidence from World Value Survey (2014) shows that about 79% of the global population
wish to live in a democratic country. This preference is not only prevalent in countries with a long
democratic tradition (United States 79%, Sweden 92%), but also in Islamic states (Pakistan 78%,
Malaysia 87%), Africa (Rwanda 74%, Zimbabwe 86%), South America (Chile 83%, Ecuador 84%),
and Asia (China 81%, South Korea 86%).
3For example, populism and other incentive distortions from the election system and interest
groups may harm growth (March and Olsen, 1983; Olson, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Besley
and Coate, 1998; De Haan and Sturm, 2003; Huntington, 2006), while the growth-enhancing effects
may come from more investment in public goods, better information and commitment, and more
inclusive opportunities for the masses (Wittman, 1989; Olson, 1993; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993;
Alesina et al., 1996; Benabou, 1996; Feng, 1997; Sen, 1999; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2012).
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estimated effects of democracy on economic growth are not significantly positive.4
The recent literature, however, shows that democracy substantially promotes eco-
nomic growth.5 This new result is achieved through various channels such as con-
structing alternative democracy indicators, using advanced econometric techniques,
or employing new instrumental variables.
So is democracy good for growth or not? Instead of trying to reach a universal yes or
no conclusion, this paper tackles the issue from a novel perspective of institutional
quality. Our basic hypothesis is that democracies are born with unequal quality;
the birth conditions in terms of economic development leave permanent birthmarks
to newly minted democratic institutions, which exert long-lasting effects on future
economic growth.
Specifically, adequate development at the democratic transition period provides a
strong foundation to establish growth-enhancing institutions, while democracies
born in weak development situations tend to have weak institutions. Even though
both are democracy by political definitions, their institutional quality may differ
substantially in terms of capability to improve economic performance. For sim-
plicity, the former type is labeled as Strong Democracy while the latter Weak
Democracy. So the main message of the paper is that Strong Democracy is good
for growth, while Weak Democracy not.
The case study on Benin and Ghana in Session 1.6.3 well explains our idea. Here
we briefly illustrate it. Benin and Ghana are located in West Africa and both became
democracies in the 1990s. But economic growth in Benin didn’t improve after
democratization, while the opposite is true for Ghana. Figure 1.1 plots GDP per
capita growth rates in Benin and Ghana respectively after controlling effects of
growth dynamics, income level, and the time trend. Such discrepancy in growth
could stem from the different improvement effects on the overall growth-enhancing
4This echoes some earlier studies such as Sirowy and Inkeles (1990); Przeworski, Limongi and
Giner (1995); Hall and Jones (1999).
5See, for example, Minier (1998); Gerring et al. (2005); Persson (2005); Aghion, Alesina and
Trebbi (2007b); Persson and Tabellini (2007, 2009); Madsen, Raschky and Skali (2015); Gründler
and Krieger (2016); Acemoglu et al. (2019).
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Figure 1.1.. GDP per capita Growth in Benin and Ghana
Figure 1.2.. Economic Freedom in Benin and Ghana
institutional qualities in Benin and Ghana. Although both countries dramatically
improve their de jure political institutions measured by polity score and Freedom
House indicators (Benin is actually better), only Ghana largely promotes the insti-
tutions that are crucial for economic growth. For example, like Figure 1.2 (follow
the similar process in Figure 1.1) show, the average Economic Freedom6 is worse
off after democratization in Benin, while is better off in Ghana. The same patterns
also exist in other growth-enhancing institutions such as government transparency
and instability. In addition, on almost all dimensions of governance (WGI), Benin
ranks the bottom when is compared with other stable democratic countries in Africa
(Pinkston, 2016).
6Economic Freedom of the World Index provided by Gwartney et al. (2013) is a composite index
on the institutional quality regarding the overall economic freedom.
3
Chapter 1 Is Democracy Good for Growth?
Their strikingly different performances on these institutions, however, are not sur-
prising based on our ideas, where Benin is categorized as Weak Democracy while
Ghana as Strong Democracy given their development conditions during democ-
ratization. As shown in Panel A of Table 1.7.16, GDP level, human capital and
the industry share are much lower in Benin than in Ghana at the transition time.
For example, the population percentage with secondary schooling was only 8.65%
in Benin but 43% in Ghana. The masses with poor human capital would have
weak bargain powers in Benin. It is difficult for the whole society to build sound
institutions to support the functioning of democracy even though there are good and
formal political institutional framework on the surface. Even Benin is considered as
a fully “free” democracy by Freedom House and its polity score has been above 6
since 2005, Pinkston (2016) finds that democratic governments in Benin are mainly
controlled by government insiders and political elites are largely closed to those
without preexisting ties to the state. In some sense, Benin is lack of the core of
democracy. As Dahl (2005) argues, the elite rule is democratic only when the
governing elite is open to individuals or representatives of previously marginalized
groups. Unlike Benin, Ghana has a more open political elite.7
Our study focuses on the period of 1960-2010 and uses within estimators based
on a dynamic growth model following Acemoglu et al. (2019). In the baseline
results using GDP as the developmental indicator, the estimated effect of Strong
Democracy on annual GDP growth is positive and significant, while that of Weak
Democracy is not statistically different from autocracy. This pattern is robust to
various alternative specifications. For example, when a more realistic indicator of
development is used, which combines information on income, education, natural
resource and inequality during the political transition period, about 45% of democ-
ratization cases in the sample are categorized as Weak Democracy and experience
no improvement in growth compared with autocracies.
7Pinkston (2016) finds that nearly two-thirds of members of parliament in Benin are government
insiders, while less than half are government insiders in Ghana.
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The key insight of this paper is not simply that development matters,8 but that
development at the critical junction of the political transition time matters in an
important way. During this democratization period, different groups in society usu-
ally negotiate with each other intensively to establish the fundamental institutions
that make democracy work, but the political bargaining power of each group is often
underpinned by its economic clout at that moment (Huang, 2012a). For example, if
democratization occurs at the time when human capital has already become the main
growth engine, the majority of population would have reached broad consensus on
growth-enhancing institutional infrastructure; in contrast, when development is still
weak, it is very likely that substantial conflicts between elites and the masses still
exist even after democratization, which may lead to political and social instability
and large policy swings between elitism and populism. So the economic structure
during the transition time leaves deep birthmarks on new-born institutions, and
exerts long-lasting effects on future growth beyond the typical transient influence
of economic conditions in any arbitrary period.9
8The role of development in democracy is discussed extensively in the literature (Lipset, 1959;
Martin, 1960; Barro, 1996, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004; Galor and Moav, 2006; Glaeser, Ponzetto and
Shleifer, 2007; Huang, 2012b,a; Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014; Madsen and Murtin, 2017).
9There are several reasons explaining why economic structures matter. First, economic
structures influence the payoffs of elites and the masses in political transitions. As Acemoglu
and Robinson (2005) argue, repression and coups are costly due to the disruption of economic
life. In a more industrialized economy, the link between buyer and supplier networks are more
complex. Their relationships rely more on investments in skill and relationship-specific capital. In
addition, economic structures also affect bargaining power of the masses in political conflict and
the redistribution for the elites in democracy. Human capital is inherently embodied in humans and
cannot be easily centralized or controlled by ruling elites through coercion. It implies that the masses
equipped with more human capital would negotiate with autocratic elites for democratization much
easier. Also, human capital is useful only if the individual makes efforts but he or she would not do
because of the high tax rates. It suggests that optimal tax rates for landowners are higher than the
ones for physical or human capital owners in democracy. Second, when people have more human
capital, it should be easier for them to resolve their disputes through negotiation and voting than
than through violence (Martin, 1960). Third, human capital, accumulated from school system, is
needed for courts to operate and to empower citizens to engage with government institutions. It is
easy to spread the information about the government’s malfeasance among educated persons. So,
it is not surprising that many scholars allege that democracy is difficult to sustain in an agrarian
society (Dahl, 1973; Moore, Friedman and Scott, 1993; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006a, 2008) also emphasize that better quality of democracy could be induced from the
better economic structures where there are more physical or human capital sectors and more complex
production relations in economy. Because elites have less to gain using repressive methods in such
economy.
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The paper is also in line with the institution-matters literature (North, 1990; Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), since the
developmental conditions at the transition time have to be embodied by institutions
to exert long-term impacts. Our contribution to this literature is to present a tangible
indicator of the overall institutional quality, namely the economic development at
the democratization period, which is similar in spirit to using one’s birth weight
to predict her overall health. The underlying insight is that, it is not any specific
institutions or any fixed dimension of their quality that matters per se, but their
germinating conditions that matter. Every dynamically effective institution must
adapt continuously in order to address ever-changing issues in a growing economy;
if the general human capital of the masses is not high enough to design, fund,
operate, and monitor the daily functioning of so many intermingled institutions
in a complex economy, then sooner or later the wheel of growth would come to
a halt. Results in this paper show that the initial economic development condition
can be used as an extremely simple and objective criterion to predict the quality of
democratic institutions and their effects on growth.
In addition, our study is related to a small group of literature that emphasizes that
the quality of democracy is greatly influenced by the conditions during the political
transition period. Yashar (1997) stresses that a high development of civil society
during the political reform time constitutes a necessary condition for democratiz-
ing elites to form cross-class coalitions. Cervellati, Fortunato and Sunde (2014);
Matteo Cervellati (2015) show that the violence during democratization has a long-
lasting effect on the quality of democratic institutions. Besley and Persson (2018)
propose that critical junctures in national political history are crucially important to
later development. There could be radically different trajectories for the countries
with similar initial levels of just above and below the threshold of the share of
concerned citizens.10 More broadly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) illustrate the
10In their setting, this type of citizens makes up a civil-society movement. These citizens not only
care about their private consumption but also have intrinsic preferences for seeing strong executive
constraints in place.
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importance of the interaction between small institutional differences and critical
junctures. Once a critical juncture occurs, the initial small institutional difference
triggers distinct responses. Our contribution to this literature is to emphasize that
economic structures at democratization leave permanent birthmarks to the function-
ing of democracy.
A first glance of data shows some preliminary evidence for our hypothesis that the
initial development during the democratic transition period has lasting impacts on
institutional quality. Figure 1.3 plots the relationship between log GDP per capita in
the year of democratic transition of a country and the average level of government
transparency after transition measured by HRV index.11 It shows that countries with
better development conditions during the transition period are more transparent in
public affairs after democratization. For illustration purpose, the 25th percentile of
these initial GDP levels is used as the cutoff value to categorize Strong versus Weak
Democracies. Significant differences between these two types can also be observed
from their distinct fitted lines.12
Results from more sophisticated regressions in this paper also confirm that the
quality of a broad range of institutions is indeed much higher in Strong Democracy
than in both Weak Democracy and autocracy, while there are no significant differ-
ences between the latter two. Even though the quality of democratic institutions
may improve over time through learning-by-doing (Gerring et al., 2005), we find
that in this kind of nature versus nurture competition, nature dominates, where
the quality of institutions is crucially shaped at birth and becomes consolidated
over time possibly due to history dependence. And specific political forms such
as presidential versus parliamentary or majoritarian versus proportional regimes
(Persson, 2005) do not have significant effects either.
11The HRV index (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2014) an objective measure of transparency
using the quality of national data reported to international organizations, which predicts well of
a country’s law and order as well as bureaucratic quality. The GDP data are from World Bank
Development Indicators and measured in 2010 US$.
12This pattern is robust to alternative indicators of institutional quality (such as corruption and
regime instability) and initial development (such as school enrollment rates and industry share of
GDP).
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Figure 1.3.. Effects of Initial Development on Government Transparency
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Salient differences between Strong and Weak Democracies also exist in other di-
mensions. For example, compared with autocracy, population growth is signifi-
cantly lower in Strong Democracy, but significantly higher in Weak Democracy.
Lower population growth is considered by Przeworski (2000) as a major channel for
democracy to facilitate economic growth, which applies only to Strong Democracy
in our results, while there are no significant differences between Weak Democracy
and autocracy in fertility and child mortality rates. Political instability and social
unrest are also much lower in Strong Democracy than in others.
Our main result is that Strong Democracy boosts economic growth but Weak Democ-
racy does not, which is driven mainly by institutional quality difference originated
from the initial development gap during democratization. This gives rise to an
intriguing question: Is it better for a country to hurry into a Weak Democracy now
or to wait and transit later to a Strong Democracy? Even though in reality political
transitions are often unexpected and thus difficult to be planned well ahead, it is
still affected by some common beliefs of society. For example, if many people
8
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believe that transition to democracy is absolutely better for economic growth, then
they are willing to incur great costs to facilitate such a transition as soon as possible
regardless of development conditions. In contrast, if instead they believe the results
demonstrated in this paper that only Strong Democracy is good for growth, then they
may choose to change political regime only when the economic structure becomes
ready for a direct transition to a Strong Democracy. Based on our simulation, this
may indeed be better than rushing into a Weak Democracy from the economic
growth perspective.13 The optimal sequence between economic liberalization and
democratization is also discussed by Epstein et al. (2006) and Persson and Tabellini
(2006).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next two sections describe data,
the dynamic estimation model, and the benchmark results as well as a variety of
robustness checks. Potential channels through which democracy affects growth are
examined in the following two sections. Some policy implications of our regression
results and further discussions are conducted in Section 6. The final section provides
concluding remarks.
1.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We construct an annual panel data set from various sources. The dichotomous
democracy index14 (1 for democracy and 0 for autocracy) is from Acemoglu et al.
13Of course, in actual political choices, a society has to consider complicated trade-offs other
than pure economic concerns. For example, some country may opt to transit to Weak Democracy
even at the cost of having slower economic growth in the long run.
14There has been an active debate in political science on whether one should treat democratic
transitions as events using dichotomous indicators. Huntington (1993); Przeworski (2000); Pa-
paioannou and Siourounis (2008b); Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010); Acemoglu et al. (2019)
are proponents of using dichotomous measures, while Bollen and Paxton (2000); Dahl (2005) favor
finer measures. The belief that democracy is an attribute that can be measured in all political regimes
leads to assertions that would appear to violate common sense. Like Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland
(2010) argue, “if one believes that democracy can be measured over all regimes, one has to be
prepared to argue that it makes sense to speak of positive levels of democracy in places like Bahrain,
China in the 1970s, Chile under Pinochet or Brazil during the military dictatorship”. We use a
dichotomous measure mainly because of two reasons. First, based on solid conceptual grounds,
we believe that democracy is not a continuous attribute of all political regimes (democracies and
autocracies). Second, given our research objective of estimating the dynamic evolution of annual
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(2019), which draws from several widely used data sources, and contains the most
updated information on political transition years.15 We slightly modify it by us-
ing a 5-year smoothing condition to mitigate noises caused by temporary regime
changes.16 The political transition from autocracy to democracy occurs in the data
when the annual democracy indicator of a country changes from 0 to 1, and this
specific year is denoted as the transition year t0.
The democracy index captures the main characteristics of electoral democracies,
but leaves out other important institutional quality that may crucially affect growth,
such as information transparency, the rule of law, or corruption. This motivates us
to refine it by creating two sub-types of democracy, where Strong Democracy has
strong institutions that promote growth, while Weak Democracy, in contrast, has
weak institutions. Such categorization, though clear and desirable conceptually, is
difficult to implement empirically because of the complexity of institutions. The
innovation of our approach is to measure it indirectly, where the intuition is similar
to using birth weight to predict a person’s overall health. Even though the prediction
is far from perfect, it is much better than no information at all.
Our basic hypothesis is that the developmental condition at this transition year
(which corresponds to a person’s birth weight) is of fundamental importance in
affecting the long-term quality of a broad range of institutions (which corresponds
to a person’s overall health). If this is true, then we can use an appropriate threshold
growth during democratic transitions, it is crucial to identify the beginning of each democratization
process. While our benchmark metric is dichotomous, in the appendix, we also allow the degree of
de jure qualities of political institution (proxied by polity score or Freedom House score [normalized
between 0 and 1]) in periods of democracy (i.e., when the democratization dichotomous variable is
equal to one) to affect the performance of democracy on economic growth. Our results still hold.
15To reduce measurement error, Acemoglu et al. (2019) set a strict criterion and classify the
country as democratic one only if Freedom House codes it as “Free”or “Partially Free,” and Polity
IV assigns it a positive score. They further revise the suspicious cases using other data sources. The
regression results also support their claim that the alternative measures are more heavily affected by
measurement error than their consolidated measure.
16Such smoothing is also adopted by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005); Persson and Tabellini (2006,
2007); Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a). Since it affects only a few countries, the main results
are similar if the original data set is used. Alternative democracy data, including Polity IV, CGV
(Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010), BMR (Boix, Miller and Rosato, 2013), and PS (Papaioannou
and Siourounis, 2008b) are used for robustness checks.
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of development in the transition year t0 to categorize a democracy into either Strong
or Weak group, and verify empirically the validity of such categorization.17
Specifically, two dummy variables DStrongit and DWeakit are created to denote
Strong Democracy and Weak Democracy respectively in the following, where Developmenti,t0
is the development indicator for country i at the political transition time t0.
DStrongit =

1 if Democracyit = 1 and Developmenti,t0 > T hreshold,
0 Otherwise.
DWeakit =

1 if Democracyit = 1 and Developmenti,t0 ≤ T hreshold,
0 Otherwise.
The usual developmental indicators for solid democratization include per capita
GDP, education, and industry share of GDP (Lipset, 1959; Huang, 2012a). Due
to uneven data availability across countries and spanning several decades, the most
widely available variable, GDP per capita from WDI, is used as the benchmark
17There are several reasons supporting to use these two types of democracy instead of democracy
and the interaction term built by the development indicator for our study. First, we emphasize that
the improvements of institutional qualities need some minimum level of development. Several
theoretical models (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a; Robinson, 2008; Besley and Persson, 2018)
propose that democracy functionally works as long as the power of the masses is larger than elites’
in political equilibrium. It implies that countries with similar initial levels of just above and below
the threshold of some condition can have radically different trajectories. Second, previous empirical
studies, such as Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2007a), that fail to find the robust heterogeneous
effect of democracy by using interaction term in regression also motivate us to try the different
strategy. Recently, Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019) question the rationality of estimates
from Multiplicative Interaction Models. They find that the potential assumptions of these models,
such as a linear interaction effect that changes at a constant rate with the moderator, are often fragile.
Instead of using standard multiplicative interaction model, they suggest that it is better to apply more
flexible models, such as the binning estimator, to explore the conditional marginal effects. Third,
according to our argument, development conditions at democratization influence the institutional
qualities in democracy, through which affect economic performance. It may be difficult for the
well-development country to greatly improve its qualities of institution by democratization because
of reduced room for progress. Generally, great economic development conditions at democratization
are more likely to have sound institutions. Thus, it is hard to advance by much when the institutional
qualities in the country are not far from the top. Empirically, we also run regressions by controlling
for democracy and its interaction with initial development conditions. The coefficients of these two
are positive but insignificant in most cases.
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indicator for development18, while others are shown in the robustness check. The
threshold to distinguish the two democratic types is essentially an empirical matter,
which may vary with the specific developmental indicator used in estimation. So we
typically report estimation results for a wide range of cutoffs as possible thresholds,
where the cutoff yielding the most significant difference between the two types of
democracy is used as the main threshold to anchor discussion and interpretation of
results.
The main dependent variable Growth is the annual log difference of real per capita
GDP from the 2015 edition of World Bank Development Indicators (WDI for short),
which covers 171 countries from 1960 to 2010. Democratic transitions during this
era are often considered as the Third-Wave democratization (Huntington, 1993),
which exhibits some common features that are distinct from earlier waves. A few
countries in this wave made political transitions before 1960 and thus have no GDP
data in the transition year from WDI, which are difficult to categorize based on
our criterion; dropping them as missing observations reduces the main sample to
153 countries.19 The so-called old democratic countries, which became democracy
before World War II and had never changed political regime in the sample years
from 1960 to 2010, are categorized as Strong Democracy directly by definition.
Robustness checks show that excluding them does not affect the main results, which
are driven mostly by transitions in the Third-Wave democratization.20
18The Skeptics may question whether it is possible to use this extremely simple and rough crite-
rion, GDP per capital at democratization, to distinguish Strong Democracy and Weak Democracy.
This method definitely neglects many other factors (For example, geopolitical, ideological, and other
ultra-economic elements.). In addition, higher GDP per capita does not definitely mean that the
whole economy is human capital driving. Many resource-abundant countries are also relatively
rich. Also, GDP per capita has no information on the distribution of income, which also influences
the bargaining powers between the masses and elites. Ignoring these factors would, more or less,
make our grouping strategy less clear-cut and weaken the differences between Strong and Weak
Democracy. In other words, it would potentially make their differences on economic growth smaller
and less significant. Since we find that Strong and Weak Democracy have significantly different
effects on growth in regressions, this concern should be less important. Furthermore, to make up the
shortcomings of using GDP as the single criterion, we also use other development indicators related
to economic structures as criteria to categorize different types of democracy.
19Results are similar if filling the missing data with GDP values in 1960 or from other data
sources.
20The within estimators used in the recent literature are mainly determined by countries with
political regime changes during the sample period. So those without any political changes would
have little effect on the estimated coefficients.
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Significant differences between the two types of democracies are indeed evident
in Table 1.7.1, which presents descriptive statistics of the main economic, demo-
graphic and institutional variables separately for Strong and Weak Democracies
as well as autocracies.21 Countries with Strong Democracy are on average more
educated, having more market reforms, more open to trade, and having higher GDP
per capita, higher investment, lower income inequality, lower rates of fertility, lower
child mortality, and lower population growth than those with Weak Democracy. Not
surprisingly, Strong Democracies also have better quality institutions as indicated by
higher levels of economic freedom, better legal infrastructure, more transparency,
higher political stability, less corruption, less social unrest and violence. The same
pattern also applies to comparison between Strong Democracy and autocracy.
Differences between Weak Democracy and autocracy, however, are not so clear-
cut. It is interesting to note that Weak Democracies are poorer, and have higher
Gini coefficients, lower secondary enrollments and higher child mortality rates than
autocracies, even though they have more economic freedom and market reforms. A
related observation is that Weak Democracies also have worse legal infrastructure,
higher corruption level, and higher political instability than autocracies.
1.3. Baseline Results
The effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP growth are estimated using
the following dynamic growth model with fixed country and time effects:
git = βSDStrongit +βW DWeakit +
3
∑
j=1
α jgit− j +ϕyit−4+λi+δt + εit . (1.1)
The dependent variable git is the growth rate of per capita GDP in country i at time t,
defined by git = 100∗ (yit−yit−1) as in the literature, where y is natural logarithmic
21The threshold used is the 25th percentile (p25) of GDP per capita levels of all democratic
countries during their transition times. Among the 88 democratization cases in the data, 66 are
categorized as Strong Democracy, while the rest 22 as Weak Democracy. The full list of detailed
definition and source of all variables are in the Online Appendix.
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form of GDP per capita. DStrongit and DWeakit are dummy variables defined earlier
indicating Strong and Weak Democracies respectively. The dynamic process of
growth is captured by three lags of GDP growth rate as well as a four-period lag of
GDP, yit−4.22 The impact of any time-invariant country-specific characteristics such
as geographic location, history, or culture is absorbed by country dummies λi, while
any global trends of GDP growth are captured by year dummies δt . The residual
term εit includes all other time-varying unobservable shocks to GDP growth, which
are assumed to be orthogonal to democratic types conditional on the full list of
control variables. Then the coefficients βS and βW can be estimated using the
standard within estimator, which is shown to have consistent results compared with
a range of alternative estimation methods in Acemoglu et al. (2019).
The dynamic structure of this model follows Acemoglu et al. (2019), except that
the growth rate is used here instead of GDP level.23 The model specification also
shares similarity with Persson (2005) where multiple dummy variables of demo-
cratic forms are used. To deal with potential serial correlations, we follow the recent
literature (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008a; Madsen, Raschky and Skali, 2015)
to use clustered standard errors at the country level in all regressions.
22Sufficiently many lags of growth rates need to be included to eliminate the residual serial
correlation in the error term, especially to remove the influence of the dip in growth rate that precedes
democratization (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008a; Acemoglu et al., 2019). Results are similar
when more than three lags of growth rates are used.
23Both variables would lead to identical estimates of democracy coefficients. Their equivalence
is shown below. Equation (1.1) can be rewritten as
yit − yit−1 = βSDStrongit +βW DWeakit +
3
∑
j=1
α j(yit− j− yit− j−1)+ϕyit−4+λi+δt + εit ,
which after re-arranging terms becomes
yit = βSDStrongit +βW DWeakit +
4
∑
j=1
γ jyit− j +λi+δt + εit ,
where γ j can be derived from α j and ϕ .
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1.3.1. Using GDP as Development Indicator
Estimation results based on Equation (1.1) are shown in Table 1.7.2, where per
capita GDP in the political transition year is used as the economic development in-
dicator to categorize Strong versus Weak Democracy.24 In Column (3), for instance,
when the threshold is set at the 25th percentile (p25), the estimated coefficient of
Strong Democracy is 1.394, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, while
that of Weak Democracy, 0.048, is much smaller and insignificant. The results are
quite similar when the threshold is lower, such as 20% in Column (2) and 15% in
Column (1), while the differences between the two groups become smaller and less
significant when the cutoffs are at higher levels. These results suggest that if the
economic development in the political transitional year didn’t pass a certain level,
democracy per se does not facilitate growth, and in this specific case, 25% of per
capita GDP seems to be the appropriate threshold, which is about 900 US dollars
measured in year 2010.
For comparison, the last column uses a single democracy dummy; its estimated
coefficient 0.919 is similar as in Acemoglu et al. (2019), which lies in-between those
of Strong and Weak Democracies. In all columns, the coefficients of three lagged
growth rates are significantly positive but well below 1, confirming the importance
of the dynamic structure. The coefficients of yit−4 (4-year lagged GDP per capita)
are always statistically negative, indicating the existence of conditional convergence
in economic growth.
Using estimates in Column (3) as the benchmark, the long run effect of a permanent
transition to Strong Democracy increases GDP per capita by 35.56%, while the
effect of a Weak Democracy is only 1.22%.25 This large discrepancy in growth
24We also use per capita GDP residual at democratization to group these two types of democracy.
The residual information is obtained by removing the year effects through the regression. This
process could further reduce the concern that per capita GDP is not comparable in different time or
it tends to autocratically grow over time. The baseline results are quite similar to the ones in Table
1.7.2. See the appendix.
25The estimated long run effect of democracy is 21.24% in Acemoglu et al. (2019). The formula
derivation is in the appendix.
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effects among democratic countries suggests that a more careful categorization is
warranted; without appropriate developmental readiness, switching to democracy
may not facilitate economic growth.
1.3.2. Alternative Development Indicators
Table 1.7.3 shows regression results using alternative indicators of economic devel-
opment during the political transition period to categorize the two types of democra-
cies, including two education variables, natural resource share of GDP, the industry
share of GDP, and income inequality. The overall results are quite similar to those
in Table 1.7.2.
The first panel uses Secondary Enrollment Ratio as the indicator; significantly dif-
ferent effects on growth between Strong and Weak Democracies exist for almost
all cutoff levels from the 10th to 50th percentile, where the coefficients of Strong
Democracy are always positive and significant (from 1.044 in Column (1) to 1.638
in Column (9)), while those of Weak Democracy are not statistically different from
zero across the board, even negative when the cutoffs are below the 20th percentile.
These results are almost perfectly replicated in the second panel where Tertiary
Enrollment Ratio is used. For example, results in Column (9) suggest that if a
country’s tertiary enrollment rate was below the sample median in the transition
year, democracy has no significant effect on growth, while in sharp contrast, those
with higher enrollment rates would enjoy an average of 1.404 percentage points
increase of economic growth rate per year. These empirical estimates are in line
with theoretical models emphasizing the crucial importance of human capital in the
process of industrialization and democratization (Glaeser et al., 2004; Galor, 2007;
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007; Huang, 2012a; Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014;
Madsen and Murtin, 2017), suggesting that democracies without adequate mass
education are not likely to improve economic growth.
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Another commonly used indicator for economic development is the income share of
natural resources in the economy. Countries with more advanced economy would
rely more on human capital than oil, mineral or other natural resource, whereas
those with heavy reliance on raw materials tend to gravitate towards rent-seeking
activities and institutions.26 To be consistent with other developmental indicators,
we use (1 - Natural Resources Revenue Share of GDP) in the third panel. A striking
difference between Strong and Weak Democracies is observed in Column (2) where
their coefficients are respectively 1.188 and -1.319, both statistically significant.
That is, democracy substantially reduces economic growth in countries among the
top 15 percentile of reliance on natural resources. And countries above the median
in natural resource dependence see no significant improvement on growth from
democracy. These results are very similar to those using enrollment rates above.
The next panel uses the Industry Share of GDP as the indicator. The most significant
difference is observed in Column (1) with 10% as cutoff, where the estimated
effect of Strong Democracy on growth is 1.038, while that of Weak Democracy
is -1.533, and both are significant. The effects are always positive and significant
for Strong Democracy but insignificant for Weak Democracy in the other columns,
even though the differences become less significant when the cutoffs are higher and
thus the between-group gap becomes smaller.27
High economic inequality is often associated with low institutional quality and
political instability.28 In the last panel, (1 - Gini) is used as the developmental
indicator, where the net Gini coefficient is from Standardized World Income In-
equality Database (SWIID). The overall pattern is again similar to the other panels,
26This is widely recognized in the literature; see, for example, Sachs and Warner (1999, 2001);
Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2011); Frankel (2012); and Hodler (2006); Bhattacharyya and Hodler
(2010); Tsui (2011); Ross (2015); Farhadi, Islam and Moslehi (2015).
27Economic Complexity Index (ECI), like the Industry Share of GDP, also contains the informa-
tion of economic structure. ECI is a measure of the relative knowledge intensity of an economy. It
is built by considering the knowledge intensity of the products it exports (Hausmann et al., 2014).
Using it to categorize the types of democracy, the patterns are similar to the ones using Industry
Share of GDP, except that an appropriate cutoff is the percentile 15. See the appendix.
28See, for example, De Tocqueville (2003); Huntington (2006); Gradstein (2007, 2008); Sunde,
Cervellati and Fortunato (2008); Cervellati, Fortunato and Sunde (2014); Jung and Sunde (2014);
Krieger and Meierrieks (2016); Kotschy and Sunde (2017).
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where for countries with income inequality higher than the median level, democracy
doesn’t improve growth.
At the 25th percentile cutoff, the coefficient of Strong Democracy is 1.370 when
the indicator is Secondary Enrollment Rate, 1.182 for Tertiary Enrollment Ratio,
1.142 for Natural Resource Share, 1.038 for Industry Share, and 1.120 for Income
Inequality, while those of Weak Democracy are respectively 0.004, -0.066, 0.303,
0.222, and 0.326, all insignificant. Since the overall results are quite similar across
these indicators, GDP per capita in the transition year with the 25% cutoff will be
used as the benchmark to conduct other robustness checks; this choice is partially
because per capita GDP by construction is meant to reflect the economy’s overall
situation, and also because of its wider availability in data.29
1.3.3. Alternative Democracy Indicators
One reason for the lack of consensus in the literature on the effects of democracy
on growth is because the empirical results are often sensitive to how democracy
is measured. This is understandable given that democracy is a complex concept
itself, implemented in reality by various institutions that are difficult to quantify and
compare across countries. The dichotomous democracy indicator and the transition
year data used in the above tables are from Acemoglu et al. (2019), which combines
information from several widely used data sets. Table 1.7.4 shows robustness of our
results to these alternative democracy indicators.30
The first panel in Table 1.7.4 shows results using Polity IV data where we define
Democracy= 1 if polity2> 0, and Democracy= 0 if polity2≤ 0 following Persson
29We are aware of the potential drawbacks of using GDP as the only developmental indicator.
For example, high income may result from rich natural resources rather than better human capital or
more advanced economy structure. Later in Session 1.6, GDP is combined with other variables to
construct a more comprehensive indicator, and the overall regression results are indeed similar.
30Results using Freedom House data are also similar but not reported here since it does not
contain political transition cases before 1972.
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and Tabellini (2007) and Acemoglu et al. (2019).31 Consistent with the literature
using a single democracy dummy, a small and insignificant effect of democracy,
0.249, is reproduced in Column (7). In sharp contrast, for a range of cutoffs (from
the 20th to 40th percentile), the coefficients of Strong Democracy are much larger
and statistically significant, while those of Weak Democracy negative, and their
differences are significant. At the 30th percentile cutoff, for example, the estimated
coefficient is 0.74 for Strong Democracy and -0.626 for Weak Democracy, and their
gap 1.366 is similar in magnitude and significance to earlier estimates.
The overall pattern is similar in the following two panels using CGV (Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010) and BMR data (Boix, Miller and Rosato, 2013). Both
have dichotomous democracy variables. The coefficients of Strong Democracy are
much higher and more significant than those of a single democracy dummy, while
those of Weak Democracy are insignificant, much smaller, and sometimes negative.
At the 25th percentile cutoff, for example, the estimated coefficients of Strong
Democracy are 1.193 and 1.149 for CGV and BMR respectively, while those of
Weak Democracy are -0.294 and -0.204, which again yield similar magnitude and
significant levels in group differences.
The PS data (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008b) in the last panel consider only
permanent transitions to democracy, which exclude many Weak Democracies be-
cause they on average have short lifespans and quick reversals to autocracies; this
may be a reason why the coefficient of the single democracy dummy is much larger
and more significant compared with other data sets. In other words, the democracy
variable in PS data already weeds out the most fragile Weak Democracies and thus
is closer in spirit to our definition of Strong Democracy.32 But even in this case,
the coefficients of Weak Democracy are insignificant for cutoffs below the 35th
31Results are similar when a higher cutoff, polity2 = 5, is used instead. Detailed results are in
the appendix. The sample size is smaller partially because the polity data set does not include some
small countries.
32Note that their sample size 124 is much lower than ours. The PS data used here is updated to
2010 as in Pozuelo, Slipowitz and Vuletin (2016), where political situations have changed in a few
countries and thus some permanent transitions considered earlier have to be corrected. Our definition
of Strong and Weak Democracies, in contrast, is based on an ex ante criterion.
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percentile, while those of Strong Democracy are always significant, suggesting that
even for permanent transitions to democracy, development conditions matter for
growth.
These results suggest that it is important to look into the heterogeneity issue more
carefully in assessing the effects of democracy on growth, and our categorization
based on developmental conditions during the transition year is robust to various
indicators of democracy.33
1.3.4. Robustness to Special Cases
Table 1.7.5 shows several robustness checks routinely used in the literature. In
the first column, results remain almost the same as before when countries with
less than 20 observations are excluded, suggesting that the Nickell bias is indeed
small.34 In Column (2) the region-specific time trends are controlled, while in
Column (3) interactions between a dummy of Soviet-related countries and year
dummies of 1989, 1990, 1991, and post-1992 when these countries experienced
political transitions are included. In both cases, the estimated coefficients are similar
as before.35
When outliers in growth rates (observations with a standardized residual below
the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile ) are dropped in Column (4), the
estimated effect of Weak Democracy, -0.453, becomes significant, while that of
Strong Democracy, 0.801, is still positive and significant, and their gap 1.254 is of
similar scale to the benchmark result; this suggests that democratization without
adequate economic development may actually hurt economic growth if we exclude
the influence of extreme outliers. Results remain similar in the last column where
all controls in the earlier columns are included.
33We also run all regressions using these democracy indicators with appropriate cutoffs. The
results do not change largely.
34The Nickell bias arises from the lack of strict exogeneity in dynamic panel models (Nickell,
1981; Alvarez and Arellano, 2003), which decays sharply when the time horizon exceeds 20 periods
(Judson and Owen, 1999).
35Result are again similar if excluding Soviet-related countries.
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1.3.5. Endogeneity Issues
The dynamic panel data model (1.1) assumes that after controlling country and time
fixed effects as well as the past growth rates and GDP level, a country’s politi-
cal regime choice is exogenous to the other unobserved variables that may affect
growth. Although this is a quite reasonable assumption, it is always possible to
think about some elements that make democratic transition endogenous to growth.36
Since political and economic forces are typically entangled and clustering together,
and the democratization process is often conducted through a broad and far-reaching
transformation of the whole society, it is not easy to find very clean instrumental
variables to estimate a pure causal effect of democracy. The best we can do is trying
to utilize some reasonably exogenous variations in democratic choices.
One possible exogenous factor that affects political regime choice is the genetic
distance across countries. Countries sharing common ancestors are more likely to
choose similar political regimes. Moreover, genetically closely related populations
are tend to have similar traits such as habits, beliefs, customs and values. In addition,
there are more trust among people with common ancestors and they are more willing
to share information (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2009). So, genetic relatedness
is a summary measure for various cultural characteristics that are vertically trans-
mitted across generations.37 Genetic distance between two countries can instrument
democracy (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016).
Historically, many democratic transitions happen in similar culture traditions (Mad-
sen, Raschky and Skali, 2015). The recent example of democratic movement is the
Arab Spring in the countries with close cultures. Furthermore, similar to their pre-
36For example, the presence of certain extremely visionary and able leaders may help increase
GDP growth and push democratization at the same time; in this case, democracy does not affect
growth per se but the leadership quality does. That is, if in the past several decades, capable
individuals in autocratic countries are more likely to receive advanced education in the western
democratic countries and thus adopt their political regimes, then in countries where these individuals
become influential leaders, growth and democracy become hand-in-hand results.
37Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009, 2011, 2013) Bove and Gokmen (2018); Madsen and Farhadi
(2018) find that genetic distance, a proxy of differences in societal norms, customs, and habits,
obstacles the diffusion of development from the frontier country.
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colonial countries in Latin America, Spain and Portugal transitioned to democracy
during the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike other countries in Europe, these two countries
have very different political trajectories. This phenomenon could be explained by
the cultural proximity, which helps transmit the similar political ideas. For instance,
Australia and New Zealand share similar political, cultural and genetic traditions
with Western Europe; Latin American countries have close characteristics with
South European countries; Singapore is similar to China, and so forth. Through
personal communications between countries, democratization in one country usu-
ally incentives political reforms in similar countries.
Considering that genetic distance could obstacle to the spread of new information,
ideas and political movements between different countries, it combined with foreign
democratic situations should be a great instrument for domestic democracy. Addi-
tionally, unlikely linguistic and cultural distances, genetic distance is less directly
affected by political and economic environments. In particular, we instrument the
democracy level of a given country by the weighted average of foreign democracies,
where the inverse genetic distance is used as the weight.38
The 2SLS estimators are reported in Table 1.7.6. In Column (1), the coefficients
of Strong and Weak Democracies are respectively 3.61 and -2.631; though indi-
vidually insignificant from that of autocracy, their difference is again significantly
different from zero. Their magnitudes are larger than the baseline results, which is
a quite typical pattern in the relevant literature (Madsen, Raschky and Skali, 2015;
Acemoglu et al., 2019), consistent with the hypothesis that richer countries are more
likely to become democratic but their growth rates are lower than others. When a
single democracy dummy is instrumented, the coefficient in Column (2) is estimated
less precisely.39
38The Weighted Genetic Distance across countries from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) is used to
calculate the weights. According to Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009, 2016, 2018), the distance captures
ancestral barriers between populations. Details are in the appendix.
39Precision is increased in Madsen, Raschky and Skali (2015) with 10-year average GDP levels
and a much longer time horizon from 1820 to 2000.
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Another possible source of exogenous variation in democracy is the influence of
regional waves of democratization and reversal to autocracy (Gründler and Krieger,
2016; Acemoglu et al., 2019). We construct the average level of democratic indica-
tors in foreign countries within the same region, and use their four lagged values as
IVs for a specific country’s democracy level. The coefficient of Strong Democracy
in Column (3) is 3.883, significant at 5% level, while that of Weak Democracy
is 0.699 and insignificant; their gap is also significant. The IV result for a single
democracy dummy in Column (4) is again not significant.
In the last two columns, only countries that share similar political institutions at
the beginning of the sample are used to construct the regional average values. The
precision of regression results indeed improves a lot, where even the coefficient of
the single democracy dummy becomes statistically significant as in Acemoglu et al.
(2019); the coefficient of Strong Democracy is 1.967, again significant, while that
of Weak Democracy is -0.499 and insignificant.
The overall pattern in these IV results is again similar to the benchmark results,
where the estimated effects of Strong Democracy are positive and significant, while
those of Weak Democracy remain insignificant and sometimes even negative. So
the dynamic panel model is not much affected by the endogeneity issue and thus
provides a reliable framework to estimate the effects of democratic types on growth.
1.4. Further Evidence
1.4.1. Controlling Current Economic Development
One may wonder whether it is the general economic development condition, not the
institutional quality as proxied by development in the transition period, that really
matters. This concern has already been taken into account in the model setup, since
in all regressions we have already controlled an earlier per capita GDP level yit−4,
which should capture the direct effect of economic development on growth. But
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to further address this issue, especially to capture the potentially nonlinear effects,
we construct a dummy variable poor_dummy that equates to 1 if the development
indicator is below a certain threshold in each period, and 0 otherwise.40
In Table 1.7.7, several development indicators, including GDP, secondary and ter-
tiary enrollment rates, industry share of GDP, and urbanization rate, are used to
construct the poor_dummy, where a range of thresholds from the 15th to the 85th
of the relevant indicator in each year are used. In Panel A of Column (3), for
example, the estimated coefficient of Strong Democracy is 1.698, again highly
significant, while that of Weak Democracy is -0.179 and insignificant, where the
difference is also highly significant; the coefficient of poor_dummy is -4.299 and
highly significant, suggesting that poor development is hindering growth in general.
In Panel B of the same column, the coefficients of Strong and Weak Democracies
are respectively 1.574 and -0.315, with a similar pattern as in Panel A, while that
of poor_dummy is insignificant from zero. Results in the rest panels are in general
similar to the first two. So the baseline results continue to hold even when the
current economic development level is further controlled in addition to the income
level.
1.4.2. Compare With the Grouping Strategy Using GDP at
Alternative Year
To further emphasize that the development condition in political transition year is
more crucial than other years, we also use GDP per capital in fixed years such as
1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, etc as the key development conditions to group Strong
Democracy and Weak Democracy. For comparison, the same value (p25 of GDP
per capita in political transition years) as the threshold. We name this grouping
strategy as the “Wrong” one, while our baseline grouping strategy as the “Right”
40This variable is thus constructed in a similar way as the two dummies of Strong and Weak
Democracies, except that the latter are based on development in the transitional year, while the
former is for each year.
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one. There are four categories for democracies in these two grouping strategies,
including, Strong Democracy in both strategies, Weak Democracy in both strategies,
Strong Democracy in “Right” Strategy but Weak Democracy in “Wrong” one, and
Weak Democracy in “Right” Strategy but Strong Democracy in “Wrong” one. If
the information at democratization is more important, we should observe that the
coefficient of the third case should be positive and significant, while the coefficient
of the fourth case should be insignificant. The regression results are consistent with
our prediction, which are displayed in Table 1.7.8.41
These results suggest that the development conditions in the critical junction of
political transition period capture something important beyond pure development,
which in our hypothesis is the quality of newly established institutions that are
affected substantially by the birth conditions.
1.4.3. Controlling Democratic Stock and Formats
Another reasonable conjecture is that, even though development in the transitional
time is crucial, the institutional quality may also improve over time after democ-
ratization through learning-by-doing. It is somewhat similar to the nurture versus
nature issue in child development. For the effect of democracy on growth, is it
possible that the birthmark impact of the initial developmental conditions may be
mitigated over time?
To check this possibility, we use the Democratic Stock variable from Gerring et al.
(2005) as an indicator for potential improvement of institutional quality after de-
mocratization. It is measured by the sum of each country’s Polity2 score from 1900
to the present year with a 1% annual depreciation rate, and we update it to 2010 to
match our sample period. In Column (1) of Table 1.7.9, the coefficients of Strong
and Weak Democracies are respectively 1.204 and 0.07, very similar to the baseline
results, while that of Democratic Stock is 0.005 and marginally significant. So the
41In 1995, there is no fourth case. It is also true in later years, which are not shown in the table.
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accumulated democratic stock is indeed good for growth, but its effect is not as
substantial as that of the initial development.42
An alternative direction explored in the literature is whether the specific formats
of democratic institutions, such as presidential versus parliamentary or majoritarian
versus proportional regimes, matter more than the difference between democracy
and autocracy in general (Persson, 2005). This issue is also examined here in Table
1.7.9. In Column (2), three dummy variables representing Majoritarian, Propor-
tional, and Mixed Election System are controlled; their coefficients are positive but
insignificant, while those of Strong and Weak Democracies are 1.492 and -0.46
respectively, again similar as before. In Column (3), indicators of Parliamentary,
Presidential, and Semi-Presidential regimes are included instead; their coefficients
are negative, while those of Strong and Weak Democracies are 1.635 and -0.004.
When all of these six dummy variables are included in Column (4), the overall
pattern remains similar. In the last column, Democratic Stock is further added, and
none of these specific institutional formats shows any significant effects, while the
coefficients of Strong Democracy, 1.477, and Democratic Stock, 0.008, are still
significant. These results demonstrate that once the initial development condition is
controlled, the specific forms of democracy don’t have significant effects on growth.
1.4.4. Controlling Economic and Demographic Variables
A common practice to check the robustness of empirical results is to control more
variables for the purpose of mitigating the omitted variable problem. But the newly
introduced variables may be bad controls since they could be part of the causal effect
we aim to estimate (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). For this reason, the more compre-
hensive model specifications may not capture the full growth effect of democracy,
though their comparison with the basic model illuminates potential mechanisms
through which democracy may affect growth.
42For example, if the polity score increases from 0 to 6 (the median level in Weak Democracy)
after democratization, the effect of 10 years democratic stock on growth is 0.287.
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Table 1.7.10 shows results controlling for standard growth covariates (Papaioannou
and Siourounis, 2008a; Barro, 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2019) including the trade
share in GDP, investment rate, inflation rate, government spending, and enrollment
rates of various school levels, fertility rate, and life expectancy. Specifically, four
lags of each covariate are used to capture the dynamic process of growth.
The overall pattern and coefficient magnitudes are again very similar to the baseline
results across all columns. Although the coefficients of all of these economic vari-
ables are not jointly significant per se, the 2nd and 3rd lags of growth rate variables
lose significance compared with the baseline model, suggesting that their effects on
current growth are partially or fully captured by earlier growth rates. In contrast,
when only demographic variables are controlled in the last two columns, these
earlier growth rates are still significant. The coefficients of Strong Democracy vary
from 1.050 in Column (6) when secondary enrollment rate is controlled, to 1.693
in Column (2) when the investment rate is controlled, all statistically significant,
while those of Weak Democracy range from -0.274 in Column (7) when tertiary
enrollment rate is controlled, to 0.32 in Column (8) when fertility rate is controlled,
all insignificant.
In summary, these results suggest that the distinct effects of Strong versus Weak
Democracy on economic growth are quite robust, and can’t be fully captured by
standard economic, demographic, and political conditions. This motivates us to
examine more carefully the potential transmission channels through which Strong
Democracy facilitates economic growth while Weak Democracy does not.
1.5. Democracy on Growth: Mechanisms
In the following dynamic panel model, the dependent variable mit is the potential
channel that may be directly affected by Strong and Weak Democracies. Following
Acemoglu et al. (2019), four of its lagged levels are controlled as well as four lagged
per capita GDP to capture the dynamic process of each variable and the dynamic
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effects of general development. The same set of country and time dummies are also
included. This model is estimated by the within estimator.
mit = βSDStrongit +βW DWeakit +
4
∑
j=1
α jmit− j +
4
∑
j=1
ϕ jyit− j +λi+δt + εit . (1.2)
1.5.1. Institutional Channels
In Table 1.7.11, we explore the effects of Strong versus Weak Democracy on vari-
ous institutional quality indicators, including economic freedom, legal institutions,
political corruption, transparency, and instability. The values of all indicators are
normalized between 0 and 1.
The Economic Freedom Index is a composite index on the institutional quality
regarding the overall economic freedom (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2016; Kotschy
and Sunde, 2017). It is composed of 42 variables in five general categories: size of
government and taxation; private property and the rule of law; soundness of money;
trade regulation and tariffs; regulation of business, labor and capital markets. Col-
umn (1) shows that economic freedom is indeed much higher in Strong Democracy
than in Weak Democracy.
Two legal indicators developed by the Cline Center, legal infrastructure and legal
order, are used to measure the rule of law. Column (2) shows that the legal infras-
tructure is higher in Strong Democracy but lower in Weak Democracy compared
with autocracy, though in Column (3) differences in legal order are insignificant.43
In Column (4), the overall Political Corruption Index is significantly lower in Strong
Democracy than in Weak Democracy, while there is no difference between Weak
Democracy and autocracy.44 Corruption often occurs where transparency is inad-
43Most indicators of the rule of law start much later (from 1990 or even 2000) or have smaller
samples, which renders the dynamic panel data model less suitable. In cross-sectional results in the
appendix, the rule of law is much higher in Strong Democracy than Weak Democracy.
44The same pattern holds true for each of the four sub-indexes covering corruption in judicial,
public sector, legislature, and executive dimensions, where the difference is highest in executive
corruption.
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equate. This is confirmed in Column (5), where the HRV Index of transparency
(Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2014) is significantly higher in Strong Democ-
racy.45
An important function of democracy is to solve conflicts among different groups
in a peaceful way. Too much instability would suggest a less effective political
regime. Several variables are used to measure instability following Aisen and Veiga
(2013). The Regime Instability Index reflects frequencies of constitutional changes,
coups, cabinet changes, executive changes, and regime crisis; as shown in Column
(6), it is much lower in Strong Democracy than autocracy and Weak Democracy.
The Within-Regime Instability is measured by the number of legislative elections,
fragmentation index, and government crises; as shown in Column (7), it is again
significantly lower in Strong Democracy than Weak Democracy, even though higher
than autocracy. These results suggest that Strong Democracy is much more effective
in resolving substantial conflicts than Weak Democracy.46
The society-wide instability is captured by two variables: Social Unrest (Acemoglu
et al., 2019) is a dummy variable where 1 means there is social unrest in that year,
while the Violence Index measures the number of assassinations, revolutions, and
wars. Results in the last two columns show that both indexes are much lower in
Strong Democracy, while Weak Democracy and autocracy are not different from
each other.
The overall pattern emerging from these results is very clear: The quality of eco-
nomic, legal, political, and conflict resolution institutions is much higher in Strong
Democracy than Weak Democracy. So the economic developmental condition dur-
ing the transition period indeed exerts significant impacts on the institutional quality
in many years after democratization, where adequate development during democra-
tization is crucial for democracy to facilitate future economic growth.
45Similar results are also obtained using other transparency indicators in the appendix.
46The effects of violence or turmoils during the political transition time on future growth are
studied by Huntington (1993), Cervellati and Sunde (2014), and Pozuelo, Slipowitz and Vuletin
(2016) among others. Exploring the link between development and democratization scenarios seems
to be a fruitful research topic.
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There are a bit messy for the effects of Weak Democracy on these institutional
qualities. Some institutions, such as economic freedom, violence and social unrest,
are weakly improved; other are either weakly worse like political corruption and
government transparency or greatly exacerbated like legal infrastructure. These
phenomena could be explained by the sea-saw effect. As Acemoglu and Robinson
(2010) discuss, there may be little influence on the general structure of institutions
when specific institutional reforms are implemented but no fundamental political
equilibrium changes. Since the masses have poor de facto political power in weak
democratization, it should be difficult for the whole society to build strong foun-
dations that make democracy works. Therefore, specific institution reforms may
be ineffective because elites could take advantage of a multitude of alternative
instruments to achieve their goals. In other words, without changing the power
balance in society or the basic political equilibrium, taking away one instrument
can simply lead to replace a new instrument.
The overall pattern found here also echoes the study of Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006a, 2008); Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2013). They propose that democ-
ratization needs not necessarily improve qualities of institution if the the change of
de jure power distribution lead to an offsetting change in de facto political power
distribution (e.g., in the forms of more lobbying, bribery, or brute force). We can see
that weak democratization does not significantly improve the economic freedom;
political corruption and government transparency become a bit worse. All these
may imply that elites make great efforts to offset the reforms after democratization
so that they can guarantee their de facto political power intact. However, it would
be less likely to happen in strong democratization because economic structures at
political transition time are better. Greater economic structures mean more physical
or human capital-intensive sectors in the whole economy and production relations
are also more complex. In this scenario, the masses have more political bargaining
power and elites have less to gain through repressive methods.
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So far we have provided the evidence of how different types of democracy are
related to various institution mechanisms and thus may explain their different per-
formances on growth. This is suggestive but gives no sense of their importance. We
do a simple test that includes these institution mechanisms in growth regressions.
If any of these were indeed a mechanism or mediator, when the corresponding
variable was controlled in the growth regression, the effect of Strong Democracy
would significantly reduce. The results are shown in Table 1.7.12. While many
mechanisms have little influence on the growth pattern, the Strong Democracy
coefficients are attenuated as we add economic freedom, government transparency
(HRV index) and regime instability index. Also, the effect of Strong Democracy
becomes insignificant when all institution-related variables are controlled. Eco-
nomic freedom in particular seems to explain the bulk of the positive effect of
Strong Democracy on growth (the coefficient on growth rate goes from a significant
1.394 to an insignificant 0.646). HRV index and regime instability index are also the
important mechanisms since the influences of Strong Democracy on growth become
less significant.
Besides institutional channels, we also explore the effect of Strong Democracy and
Weak Democracy on other dimensions, including economic channels and demo-
graphic channels.
1.5.2. Economic Channels
Table 1.7.13 explores some potential economic channels. As to be expected from
the lack of additional influences in Table 1.7.10 once lagged growth rates and GDP
level are controlled, differences between Strong and Weak Democracies are not
significant for trade share, investment rate, physical capital, TFP, market reform
index, tax share, and tertiary enrollment rate.
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However, they do differ from each other in other dimensions. Compared with
Strong Democracy, the probability of having hyper-inflation47 is much higher in
Weak Democracy, and the government spending is much larger, together with higher
primary and secondary enrollment rates as well as lower Gini coefficients.48
These results suggest that democracy without adequate economic development is
likely to face heavy populism pressure to redistribute despite the lack of means to
raise tax revenues (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; De Tocqueville, 2003; Huntington,
2006), which may lead to high inflation rates.
1.5.3. Demographic Channels
Differences in demographics are quite prevalent between Strong and Weak Democ-
racies. In Table 1.7.14, the effect on population growth is negative for Strong
Democracy but positive in Weak Democracy, both significantly different from au-
tocracy. The population growth rate depends on both birth rate and death rate. Inter-
estingly, Strong and Weak democracy have heterogeneous effects on them compared
with autocracy: birth rates are much lower in Strong Democracy, while death rates
are reduced more in Weak Democracy. So as a consequence, the population growth
rate is reduced in Strong Democracies but increased in Weak Democracies. These
results are broadly consistent with the populism tendency in Weak Democracies
discussed above.
The fertility rate is also significantly lower in Strong Democracy than autocracy,
so are infant and child mortality rates, while no significant differences are found
between Weak Democracy and autocracy. The effects on life expectancy of the two
democracies, though positive, are not statistically different from autocracy.
47It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if CPIi,t ≥ 50% and 0 otherwise.
48However, in Column (9) the overall human capital as measured by Aisen and Veiga (2013) is
much lower in Weak Democracy, which combines the average years of schooling in the population
over 25 years old, the returns to schooling, and labor force participation rate. Noticing the drop of
sample size in Column (9), we repeat regressions on primary and secondary enrollment rates using
the same sample, and results remain unchanged. The Online Appendix shows that Weak Democracy
significantly lowers the labor participation rate, which may explain why higher enrollment rates and
lower human capital stock coexist.
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Figure 1.4.. Simulated GDP Paths of Strong Democracy, Weak Democracy, and Autocracy
1.6. Discussions and Policy Implications
1.6.1. Timing of Democratization: Now or Later?
Our results show that Strong Democracy boosts economic growth but Weak Democ-
racy does not. This gives rise to an intriguing question: Shall a poor country
democratize first but into a Weak Democracy, or improve economic development
first to prepare for a later transition to a Strong Democracy?
A proper answer to such a question involves many dimensions beyond the scope of
this paper. Here we only attempt to provide some simple conceptual exploration
focusing on the perspective of economic growth. The growth trajectories of three
political regime choices (namely Autocracy, Weak Democracy, and Strong Democ-
racy) are simulated from 1960 to 2010 based on the baseline results in Column
(3) of Table 1.7.2. At the starting point of 1960, country j is independent but
under autocracy with GDP per capita at $400, and the threshold GDP per capita
of becoming a Strong Democracy is set at $900 (the 25th percentile). Results are
plotted in the following two graphs, one with real GDP paths and the other with
normalized paths against Autocracy.
On the Autocracy Path, the country never becomes democracy; the trajectory of
its GDP per capita is the dashed line in both graphs. If it chooses to democratize
immediately in 1960, it would follow the Weak Democracy Path along the solid
line in the graphs. Since Weak Democracy has little impact on growth, it is almost
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indistinguishable from the Autocracy Path. The Strong Democracy Path is the
dotted line in the graphs, where the country stays in autocracy for the first several
years, and then transits into Strong Democracy in 1968, the first period when its
income per capita is over the threshold $900. From then on it embarks on a much
higher growth path, surpassing Weak Democracy from 1969 and staying ahead of
the other two paths with more than 37% higher GDP in 2010.
So from the economic growth perspective alone, not rushing to democracy may be
a desirable strategy for countries with low development levels; it is beneficial to
improve economic conditions first, and then jump onto the Strong Democracy Path
of faster growth in many years to come.
1.6.2. A More Realistic Indicator for Weak Democracy
The main motivation for categorizing Weak and Strong Democracies in this paper
is to show that democracy has heterogeneous effects on economic growth. With-
out adequate development, democratization itself does not improve growth. Then
another question follows: how do we predict whether a country has the adequate
development or not?
In our empirical results so far, a single variable is used as the developmental in-
dicator to categorize Weak Democracy, which is mainly to guarantee simplicity,
transparency, and objectivity. But it is far from being realistic because each variable
alone can’t capture the overall development that enables a country to establish
growth-facilitating institutions after democratization. For example, even when a
country is relatively rich, but if the income is mainly from natural resources, or
if its people are still poorly educated, or if the inequality is very high, one may
suspect that it is not ready yet to run a solid democracy that needs robust and
enlightened public participation. So a more practical criterion should combine all
useful information together.
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There are many possible ways to combine various developmental indicators. Find-
ing an optimal way to do this seems to be a fruitful topic for future research. As
a first attempt, we use developmental variables in our earlier tables, namely, GDP,
secondary enrollment ratio, tertiary enrollment ratio, the natural resource share of
GDP, industry share of GDP, and the Gini coefficient at the transition period to
categorize a country into Weak Democracy if any of these variables falls short of its
specific threshold.49
Based on this combined indicator, Weak Democracy constitutes 45% of the sample,
and the main results on growth effects and mechanisms are again similar to the
benchmark. As shown in Table 1.7.15, the differences between Strong and Weak
Democracy become even more striking in most cases.50
1.6.3. Comparison between Benin and Ghana
As an illustration on the relevance of our results, this subsection compares the po-
litical economy situations of Benin and Ghana in West Africa. Both countries went
through democratization in the 1990s, and are considered as fully “free” democra-
cies by Freedom House, while their polity scores have been above 6 since 2005. But
economic growth in Benin didn’t improve after democratization, while the opposite
is true for Ghana. Figure 1.1 plots GDP per capita growth rates in Benin and Ghana
respectively after controlling effects of growth dynamics, income level, and the time
trend.
Such discrepancy in growth, however, is not surprising based on our results, where
Benin is categorized as Weak Democracy while Ghana as Strong Democracy given
their development conditions during democratization. As shown in Panel A of Table
49The threshold for each of these indicators is set at the cutoff that best separates Strong and
Weak Democracy in growth effect as reported in Table 1.7.2 and 1.7.3, which are the 25th, 20th,
25th, 15th, 10th, and 10th percentiles, respectively.
50The full set of regression results are available upon request. Honduras, for example, is
categorized into Weak Democracy by its high inequality and heavy reliance on natural resources
(Auty, 2001), despite adequate income and schooling levels at the transition period. South Africa is
another example. Both experience worse economic growth after democratization.
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1.7.16, the GDP per capita of Benin at the political transition year 1991 is only 610,
well below the threshold 900 adopted in our baseline results, while Ghana’s GDP
in the democratization year exceeds that level. Consistent with their differences in
GDP levels, both human capital and the industry share are much lower in Benin
than in Ghana at the transition time; for example, the population percentage with
secondary schooling was only 8.65% in Benin but 43% in Ghana.
The overall institutional quality is also much lower in Benin than in Ghana, which
is shown in Panel B of Table 1.7.16.51 In Benin, the average Economic Freedom
Indicator is worse off after democratization, and so are the other major institutions
such as legal infrastructure, political corruption, transparency, and instability. While
in contrast, most of these indicators become better in Ghana after the democratic
transition. Benin is also ranked at the bottom among stable democratic countries in
Africa on almost all dimensions of governance (WGI) (Pinkston, 2016).52
As the recent literature in political science and economics (Lindberg, 2006; Bank,
2007; Aryeetey and Kanbur, 2008; Bierschenk, 2009; World Bank, 2009; Polity,
2010; Bertelsmann, 2010a,b; Pinkston, 2016) has confirmed, the deep-rooted po-
litical economic structure has not been changed in Benin by its democratic tran-
sition, where the economy is almost entirely informal with low productivity, and
the politics are controlled by a closed group of elite as government insiders relying
on foreign aid and donations. In contrast, Ghana has robust private sectors that
are capable of supporting healthy political competition to facilitate broad economic
growth. A more disturbing observation is that other African democracies such as
Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, and Zambia are more like Benin than Ghana (Pinkston,
2016), all of which are also categorized as Weak Democracy based on our grouping
strategy. This suggests that the failure of democratization to improve growth is quite
prevalent in countries with poor development.
51To precisely compare the effects of democratization on these indicators, we have removed other
confounding influences from lagged levels, current and past incomes, as well as the time trend. In the
appendix, we directly use raw data for comparison, and the patterns are similar; the corresponding
indicators before and after democratization are also plotted.
52See the appendix for more details.
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1.6.4. Weak Democracy and Partial Democracy
The concept of Weak Democracy is based on its (lack of) ability to improve eco-
nomic growth, and the categorizing criterion is the overall institutional quality,
which is proxied in this paper by economic development in the political transition
period. It is different from Partial Democracy, which is defined from the political
side as any country with a polity score between 1 and 7 (Epstein et al., 2006; Pa-
paioannou and Siourounis, 2008b). Though motivated from different perspectives,
these two concepts are closely related. For example, the median polity score of
Weak Democracies based on the above combined index is 6, while that of Strong
Democracies is 8, where the share of partial democracy is 87% in the group of Weak
Democracy, and 57% in Strong Democracy.
This suggests that a country with weak development at transition time is more likely
to see no significant improvement in economic growth and to end up in a partial
democracy on the political side. Given that most democratization cases after 1960
are partial democracy (Epstein et al., 2006), and among them almost half are Weak
Democracy, their economic and political situations seem to have distinct features
from traditional democracies, and thus need more in depth research in future works.
1.6.5. Does Development Matter?
The main message of this paper is that adequate development during the transition
time is important for democratization to facilitate future economic growth. Ace-
moglu et al. (2019) also find evidence that democracy is more conducive to growth
in countries with more educated people than in others, but their estimated effect of
development is quantitatively small.
In order to facilitate a direct comparison, we use the model setup of Acemoglu et al.
(2019) and construct the interaction term of poor development and democracy
Interactionit = Democracyit ∗WeakDevit ,
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where WeakDev is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the development indicator
at the transition time is below a threshold, and 0 otherwise. The only difference
from Acemoglu et al. (2019) is the time at which development is measured: they
use a range of fixed years such as 1960 or 1970 for all countries, while we use
the political transition year for each country. In this specification, the coefficient
of Democracy is equivalent to that of Strong Democracy in our basic set up, and
the sum of coefficients of Democracy and Interaction is equal to that of Weak
Democracy. In other words, the difference in coefficients between Strong and Weak
Democracy is equivalent to the coefficient of Interaction here.
The results are presented in Table 1.7.17, where several variables are used to in-
dicate poor development, including GDP, secondary and tertiary enrollment rates,
natural resources rents of GDP, industry share of GDP, and net Gini coefficient. The
estimated coefficients of this interaction term are significantly negative for all of
these development indicators with appropriate cutoffs, and some of them have larger
magnitudes than the democracy coefficient, meaning that under poor development
the overall effect of democracy is negative. For example, in Panel B at the p20
cutoff of secondary enrollment rate, the coefficient of Democracy is 1.294, while
that of the interaction term with poor development is -1.562, meaning that the effect
of democracy in a poor development country on growth is -0.268. In Panel E at the
p15 cutoff of industry share, the coefficient of Democracy is 1.065, while that of
the interaction term with poor development is -1.920, making a net effect of -0.855.
These results demonstrate that development indeed matters.
The main reason why these results differ from Acemoglu et al. (2019) is that the
economic development indicators are measured at the transition time, while theirs
in an arbitrarily fixed year.53 So development matters most at the critical junc-
tion of the political transition time when different groups in society negotiate with
53Without properly considering GDP growth dynamics may also lead to biased estimates of
democracy on economic performance. For example, the growth effects in Benin and Madagascar
(Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005) become insignificant after controlling growth dynamics and past
income levels.
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each other intensively to establish the fundamental institutions, since the political
bargaining power of each group is often underpinned by its economic clout at that
moment (Huang, 2012a).
1.7. Concluding Remarks
Is democracy a better political regime for economic prosperity than autocracies?
This paper suggests that the answer depends on the economic development dur-
ing the transition periods of democratization when the foundation of democratic
institutions is laid. Countries already having an adequate economic structure for
democracy, which are labeled Strong Democracy in the paper, grow faster after
democratization compared with autocracies, while the others that are not so ready
and thus called Weak Democracy, do not. Based on a combined developmental
index containing information on income, education, natural resource reliance, and
inequality, about 45% of democratization cases after 1960 are Weak Democracy.
The analysis of potential mechanism reveals that Weak Democracy is more populist
in public policies, less transparent in government operations, weaker in legal infras-
tructure, higher in political corruption and social instabilities compared with Strong
Democracy. This lower institutional quality in Weak Democracy is determined
by the poor economic development in the political transition period, enabling it
to affect future growth well beyond the typically temporary effect of economic
development in routine times.
These results are consistent with both the modernization theory and the new institu-
tional theory in that economic development affects the institutional quality, which in
turns exerts substantial effects on future economic growth. During the crucial transi-
tional period where new institutions are established, the overall economic structure
has the kind of birthmark effects on the institutional quality. Once institutions are
stabilized, however, the direct feedback from economic development is smaller,
while the indirect effects through institutions become more dominant.
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Chapter 1 Is Democracy Good for Growth?
Some fruitful topics for future research include finding more accurate and practical
criteria to help a country gauge the readiness for Strong Democracy, examination
of the links between development and specific formats of democratization, and
exploring ways to help a Weak Democracy improve its institutions and growth.
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Table 1.7.2.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth: Baseline Results
GDP Percentiles in Political Transition Period as Cutoffs No Grouping
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Growth Rate p15 p20 p25 p30 p35 p40
Strong Democracy 1.111*** 1.279*** 1.394*** 1.258*** 1.233*** 0.906**
(0.339) (0.346) (0.362) (0.371) (0.398) (0.356)
Weak Democracy 0.219 0.079 0.048 0.496 0.615 0.930**
(0.484) (0.420) (0.382) (0.412) (0.401) (0.427)
Democracy 0.919***
(0.303)
GDP Growth First Lag 0.165** 0.165** 0.165** 0.165** 0.165** 0.165** 0.165**
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
GDP Growth Second Lag 0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 0.045**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
GDP Growth Third Lag 0.042** 0.042** 0.042** 0.041** 0.041** 0.041** 0.041**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
GDP Fourth Lag -3.904*** -3.903*** -3.920*** -3.913*** -3.913*** -3.862*** -3.864***
(0.783) (0.777) (0.779) (0.786) (0.793) (0.793) (0.778)
Coef. Test (p-value):
βS = βW 0.0955 0.0128 0.0039 0.1209 0.2303 0.9625
Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
Observations 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.151 0.152 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications. Robust standard errors for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the
country level are in the parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7.3.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth: Alternative Development Indicators
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Growth Rate p10 p15 p20 p25 p30 p35 p40 p45 p50
Panel A: Secondary Enrollment Ratio Percentiles in Political Transition Period as Cutoffs
Strong Democracy 1.044*** 1.139*** 1.294*** 1.370*** 1.271*** 1.371*** 1.318*** 1.502*** 1.638***
(0.381) (0.379) (0.389) (0.412) (0.425) (0.437) (0.462) (0.527) (0.547)
Weak Democracy 0.116 -0.15 -0.268 0.004 0.37 0.32 0.478 0.486 0.428
(0.713) (0.723) (0.558) (0.513) (0.481) (0.451) (0.431) (0.389) (0.382)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.2166 0.0905 0.0101 0.0202 0.1103 0.055 0.1279 0.0805 0.0427
Countries 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
Observations 4992 4992 4992 4992 4992 4992 4992 4992 4992
Panel B: Tertiary Enrollment Ratio Percentiles in Political Transition Period as Cutoffs
Strong Democracy 0.917** 1.074*** 1.070*** 1.182*** 1.240*** 1.206*** 1.387*** 1.377*** 1.404***
(0.360) (0.357) (0.372) (0.382) (0.404) (0.411) (0.434) (0.465) (0.500)
Weak Democracy 0.356 -0.169 0.11 -0.066 0.103 0.281 0.192 0.354 0.423
(0.654) (0.583) (0.557) (0.521) (0.434) (0.445) (0.403) (0.382) (0.373)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.4259 0.0472 0.1081 0.03 0.0266 0.0797 0.0198 0.0492 0.0729
Countries 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
Observations 4792 4792 4792 4792 4792 4792 4792 4792 4792
Panel C: Non-Natural Resources Share of GDP in Political Transition Period as Cutoffs
Strong Democracy 1.053*** 1.188*** 1.086*** 1.142*** 1.153*** 1.097*** 1.209*** 1.275*** 1.500***
(0.320) (0.319) (0.308) (0.316) (0.331) (0.337) (0.365) (0.372) (0.386)
Weak Democracy -1.105 -1.319* 0.289 0.303 0.460 0.667 0.615 0.580 0.459
(0.919) (0.703) (0.848) (0.692) (0.576) (0.519) (0.453) (0.449) (0.422)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0237 0.0009 0.3588 0.2456 0.2661 0.4491 0.2677 0.2051 0.0568
Countries 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
Obs. 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005
Panel D: Industry Share of GDP Percentiles in Political Transition Period as Cutoffs
Strong Democracy 1.038*** 1.065*** 1.027*** 1.038** 1.126*** 1.169*** 1.266*** 1.069** 1.149***
(0.377) (0.385) (0.379) (0.400) (0.402) (0.412) (0.440) (0.411) (0.437)
Weak Democracy -1.533** -0.855 -0.07 0.222 0.061 0.142 0.132 0.537 0.512
(0.638) (0.637) (0.892) (0.689) (0.666) (0.606) (0.546) (0.575) (0.530)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0002 0.0048 0.2284 0.2624 0.1359 0.1232 0.077 0.4069 0.3086
Countries 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Observations 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801
Panel E: Economic Equality (1-Gini) in Political Transition Period as Cutoffs
Strong Democracy 1.030*** 1.076*** 1.049*** 1.120*** 1.264*** 1.324*** 1.266*** 1.325*** 1.506***
(0.376) (0.391) (0.397) (0.418) (0.415) (0.430) (0.457) (0.464) (0.514)
Weak Democracy -0.184 -0.064 0.291 0.326 0.102 0.195 0.408 0.365 0.374
(0.424) (0.378) (0.478) (0.436) (0.490) (0.479) (0.457) (0.447) (0.398)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0121 0.0105 0.1541 0.1245 0.043 0.0553 0.1453 0.1037 0.0602
Countries 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Observations 4514 4514 4514 4514 4514 4514 4514 4514 4514
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates and the fourth lag of GDP per capita.
Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7.4.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth: Alternative Democracy Indicators
GDP Percentiles in Political Transition Period as Cutoffs No Grouping
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Growth p15 p20 p25 p30 p35 p40
Panel A: Democracy Indicator from Polity
Strong Democracy 0.429 0.535* 0.626* 0.740** 0.659* 0.760**
(0.311) (0.315) (0.317) (0.327) (0.341) (0.379)
Weak Democracy -0.632 -0.747 -0.679 -0.626 -0.358 -0.326
(0.685) (0.622) (0.537) (0.475) (0.456) (0.512)
Democracy 0.249
(0.271)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.1413 0.0545 0.0277 0.0132 0.0614 0.1016
Countries 128 128 128 128 128 128 128
Observations 4689 4689 4689 4689 4689 4689 4689
Panel B: Democracy Indicator from CGV
Strong Democracy 0.970** 1.064** 1.193** 0.942* 0.845* 0.756
(0.449) (0.484) (0.524) (0.502) (0.506) (0.505)
Weak Democracy -0.387 -0.297 -0.294 0.184 0.335 0.469
(0.458) (0.371) (0.360) (0.472) (0.476) (0.477)
Democracy 0.592*
(0.331)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0259 0.0189 0.0157 0.2486 0.4402 0.662
Countries 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Observations 4694 4694 4694 4694 4694 4694 4694
Panel C: Democracy Indicator from BMR
Strong Democracy 0.836* 1.080** 1.149** 1.159** 0.921* 0.801
(0.447) (0.487) (0.519) (0.557) (0.542) (0.553)
Weak Democracy 0.079 -0.244 -0.204 -0.004 0.359 0.544
(0.542) (0.465) (0.409) (0.402) (0.456) (0.463)
Democracy 0.691**
(0.337)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.2675 0.0442 0.0375 0.085 0.4164 0.7119
Countries 151 151 151 151 151 151 151
Observations 4957 4957 4957 4957 4957 4957 4957
Panel D: Democracy Indicator from PS
Strong Democracy 1.310*** 1.320*** 1.105*** 1.064** 1.053** 1.065**
(0.473) (0.489) (0.409) (0.427) (0.438) (0.473)
Weak Democracy 0.39 0.597 1.243 1.307 1.305* 1.246*
(0.651) (0.603) (0.903) (0.801) (0.747) (0.637)
Democracy 1.144***
(0.427)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.2095 0.2994 0.8799 0.7683 0.748 0.7969
Countries 124 124 124 124 124 124 124
Observations 4472 4472 4472 4472 4472 4472 4472
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates and the fourth lag
of GDP per capita. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7.5.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth: Using More Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: At Least Regional Soviet Outlier Including
Growth Rate 20 Obs. Trends Dummies Excluded All
Strong Democracy 1.398*** 1.229*** 1.135*** 0.801*** 0.701***
(0.366) (0.342) (0.341) (0.261) (0.262)
Weak Democracy 0.044 0.04 0.104 -0.453* -0.403
(0.381) (0.553) (0.369) (0.234) (0.309)
GDP Growth First Lag 0.168** 0.160** 0.165** 0.189*** 0.188***
(0.068) (0.062) (0.066) (0.017) (0.016)
GDP Growth Second Lag 0.043** 0.023 0.047** 0.040*** 0.027*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015)
GDP Growth Third Lag 0.045** 0.041** 0.046*** 0.014 0.02
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015)
GDP Fourth Lag -3.921*** -4.646*** -3.730*** -2.413*** -2.665***
(0.782) (0.745) (0.779) (0.317) (0.407)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0038 0.0376 0.0202 0.0001 0.004
Countries 141 153 153 153 141
Observations 5284 5419 5419 4879 4759
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.197 0.156 0.249 0.269
Note: Column (1) excludes countries with less than 20 observations of the dependent variable. Column (2)
adds regional trends. Column (3) adds interactions between a dummy for Soviet-related countries and dummies
for the years 1989, 1990, 1991, and post-1992. Column (4) removes observations with a standardized residual
estimated below percentile 5 or above percentile 95. In Column (5), all factors controlled are controlled. A
full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications. Standard errors robust against
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7.6.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth: Using Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth Rate Genetic Distance Regional Democracy Region+Initial
Weighted Average Political Regime
Strong Democracy 3.61 3.883** 1.967**
(3.363) (1.697) (0.833)
Weak Democracy -2.631 0.699 -0.499
(3.433) (1.833) (1.808)
Democracy 21.604 2.01 1.657**
(39.357) (1.390) (0.788)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0938 0.0875 0.1525
Hansen test (p-value) 0.1298 0.3934 0.0073 0.1475 0.016 0.0324
F Tests in First Stage:
IV for Strong Democracy 2.585 2.916 9.047
IV for Weak Democracy 1.500 3.562 3.326
IV for Democracy 0.736 5.783 12.53
Partial R2 for Strong Democracy (p-value) 0.0237 0.0761 0.179
Partial R2 for Weak Democracy (p-value) 0.0400 0.1460 0.1110
Partial R2 for Democracy (p-value) 0.0009 0.0426 0.1040
Countries 146 146 149 149 149 149
Observations 5,271 5,271 5,241 5,241 5,206 5,206
Note: All columns present results using the 2SLS method. A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in
all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates and the fourth lag of GDP per capita. Standard errors robust against
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7.7.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth: Controlling Development
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth Rate p15 p25 p35 p45 p55 p65 p75 p85
Panel A: Using GDP per Capita Percentiles for Poor Dummy
Strong Democracy 1.245*** 1.333*** 1.698*** 1.622*** 1.483*** 1.434*** 1.363*** 1.400***
(0.386) (0.383) (0.434) (0.430) (0.389) (0.351) (0.356) (0.366)
Weak Democracy -0.135 -0.094 -0.179 -0.103 -0.022 0.009 0.029 0.072
(0.404) (0.436) (0.465) (0.437) (0.412) (0.395) (0.387) (0.385)
Poor Dummy -3.765*** -4.533*** -4.299*** -3.362*** -2.661** -1.593** -1.049 -1.428**
(0.915) (1.231) (1.282) (0.927) (1.025) (0.713) (0.719) (0.556)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0056 0.007 0.0018 0.0026 0.0039 0.0026 0.0044 0.0047
Panel B: Using Secondary Enrollment Rate Percentiles for Poor Dummy
Strong Democracy 1.596*** 1.600*** 1.574*** 1.491*** 1.437*** 1.581*** 1.601*** 1.597***
(0.536) (0.537) (0.556) (0.531) (0.497) (0.511) (0.536) (0.537)
Weak Democracy -0.294 -0.311 -0.315 -0.266 -0.322 -0.289 -0.316 -0.318
(0.428) (0.425) (0.430) (0.427) (0.421) (0.416) (0.427) (0.429)
Poor Dummy -0.413 -0.103 0.218 1.225*** 1.708*** 1.267** 0.125 -0.139
(0.719) (0.439) (0.451) (0.426) (0.552) (0.508) (0.442) (0.321)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0057 0.0051 0.0072 0.0091 0.0058 0.0041 0.0051 0.0053
Panel C: Using Tertiary Enrollment Rate Percentiles for Poor Dummy
Strong Democracy 1.218*** 1.227*** 1.179** 1.164** 1.221*** 1.224*** 1.226*** 1.207***
(0.462) (0.459) (0.455) (0.477) (0.462) (0.456) (0.459) (0.455)
Weak Democracy -0.342 -0.421 -0.409 -0.370 -0.377 -0.394 -0.390 -0.394
(0.407) (0.400) (0.388) (0.399) (0.401) (0.408) (0.405) (0.409)
Poor Dummy -0.558 0.191 0.744 0.513 0.182 -0.311 -0.215 -1.129***
(0.362) (0.492) (0.598) (0.615) (0.581) (0.469) (0.491) (0.357)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0080 0.0049 0.0053 0.0093 0.006 0.0055 0.0056 0.0062
Panel D: Using Industry Share of GDP Percentiles for Poor Dummy
Strong Democracy 1.725*** 1.723*** 1.744*** 1.764*** 1.809*** 1.802*** 1.862*** 1.887***
(0.502) (0.500) (0.504) (0.519) (0.522) (0.520) (0.505) (0.491)
Weak Democracy -0.235 -0.225 -0.217 -0.220 -0.227 -0.230 -0.189 -0.167
(0.409) (0.417) (0.431) (0.434) (0.436) (0.438) (0.443) (0.437)
Poor Dummy -0.515 -0.469 -0.364 -0.690** -0.706** -0.689* -1.084*** -0.999**
(0.413) (0.320) (0.351) (0.304) (0.328) (0.352) (0.390) (0.498)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0013 0.0016 0.0020 0.00220 0.0020 0.0020 0.0015 0.0010
Panel E: Using Urbanization Rate Percentiles for Poor Dummy
Strong Democracy 1.394*** 1.424*** 1.394*** 1.354*** 1.363*** 1.395*** 1.427*** 1.396***
(0.362) (0.363) (0.361) (0.369) (0.355) (0.363) (0.374) (0.364)
Weak Democracy 0.034 0.024 0.067 0.034 0.016 0.049 0.036 0.046
(0.382) (0.398) (0.380) (0.377) (0.379) (0.383) (0.384) (0.382)
Poor Dummy -0.261 -0.609 -0.309 1.690 1.280* -0.098 1.132* 0.253
(0.777) (0.600) (0.852) (1.340) (0.751) (0.662) (0.675) (0.396)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0037 0.0033 0.0046 0.0050 0.0035 0.0039 0.0032 0.0039
Note: For each period, the Poor Dummy is equal to 1 if the economic development indicator of a country is lower than the threshold percentile specified
in each column, and 0 otherwise. A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates and
the fourth lag of GDP per capita. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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1.7.8..E
ffectsofStrong
and
W
eak
D
em
ocracieson
G
D
P
G
row
th:C
om
pare
Tw
o
G
rouping
Strategies
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
D
ependentV
ariable:
G
D
P
perC
apita
in
Fixed
Y
earto
G
roup
D
em
ocracy
G
row
th
R
ate
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Strong
D
em
ocracy
In
B
oth
Strategies
(β
S )
0.783***
1.085***
1.198***
1.292***
1.438***
1.402***
1.406***
1.399***
(0.287)
(0.329)
(0.368)
(0.362)
(0.378)
(0.384)
(0.375)
(0.369)
W
eak
D
em
ocracy
In
B
oth
Strategies
(β
W
)
0.306
0.302
0.145
0.196
0.271
0.086
0.031
0.044
(0.367)
(0.358)
(0.424)
(0.418)
(0.393)
(0.391)
(0.402)
(0.381)
Strong
D
em
ocracy
In
“R
ight”
Strategy
2.690***
2.852***
2.255***
2.284***
4.795***
2.553**
1.137***
1.149***
B
utW
eak
D
em
ocracy
In
“W
rong”
Strategy
(0.675)
(0.851)
(0.621)
(0.611)
(0.665)
(1.129)
(0.298)
(0.295)
W
eak
D
em
ocracy
In
“R
ight”
Strategy
0.871
0.810
0.487
0.599
0.639
0.744
0.202
B
utStrong
D
em
ocracy
In
“W
rong”
Strategy
(1.002)
(0.992)
(0.864)
(0.874)
(0.953)
(0.917)
(0.756)
C
oef.Test(p-value):β
S
=
β
W
0.2590
0.0723
0.0380
0.0286
0.0160
0.0069
0.0050
0.0042
C
ountries
79
83
93
98
114
123
141
149
O
bservations
3,625
3,793
4,153
4,308
4,742
4,956
5,284
5,393
A
djusted
R
2
0.136
0.153
0.112
0.112
0.122
0.132
0.151
0.153
N
ote:
A
fullsetofcountry
and
yearfixed
effects
are
controlled
in
allspecifications
as
w
ellas
three
lags
ofgrow
th
rates
and
the
fourth
lag
ofG
D
P
percapita.Standard
errors
robustagainstheteroscedasticity
and
serialcorrelation
atthe
country
levelare
reported
in
parentheses.*
p
<
0.1,**
p
<
0.05,***
p
<
0.01.
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Table 1.7.9.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth: Controlling Democratic Formats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Majoritarian Parliamentary All forms
Adding Covariates: Democratic versus versus of All
Stock Proportional Presidential Democracies Covariates
Strong Democracy 1.204*** 1.492** 1.635*** 1.717*** 1.477**
(0.358) (0.609) (0.461) (0.655) (0.645)
Weak Democracy 0.07 -0.46 -0.004 0.156 0.256
(0.376) (0.606) (0.441) (0.707) (0.694)
Democratic Stock 0.005* 0.008**
(0.002) (0.004)
Majoritarian 0.172 0.258 0.484
(0.640) (0.647) (0.635)
Proportional 1.192 1.341 1.299
(1.161) (1.190) (1.053)
Mixed Election System 0.363 0.706 0.694
(0.737) (0.815) (0.783)
Parliamentary -1.046 -2.415** -1.304
(0.669) (1.212) (1.006)
Presidential -1.263** -1.533 -0.26
(0.625) (1.125) (0.971)
Semi-Presidential -0.605 -0.623 0.433
(0.839) (1.197) (1.117)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0128 0.0046 0.0055 0.0369 0.1009
Countries 150 149 153 149 149
Observations 5222 3830 5049 3830 3777
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.105 0.133 0.106 0.112
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates
and the fourth lag of GDP per capita. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country
level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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1.7.10..E
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W
eak
D
em
ocracieson
G
D
P
G
row
th:C
ontrolling
E
conom
ic
and
D
em
ographic
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
L
og
of
L
og
of
L
og
of
L
og
of
L
og
of
L
og
of
L
og
of
L
og
of
A
dding
C
ovariates:
Trade
Investm
ent
Inflation
G
ov
Prim
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Tertiary
Fertility
L
ife
Share
R
ate
R
ate
Spending
E
nrollm
ent
E
nrollm
ent
enrollm
ent
R
ate
E
xpectancy
Strong
D
em
ocracy
1.574***
1.693***
1.422***
1.606***
1.259***
1.050*
1.449**
1.111***
1.306***
(0.537)
(0.489)
(0.386)
(0.487)
(0.471)
(0.576)
(0.720)
(0.375)
(0.353)
W
eak
D
em
ocracy
-0.185
-0.064
-0.143
-0.191
-0.217
-0.022
-0.274
0.32
-0.151
(0.377)
(0.382)
(0.408)
(0.392)
(0.389)
(0.541)
(0.637)
(0.383)
(0.414)
G
D
P
G
row
th
FirstL
ag
0.149**
0.200***
0.148**
0.154*
0.234***
0.217***
0.278***
0.157**
0.159**
(0.075)
(0.047)
(0.073)
(0.078)
(0.035)
(0.038)
(0.038)
(0.068)
(0.067)
G
D
P
G
row
th
Second
L
ag
0.027
0.007
0.037
0.021
-0.037
-0.026
-0.034
0.044**
0.046**
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.023)
(0.021)
(0.035)
(0.042)
(0.037)
(0.020)
(0.020)
G
D
P
G
row
th
T
hird
L
ag
0.014
0.015
0.025
0.025
-0.004
-0.046
-0.016
0.038**
0.041**
(0.021)
(0.022)
(0.017)
(0.020)
(0.026)
(0.031)
(0.031)
(0.018)
(0.018)
G
D
P
Fourth
L
ag
-3.617***
-3.513***
-4.479***
-3.549***
-4.773***
-5.049***
-5.790***
-4.285***
-3.802***
(0.698)
(0.669)
(0.955)
(0.674)
(0.748)
(0.926)
(1.153)
(0.799)
(0.789)
Sum
ofC
ovariate
C
oefficients
0.013
0.007
-0.007
-0.003
-0.006
-0.006
0.002
-0.516
0.023
p-value
(C
ovariate)
0.140
0.162
0.126
0.292
0.394
0.195
0.607
0.009
0.334
C
oef.Test(p-value):β
S
=
β
W
0.005
0.0025
0.0032
0.0034
0.0089
0.1498
0.0772
0.0975
0.003
C
ountries
150
146
153
146
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142
134
149
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O
bservations
5038
4696
5243
4895
3444
2594
2286
5286
5289
A
djusted
R
2
0.14
0.16
0.154
0.131
0.179
0.171
0.258
0.157
0.156
N
ote:
In
each
colum
n,
four
lags
of
the
covariate
specified
in
each
colum
n
label
are
controlled,
and
the
sum
of
their
coefficients
is
reported
as
w
ell
as
the
p-value
for
joint
significance.A
fullsetofcountry
and
yearfixed
effects
are
controlled
in
allspecifications.Standard
errors
robustagainstheteroscedasticity
and
serialcorrelation
atthe
country
levelare
reported
in
parentheses.*
p
<
0.1,**
p
<
0.05,***
p
<
0.01.
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1.7.12..E
ffectsofStrong
and
W
eak
D
em
ocracieson
G
D
P
G
row
th:C
ontrolling
for
InstitutionalQ
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Variables
D
ependentV
ariable:G
D
P
G
row
th
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
C
ontrolV
ariable:
L
egal
R
egim
e
W
ithin
E
conom
ic
Infra
L
egal
Political
Transparency
Instability
R
egim
e
V
iolence
Social
Freedom
-structure
O
rder
C
orruption
(H
RV
Index)
Index
Index
Index
U
nrest
A
ll
Strong
D
em
ocracy
0.646
1.624***
1.744***
1.710***
1.374**
1.239**
1.676***
1.267***
1.424***
-0.061
(0.422)
(0.489)
(0.475)
(0.402)
(0.593)
(0.513)
(0.547)
(0.467)
(0.456)
(0.950)
W
eak
D
em
ocracy
0.317
0.173
-0.173
0.029
0.348
-0.015
0.583
-0.336
0.154
1.022
(0.359)
(0.407)
(0.463)
(0.387)
(0.475)
(0.405)
(0.489)
(0.411)
(0.389)
(0.619)
E
conom
ic
Freedom
9.623***
9.398***
(1.681)
(2.025)
L
egalInfrastructure
5.729
7.208
(3.988)
(4.957)
L
egalO
rder
6.083***
2.058
(2.214)
(5.251)
PoliticalC
orruption
0.687
-1.118
(1.353)
(2.565)
Transparency
(H
RV
Index)
8.402**
5.843**
(3.208)
(2.884)
R
egim
e
Instability
Index
-8.727***
-5.122**
(1.758)
(2.288)
W
ithin
R
egim
e
Instability
Index
-4.357***
-2.550
(1.373)
(1.617)
V
iolence
Index
-12.015***
-2.887
(3.485)
(2.603)
SocialU
nrest
-1.433***
-1.071***
(0.283)
(0.323)
C
oef.Test(p-value):β
S
=
β
W
0.5370
0.0207
0.0046
0.0018
0.1610
0.0412
0.0691
0.0062
0.0252
0.3360
C
ountries
98
128
127
133
106
148
148
150
145
77
O
bservations
3,226
4,693
4,646
4,770
3,082
4,258
4,166
4,521
4,932
1,693
A
djusted
R
2
0.168
0.159
0.161
0.150
0.126
0.134
0.113
0.130
0.159
0.143
N
ote:
A
fullsetofcountry
and
yearfixed
effects
are
controlled
in
allspecifications.R
obuststandard
errors
forheteroscedasticity
and
serialcorrelation
atthe
country
levelare
in
the
parentheses.
*
p
<
0.1,**
p
<
0.05,***
p
<
0.01.
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Table 1.7.17.. Effects of Democracy on Growth: Development in Political Transition Time Matters
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variable: Growth p10 p15 p20 p25 p30 p35 p40 p45 p50
Panel A: Weak Development Dummy by GDP in Transition Period
Democracy 1.073*** 1.111*** 1.279*** 1.394*** 1.258*** 1.233*** 0.906** 1.002*** 0.949**
(0.322) (0.339) (0.346) (0.362) (0.371) (0.398) (0.356) (0.382) (0.400)
Dem*WeakDev -1.020* -0.892* -1.200** -1.346*** -0.762 -0.618 0.024 -0.136 -0.045
(0.588) (0.532) (0.476) (0.459) (0.488) (0.513) (0.514) (0.503) (0.488)
Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
Observations 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419
Panel B: Weak Development Dummy by Secondary Enrollment Ratio in Transition Period
Democracy 1.044*** 1.139*** 1.294*** 1.370*** 1.271*** 1.371*** 1.318*** 1.502*** 1.638***
(0.381) (0.379) (0.389) (0.412) (0.425) (0.437) (0.462) (0.527) (0.547)
Dem*WeakDev -0.928 -1.289* -1.562** -1.365** -0.901 -1.051* -0.840 -1.016* -1.210**
(0.747) (0.756) (0.599) (0.582) (0.561) (0.543) (0.549) (0.577) (0.592)
Countries 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
Observations 4992 4992 4992 4992 4992 4992 4992 4992 4992
Panel C: Weak Development Dummy by Tertiary Enrollment Ratio in Transition Period
Democracy 0.917** 1.074*** 1.070*** 1.182*** 1.240*** 1.206*** 1.387*** 1.377*** 1.404***
(0.360) (0.357) (0.372) (0.382) (0.404) (0.411) (0.434) (0.465) (0.500)
Dem*WeakDev -0.561 -1.243** -0.960 -1.249** -1.137** -0.925* -1.195** -1.023** -0.981*
(0.703) (0.621) (0.594) (0.570) (0.507) (0.524) (0.507) (0.516) (0.543)
Countries 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
Observations 4792 4792 4792 4792 4792 4792 4792 4792 4792
Panel D: Weak Development Dummy by Non-Natural Resources Share of GDP in Transition Period
Democracy 1.053*** 1.188*** 1.086*** 1.142*** 1.153*** 1.097*** 1.209*** 1.275*** 1.500***
(0.320) (0.319) (0.308) (0.316) (0.331) (0.337) (0.365) (0.372) (0.386)
Dem*WeakDev -2.158** -2.507*** -0.798 -0.839 -0.692 -0.430 -0.594 -0.695 -1.041*
(0.944) (0.740) (0.866) (0.720) (0.620) (0.566) (0.533) (0.546) (0.542)
Countries 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
Observations 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005
Panel E: Weak Development Dummy by Industry Share of GDP in Transition Period
Democracy 1.038*** 1.065*** 1.027*** 1.038** 1.126*** 1.169*** 1.266*** 1.069** 1.149***
(0.377) (0.385) (0.379) (0.400) (0.402) (0.412) (0.440) (0.411) (0.437)
Dem*WeakDev -2.571*** -1.920*** -1.097 -0.816 -1.065 -1.027 -1.134* -0.532 -0.636
(0.666) (0.669) (0.907) (0.725) (0.710) (0.662) (0.636) (0.639) (0.623)
Countries 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Observations 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801
Panel F: Weak Development Dummy by Economic Equality (1-Gini) in Transition Period
Democracy 1.030*** 1.076*** 1.049*** 1.120*** 1.264*** 1.324*** 1.266*** 1.325*** 1.506***
(0.376) (0.391) (0.397) (0.418) (0.415) (0.430) (0.457) (0.464) (0.514)
Dem*WeakDev -1.214** -1.140** -0.758 -0.794 -1.163** -1.128* -0.858 -0.961 -1.131*
(0.477) (0.439) (0.529) (0.514) (0.569) (0.584) (0.586) (0.586) (0.597)
Countries 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Observations 4514 4514 4514 4514 4514 4514 4514 4514 4514
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates and the fourth lag of GDP
per capita. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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2. Curriculum Control and
Innovation1
2.1. Introduction
Innovations improve the living standards of human beings by creating and intro-
ducing new goods and services (Schumpeter and Opie, 1961). Nelson and Phelps
(1966); Lucas Jr (1978); Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991); Gennaioli et al.
(2012); Jones (2016) emphasize that the human capital for innovation plays a unique
role in shaping the creativity of the country and promoting the prosperity of the
entire economy.
The foundations of innovation—curiosity, imagination, risk-taking, and collaboration—
are in our bones and part of our human nature and experience. Human beings are
born with the desire and potential to create and innovate, dream and imagine, and
challenge and improve the status quo. The potential can be suppressed or amplified
by our experiences (Zhao, 2012).
Schools should be the primary institution for the person beyond the family, and
therefore, the primary place that shapes the experiences the person has. Economists
generally agree that schooling helps people accumulate human capital and bene-
fits innovation (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir,
1I am greatly indebted to my advisor, Fali Huang, and to Jungho Lee and Madhav S. Aney for their extremely valuable
guidance and supervision. I have benefited from discussions with Luca Facchinello, Tomoki Fujii, Paoli Chang, Ryan Decker,
Yubo Tao, and workshop participants at SMU for helpful comments and suggestions.
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2006; Madsen, 2014; Cinnirella and Streb, 2017), but it is not clear what kind of
school education can best cultivate the quality of human capital for innovation.
Scholars in education emphasize that the types of education institutions matter. For
example, Au (2007); Bonawitz et al. (2011); Kapur (2014, 2016); Zhao (2017) point
out that tightly controlled standardized curricula and rigorously watched and fre-
quently administered high-stakes achievement tests tend to emphasize rote learning
and diminish students’ natural curiosities and suppress their imaginations. They
could squelch creativity in the long run.
This paper empirically explores the effect of one specific education structure –
curriculum control degree or the degree of governments control what children learn
in school – on innovation or creativity. I argue that such control is exercised through
two interconnected measures, as follows: (1) the development of centralized official
curriculum standards, and (2) the use of high-stakes achievement tests2 to enforce
such standards.3 More centralized official curriculum standards potentially bring
more unified learning menus to children. Moreover, implementing high-stakes
testing would push teachers to instruct students by narrowing the knowledge the
curriculum describes, especially when the achievement test performances are used
as the crucial criteria for students’ promotion, graduation, and admission.
Tighter curriculum control will spread rote learning, suppress children’s curiosity
and imagination, and impair the development of their critical and independent think-
ing (LeTendre, 1999; Doyon, 2001; Au, 2007; Bonawitz et al., 2011; Kapur, 2014,
2016). In addition, intensive high-stakes examinations and comparisons are not
favorable to the cultivation of their self-confidence (Loveless, 2006). However, di-
verse and open minds, curiosity, imagination, critical thinking, and self-confidence
are core elements of innovation. Therefore, more centralized curriculum control
2Testing becomes high stakes when the outcomes are used to make decisions about promotion,
admissions, graduation, and salaries.
3For common standards to be truly enforced, high-stakes testing seems to be an inevitable tool
(Hamilton, Stecher and Yuan, 2008).
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could lead to less quality of human capital for innovation and eventually undermine
the country’s innovation.
The regression results suggest that more centralized curriculum control is associated
with less national innovation, measured by the various quality of patent variables
and other innovation-related indicators at the country level.4 The results are quite
robust when I control for other important variables that influence innovation.
I also examine the within-country variation of occupational choices among immi-
grants born in the United States and in the countries of origin. These immigrants
work in the United States, but many of them receive schooling in different education
systems. This analysis further minimizes the effects of potentially omitted factors
in the cross-country regressions. My argument predicts that people receiving educa-
tion from countries with lower curriculum control should work in research-oriented
occupations, which require creative and independent thinking, more frequently than
those raised in the traditions of countries with higher curriculum control.
Using U.S. Census data, I find that people receiving schooling from less curriculum-
controlled education systems are more likely to become scientists and researchers.
Furthermore, to solve the endogenous issue and reduce omitted variables’ biases, I
use exogenous land productivity distribution within the country as the instrumental
variable (IV).5 This factor could be an important exogenous determinant that shapes
the political power distribution on education institutions between the central and
local regions during the early period. Current education structures at least partially
resemble these initial structures. Thus, I expect the country where there is a high
dispersed land productivity in different regions has a highly decentralized education
system, or more specifically, a low curriculum control degree. Considering that
4Non-patent indicators used to measure innovation include the quality of academic publications,
a number of top brands and innovative companies, and a number of famous universities.
5Exogenous land productivity distribution is measured by the standard deviation of crop yield
(measured by the standard deviation of the Caloric Suitability Index, CSI) in the post-1500 period.
This indicator is from Galor and Ömer Özak (2015). By focusing on potential crop yield, based
on agri-climatic characteristics that are unaffected by human intervention, they argue that the CSI
could be used as an exogenous proxy for land productivity. I employ the standard deviation of the
index as the exogenous proxy of the observability of land productivity. See Section 2.6.2 for detailed
discussions.
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these immigrants get schooling from their original countries but work in the United
States, the effect of this IV should mainly work through schooling instead of other
channels, such as political structures in their original countries. The two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression results are consistent with the ordinary least squares
(OLS) ones, suggesting that high curriculum control degree causally impairs the
individual’s creativity.
I give some preliminary evidence on the micro-foundations of curriculum control
for innovation. More specifically, I investigate the roles of curriculum control in
teaching practices, student learning experiences, and the formations of the individ-
ual’s beliefs and values on career related to creativity. I find that teacher-centered
approaches are more popular in countries with more centralized curriculum con-
trol. In such education environments, students have fewer opportunities to discuss
issues with teachers. They probably mainly focus on textbooks or mechanically
memorize what the instructor lectures in class. It is consistent with my finding
on the relationship between curriculum control and critical thinking in teaching
at the country level, which shows that more centralized curriculum control is as-
sociated with lower critical thinking score.6 Not surprising, under the education
with centralized curriculum control, students have the less positive attitude toward
learning and lower self-confidence. These eventually would be less favorable for
the development of their creativity. In addition, I also find that there are systematic
associations between curriculum control and the individual’s beliefs and values on
careers. In more decentralized curriculum-control countries, people are more likely
engaged in creative tasks at work. They tend to believe that it is important for the
career that provides the opportunity to use their own initiatives.
This paper makes several contributions. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first
study to systematically explore the relationship between the degree of government-
controlled curriculum and innovation or creativity. Gennaioli et al. (2012); Madsen
6Critical thinking score in teaching is extracted from The Global Competitiveness Report in
2018.
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(2014); Cinnirella and Streb (2017) stress the importance of schooling for human
capital and innovation. They contend that education will play an increasing role in
the economy when innovation becomes more important as the country approaches
the global technological frontiers. I refine their arguments and emphasize that
education structure matters. It is an independent factor shaping creativeness. Im-
portantly, decentralized curriculum control in education is beneficial for innovation
or creativity, while rigid national control is not. The indicator I build, curriculum
control index, can measure the degree of governments control what children learn
in school.
The study implies that the approach to reforming the education system should be
cautious. Poor international testing (i.e., Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study [TIMSS], Programme for International Student Assessment [PISA])
performances in some developed countries, like the United Kingdom, United States,
and Australia, have created incentives to implement some education policies, such
as national standard curriculum and high-stakes tests.7 These may be the misleading
policies because they could have negative effects on the long-run creativity develop-
ment of children, and then the country’s innovation. Clearly, the serious education
issues in some developed countries need to be solved, but the reform measures they
carry out should be circumspect. Directly copying the policies executed in some
Asian countries with remarkable test performances may be problematic. Although
these policies might promote students’ test performances, they may simultaneously
squelch the development of children’s creativity. Since developed countries are
already around the global technological frontiers, human capital for innovation
would be crucially important. Interestingly, homogeneous official curricula with
high-stakes examinations, as well as the rigid admission policies in higher educa-
tion, have already been criticized in many Asian countries (LeTendre, 1999; Doyon,
2001; Davey, De Lian and Higgins, 2007; Dello-Iacovo, 2009; Kamens, 2016).
7See Porter et al. (2011) for the United States, Polesel, Rice and Dulfer (2014) for Australia, and
James et al. (2011) for the United Kingdom.
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This paper is related to the studies that explore the determinants of inventors. Aghion
et al. (2016); Akcigit, Grigsby and Nicholas (2017) find various factors and circum-
stances have profound impacts on the probability of becoming an innovator, includ-
ing family backgrounds, rule of law, property right protection, culture, and so on.
This study adds a new and important macro-environment—educational structure,
especially official curriculum design and the corresponding exam policies. More
decentralized curriculum design with flexible evaluation policies would facilitate
more children developing the potential capacities to become inventors in the future.
My study also complements a small body of literature that explores the content of
education on the development of economy and politics. For example, Cantoni and
Yuchtman (2013) illustrate that educational content can play an important role in the
process of economic development. Fuchs-Schündeln and Masella (2016) examine
the impact of socialist education on the likelihood of the individual to obtain a
college degree and on labor market outcomes in East Germany after reunification.
Cantoni et al. (2017) study the causal effect of school curricula on students’ political
attitudes in China. Instead of investigating the effect of educational content, I
consider one specific educational organization, the degree of governments control
educational content, on the influence of innovation and creativity. Decentralized
curriculum control with flexible evaluation criteria would enhance and expand (or
at least not impair) human talents instead of standardizing them.
The only article I find that is very relevant to mine is Chang and Huang (2014), who
discuss the degree of centralization imposed on the curriculum on the country’s
talent distribution and comparative advantage. Unlike their study, which theoreti-
cally explores the endogenous choice of education policy and the two-way causal
relationship between trade and education systems, I empirically examine the effect
of curriculum design interconnected with high-stakes testing on innovation.
By exploring the origins of the education organization to build IV, this paper con-
nects the studies of the historical roots of the education system (Pritchett, 2002;
Goldin and Katz, 2003; Lindert, 2004; Gallego, 2010; Ansell and Lindvall, 2013). I
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show that political decentralization during the early time could be one of the major
factors determining the decentralized structure of education. This is in line with
the studies by Lindert (2004); Gallego (2010), who argue that the expansion of
education in Prussia and the United States during the 19th century was closely
related with the power balance on education policies between the central and the
local. To build a valid IV, I take advantage of exogenous differences in the deviation
of land productivity in the post-1500 period constructed by Galor and Ömer Özak
(2015). I find that the low agricultural observability (higher standard deviation in
the farming sector across regions within the country) is positively associated with
high political decentralization and decentralized curriculum control. It also echoes
the recent study on the historical roots of political institutions. The observability
of agricultural output at early time is one of the important factors affecting the
information collection cost of the ruling elites. This observability is shaped by
technological and geographic factors (Huning and Wahl, 2016; Mayshar, Moav and
Neeman, 2017; Ahmed and Stasavage, 2017).
By investigating the side effects of the homogeneous learning experiences of stu-
dents, I firmly confirm some educators’ opinions (Au, 2007; Liu and Neilson, 2011;
Zhao, 2012; Polesel, Rice and Dulfer, 2014; Feniger, Israeli and Yehuda, 2016).
They have criticized a centralized curriculum design with high-stakes testing for
having negative effects on learning, including curriculum narrowing, the spread of
the cramming teaching style, high pressure on both students and teachers, low self-
confidence among students, low interest in learning, and so on. These detrimental
effects on students will produce fewer creative talents.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the argument for how
curriculum control and innovation can be related. Section 3 introduces the data,
while Section 4 shows the baseline results. Section 5 provides a series of robustness
checks. Section 6 investigates the occupational choices of various ethnic groups
in the United States. It also discusses potential IV and provides 2SLS regression
results. Section 7 presents some mechanisms of the curriculum control through
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which affect innovation. Section 8 discusses policy applications, and Section 9
concludes.
2.2. The Economic Argument
In modern society, school has become one of the primary institutions that shapes
people’s thinking abilities, habits, values, and preferences, while it provides knowl-
edge and skills (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011;
Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011; Huang, 2012b,a; Ito, Kubota and Ohtake, 2015;
Meyer, 2017). The curriculum is the main medium through which the school trans-
mits knowledge, experience, and values to children and influences their develop-
ments.8 The nation-state, through a variety of political processes, exercises control
over what children should learn. However, there are considerable differences in how
states exercise this control. These differences, for example, include which level of
educational authority is responsible for designing the curriculum and what kinds of
policies are used to evaluate students.
A homogeneous curriculum could improve the likelihood that the same contents
are taught and the similar manners are delivered to students if it is effectively
implemented throughout the country. On the one hand, it contributes to the fusion
of people with different backgrounds and strengthens people’s common values and
national identities, as well as equips people with a few desirable skills; On the other
hand, too many common standards reduce diversity in talents. Being creative is
being different, deviating from the norm. But common standards ask for confor-
mity and tend to demand a uniform way of thinking, learning, and demonstrating
one’s learning (Zhao, 2017). The homogeneous learning experiences among people
shaped by the education system may be an obstacle for innovation. Because it is
8For example, Cantoni et al. (2017) find that a major textbook reform in China between 2004 and
2010 had the effect of shaping students’ political attitudes. The changes in the textbooks’ content are
reflected in students’ factual knowledge. Cantoni and Yuchtman (2013) illustrate that educational
content can play an important role in the process of economic development. Huang (2012b) argues
that what is taught (general or specific education) greatly influences one’s skills in a broad range of
tasks, including political rent-seeking abilities.
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difficult for people with similar minds to diverge into new ideas.9 Diverse knowl-
edge and perspectives are crucial ingredients in the innovation process (Kerr, 2008;
Stuen, Mobarak and Maskus, 2012), especially when technical bottlenecks become
increasingly complex; thus, the paradigm of solo geniuses has slowly been replaced
by that of large teams and networks (Hargadon, 2003; Barabási, 2005; Jones, 2009).
A centralized official curriculum is usually associated with high-stakes examina-
tions.10 Using external examinations is an efficient way of checking whether the
school follows the official curriculum.11 The exam would further strengthen the
link between the official curriculum and what children actually learn when the test
performance is used as the main criterion for promoting students to the next grade
or next education level. For example, admission examinations for universities in
many East Asian countries are widely seen as “the baton of education”, determining
education policies in the primary- and secondary-level education. They are the
yardsticks by which schools are evaluated.12
The interconnection between the centralized official curriculum and frequently high-
stakes and curriculum-based examination will bring more detrimental effects and
hamper innovation or creativity. First, unified official curricula with high-stakes
exams would lead to curriculum narrowing (Au, 2007; Zhao, 2012; Polesel, Rice
and Dulfer, 2014). The desire to perform best on exams carries the highest stakes for
students, but the schools receive the most attention and resources. Other knowledge
that is not tested becomes peripheral and disposable.13 However, the loss of the
9Insights from knowledge recombination theory suggest that more knowledge from distant
sources is associated with greater idea generation and creative attainments (Fleming, 2001; Saxenian,
2005; Agrawal et al., 2011; Franzoni, Scellato and Stephan, 2014).
10As observed by Clune (1993), and shared by others, high-stakes student examinations are a key
component, perhaps the cornerstone, of the centralized version of systemic educational policy.
11There is also evidence that the alignment of the curriculum with high-stakes achievement
testing may result in greater curriculum consistency within and across schools, ensuring a command
of agreed competencies and transferability of experiences across regions (Clarke et al., 2003;
Crocker, 2005; Jones, 2007).
12In fact, the selective examination for the university is so powerful that researchers believe many
educational reforms aimed at a more flexible and less pressured approach to developing students’
personalities cannot be fully implemented if the examination as the main admission policy is not
changed (Doyon, 2001; Dello-Iacovo, 2009).
13For example, Au (2008); David (2011) find that the high-stakes testing programs spawned by
the No Child Left Behind Act in the United States have resulted in drastic changes to the proportions
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principle of children’s entitlement to a broad, balanced, and rich curriculum may be
not conducive to cultivating creativity (Ravitch, 2010; Zhao, 2012).
Second, centralized curricula with high-stakes exam are usually associated with
a instructor-centered teaching style and rote learning method (Cunningham and
Sanzo, 2002; Au, 2008). Teachers may find it is more efficient to instill knowledge
and improve their exam performances by using the cramming style and drilling
through repetitive exercises focusing on exam questions.14 The widespread of rote
learning suppresses the development of children’s critical and independent thinking.
In addition, high pressures to cover the content required to produce passing test
scores override the desire to stimulate children’s imagination and curiosity (Zhao,
2012). Students under such education system have little freedom and opportunity to
pursue their individual interests and potentials. Lack of imagination, curiosity, crit-
ical and independent thinking would be harmful to cultivate the spirit of innovation
(Zhao and Meyer, 2013).
Third, Loveless (2006) points out that centralized education systems with high-
density examinations produce higher TIMSS scores, but students own lower self-
confidence. The loss of confidence may lead from what Feniger, Israeli and Yehuda
(2016) call “the power of number”. One dimension of the power of numbers is the
use of comparisons. It is easy to assess who is smart or clumsy by the number—
test scores. Students living test-orient environment could easily lose confidence by
intensive exams and comparisons. But, self-confidence is a key factor in the success
of doing innovative jobs.15 The loss of confidence as a result of pursuing test scores
of time allocated to different subject areas, with the content of the tests largely determining the
curriculum, especially in schools identified as being low performing. Barlow (2003) notes that the
social sciences, arts, and physical education have all seen reductions in the time allocated to them as
a result of the demands of high-stakes testing programs.
14For example, Cunningham and Sanzo (2002) find that high-stakes testing impacts negatively
on creative and effective teaching, leading to cramming for tests rather than instruction.
15Bénabou and Tirole (2002) emphasize the crucial role played by self-confidence in motivation.
Morale is universally recognized as key to writing a great book, doing innovative research, and
setting up a firm. Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) examine that firms with overconfident CEOs
obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research
and development (R&D) expenditure.
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would be detrimental to the individual’s innovation activities. From these analyses,
the hypothesis below is made:
• More centralized official curriculum design combined with more frequently
high-stakes achievement tests in the education system would lead to less in-
novation or creativity.
2.3. Data: Curriculum Control and Innovation
In this section, I briefly introduce the key indicator, curriculum control, and the
variables used to measure different dimensions of innovation at the country level.
The detail construction process of key variables and information on all the variables
used are given in the appendix.
2.3.1. Curriculum Control: Official Curricula and
High-Stakes Exams
I collect the information on the education authorities that are responsible for de-
signing the official curriculum and the for the student’s admission, promotion, and
graduation policies in primary, lower and upper secondary education. In terms of
admission, graduation, and promotion policies, I focus on the role of achievement
tests and collect the information on which level of educational authority designs
and controls examinations. As argued before, more centralized official curriculum
design combined with high-stakes achievement tests administered by a higher level
of the education authority would put greater pressure on both teachers and students
to concentrate on the materials the official curriculum describes, which, to a larger
extent, homogenizes children’s learning experience across the country.
The main documents used include the following: World Survey of Education—
International Handbook of Education Systems (published in 1982), International
Encyclopedia of National Systems of Education (published in 1995), and World
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Data on Education (sixth edition, published in 2006). I also use many supple-
mentary materials.16 By using these documents published in different periods, I
construct related indicators in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
I build the indicators to measure the degree of government control official curricu-
lum design and exam, respectively. In each period, I firstly construct O f f icialCurrit
to measure the overall degree of the official curriculum control, where i indexes the
country, and t indexes the time period. It is built by averaging the degree of the
official curriculum control, O f f icialCurr jit , in primary, lower and upper secondary
education, where j indexes the educational cycle. In each cycle, I identify the
educational authority that plays a key role in the official curriculum design. Next,
I find other lower educational authorities that also have influences on the official
curriculum. Based on the combinations between the major authority and other
subordinate lower educational authorities, I code the indicator O f f icialCurr jit .
There are two principles of coding. The higher level the dominant government, the
stronger centralizing force in the official curriculum, and therefore the higher value
of O f f icialCurr jit . Lower educational authorities are the decentralizing forces and
they tend to introduce heterogeneity in the official curriculum. Condition on the
dominant authority, the lower level the educational authority in the decentralizing
force, the stronger decentralizing force in the official curriculum, and therefore
the lower value of O f f icialCurr jit . Table 2.9.1 shows the coding process and the
corresponding examples in the 1990s. In each cycle, O f f icialCurr jit is categorized
into seven levels, where 1 is the most decentralized, 7 is the most centralized, and
2–6 are at the intermediate levels.17
Next, the degree of examination control, ExamControlit , is built. It is obtained
by averaging the indicator measured achievement exam controls, ExamControl jit ,
16These auxiliary documents are mainly used to supplement or check the indicators I build.
They include TIMSS Curriculum Survey Data (2003 and 2007), The Education Systems of Europe
(published in 2015), International Encyclopedia of Education (third edition, published in 2010),
World Higher Education Database, and Helms (2008). See the detail descriptions in the appendix.
17For example, the official curricula of each educational cycle in Canada and the United States
during the 1990s are the most decentralized, while they are the most centralized in Egypt and
Senegal.
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for promotions, graduation, and admissions in the three educational cycles. More
specifically, ExamControl jit represents exam policies within the educational cycle
(for promotion) and at the end of the cycle (for the graduation and the admission
to the next level). In each cycle, I collect the information about the educational
authorities that control examinations. There could be several examinations in each
educational cycle. Generally, each examination is controlled by one educational
authority. By combining all of these authorities in these examinations for each
cycle and identifying the centralizing and decentralizing forces, I can code the
indicator ExamControl jit . The coding process is similar to O f f icialCurr jit , which
is shown in Table 2.9.1. In each cycle, ExamControl jit is categorized into nine
levels, where 1 is no exam18, 2–3 represents high decentralization, 8–9 represents
high centralization, and 4–7 represents the intermediate levels.19 I do not consider
admission policies besides exams because it is difficult to know whether and how
schools rely on these “soft” criteria. In addition, it is challenging to find credible
data source.20
As discussed above, the two dimensions, O f f icialCurrit and ExamControlit , inter-
connect with each other to enhance what children learn in the official curriculum. I
construct one index, CurrControlit , to represent curriculum control degree through
18Only a few countries do not use achievement tests as main assessment methods. For example,
in most provinces of Canada, universities use the grade point average (GPA) in secondary school plus
other admission criteria, such as recommendation letters or personal statements, to select students.
I also group the countries where universities use aptitude tests to select students into this type (e.g.,
Sweden). Because the aptitude exams are not directly related to the knowledge students learn in the
official curriculum. Therefore, there is no such an enhanced effect on official curriculum.
19For example, during the basic education stage (primary and lower secondary) in the 1990s,
many developed countries seldom use achievement tests as the main criteria to promote students
within the education cycle and to select them to the next education cycle, while examinations
are quite popular in many developing countries, especially in African countries. In addition,
achievement tests are the common criteria at the end of the upper secondary in both rich and poor
countries.
20Besides exams and GPA, there are several other criteria, including ethnicity, family income,
previous work, past service or volunteer work, recommendations, applicant letters or written
rationales, and so on (Helms, 2008). In the appendix, using the recent survey data on the other
criteria employed to determine access to tertiary education (OECD, 2012), I consider those criteria
that could measure potential abilities of students (ethnicity and family income are not considered)
and code them as another dimension (only 29 observations). The results are similar when I use the
composited indicators by combining official curriculum, exam, and other admission criteria through
the principal component analysis (PCA). See the results in the appendix.
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the principal component analysis (PCA) technique.21 The variable is normalized to
the unit interval, where 0 is most decentralized and 1 is most centralized. It turns out
that CurrControlit is stable in different periods. Figure 2.1 show the relationships of
curriculum control in each country between different periods and the global trends
of O f f icialCurrit , ExamControlit , and CurrControlit . The curriculum control is
relatively stable in each county. According to the global trend, there is an increasing
interest in using standardized tests to evaluate students around the world, although
the design of the official curriculum has been slowly decentralized. This shift
is partly attributed to the technological advances that make it easier to test large
populations of students regularly (OECD, 2012; Hanushek, Link and Woessmann,
2013). I discuss this issue in Section 2.8.
Since CurrControlit influences national innovation 10 or even 20 years later, the
information on curriculum control degree in the 1980s and 1990s would affect the
country’s innovation performance after 2000. I use the average of CurrControlit
in the 1980s and 1990s as the appropriate indicator to represent the overall degree
of curriculum control in the country.22 In total, I identify the degree of curriculum
control in about 180 countries.23 Curriculum controls are highly diverse around
the world during the 1980s and 1990s, as shown in Figure 2.2. The United States,
Canada, and Australia have extremely decentralized curriculum controls, while cur-
21The first principal component explains about 70% of the common variance of the two
indicators. As the principal component reflects the overall degree of curriculum control degree, I
expect it to have the strongest effects on the outcomes of interest. For robustness, other methods
are also used to construct a single variable that represents curriculum control degree, e.g., an
equally weighted average of O f f icialCur and ExamControl, or a multiplication of O f f icialCurr
and ExamControl (after normalizing these two indicators between zero and one). They generate
similar significant results presented in the following sections, although the estimated coefficients
I concern are different. In addition, I also directly use O f f icialCurr and ExamControl to run
regressions. Both indicators have great influences on innovation. The effects of the former one
are quite stable in all regressions, while the effects of the later one become insignificant in some
robustness checks. I present a broad set of results using these three methods in the appendix.
22Jones (2010) finds that innovators generally have great achievements in knowledge when they
are between 30 and 50 years old.
23Some scholars also construct curriculum related indicators. For example, Stevenson and Baker
(1991); Chang and Huang (2014). But, the sample sizes in these studies are very small (from 14 to
36). In addition, they mainly focus on the official curriculum and pay little attention to the exam.
The curriculum control index I build is highly correlated with the curriculum-related indexes in these
previous studies.
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Figure 2.1.. Trends of Curriculum Control And Its Sub-indicators.
riculum controls in most African countries and some Asian countries are extremely
centralized.
2.3.2. Innovation Indicators: Patent and Other Non-Patent
Indicators
Innovations are multidimensional.24 I collect various innovation indicators from
broad data sources to capture different dimensions of innovation. For each indicator,
I use one observation to represent the country’s innovation.25 To easily compare, I
normalize all these indicators to the interval [0, 100], where 0 is the lowest level of
24For example, Schumpeter and Opie (1961) categorize innovation into four types, as follows:
process innovation, product innovation, exploitation of new markets, and organizational innovation.
25For most innovation-related indicators, I use the average levels from 2005 to 2010 as the proxies
for national innovation. But brand and innovative company rankings data are only available in recent
years. I respectively use the average amounts of brands between 2007 and 2017, and the average
amounts of innovative companies between 2010 and 2017 to represent national innovation. See the
appendix for the detailed descriptions.
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Figure 2.2.. Curriculum Control around the World during the 1980s and 1990s.
innovation while 100 is the highest one. I mainly rely on patent-related indicators as
the proxy of innovation level in the country and use others for robustness checks.26
2.3.2.1. Patent
To measure national innovation, I employ the quality rather than the quantity of
patents as the proxy of inventiveness.27 Following the patent literature (Hall, Jaffe
and Trajtenberg, 2001; Squicciarini, Dernis and Criscuolo, 2013; Kwon, Lee and
Lee, 2017), the quality indicators, including the Hirsch index (H-index), share of
breakthrough inventions, and average citations of patents, are used to measure na-
tional innovation.28 I mainly rely on the patent data from the United States Patent
26Patent data remain a widely accepted resource for the study of innovation (Kortum, 1993; Hall,
Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001; Squicciarini, Dernis and Criscuolo, 2013; Aghion et al., 2016; Cinnirella
and Streb, 2017; Kwon, Lee and Lee, 2017).
27Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001); Squicciarini, Dernis and Criscuolo (2013) find that around
80% patents have no citation.
28The Hirsch index is defined to be the largest number h such that the inventor has at least h
patents with h or more citations (Hirsch, 2005). It thereby de-emphasizes the number of citations
to a one’s most-cited patent. Ellison (2013) uses it to measure the productivity of professors, and
Kwon, Lee and Lee (2017) employ it to be the measure of the nation’s innovative strength. The share
of breakthrough inventions is defined as the proportion of patents that have the top 5% of citations
in their technological fields. They are the most influential, innovative, and original patents and can
be taken as “creative innovations” (Acemoglu, Akcigit and Celik, 2014). The average citation of a
patent is defined as total citations divided by total amounts of patents in a given period. See the data
source and detailed construction processes in the appendix.
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and Trademark Office (USPTO).29 In the robustness checks, European Patent Office
(EPO) data are also used.30
2.3.2.2. Non-Patent Indicators
Other non-patent indicators associated with innovation or creativity are also used.
These include average citations of journal publications, top universities or innova-
tive companies or brands (per million population).
2.3.3. Link Between Curriculum Control and Innovation
A first glance at the data shows some preliminary evidence to support my argument.
Figure 2.3 plot the relationship between curriculum control index (CurrControl)
and several national innovation variables. In each graph, there is a strong and
negative relationship between curriculum control and innovation, suggesting that
greater control of what children learn in school is negatively associated with national
inventiveness. However, the negative relationships could be driven by some outliers
in the graphs, such as the United States. In addition, various factors that influence
the innovation are not considered. I deal with these issues in the formal regression
analyses in the next three sections.
2.4. Baseline Regressions
In this section, I formally check my argument. There are many factors affecting the
country’s innovation. GDP per capita (log form) and average years of schooling
29The USPTO patent data are from Kwon, Lee and Lee (2017). They revise some mistakes in
USPTO files and match the patent’s inventor with nationality, which greatly reduces the burden of
my work.
30Since the United States is the largest technology consumer market in the world, it has
commonly been assumed in prior studies that all important innovations have been patented by the
USPTO (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001; Griffith, Harrison and Van Reenen, 2006; Kwon, Lee and
Lee, 2017). In addition, there are more patent observations in the USPTO than in the EPO.
75
Chapter 2 Curriculum Control and Innovation
Figure 2.3.. Curriculum Control and National Innovation.
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(log form) are considered, trying to control for the effects of the economic de-
velopment on innovations. Generally speaking, better economic development is
positively associated with a higher level of innovation, probably because countries
with higher development comprise better-educated people with more resources. In
addition, continent dummies are included. Continent fixed effects are vulnerable
to unobserved factors that affect all countries on the continent similarly. Such un-
observed factors, including culture, deeper historical conditions, bio-geographical
conditions or intra-continental diffusion, may affect innovation. Therefore, the
following cross-country regression model is used:
Innovatoni,2005−2010 = β0+β1CurrControli+β2X1990−2005+Continenti+υi
(2.1)
i is the country. National innovation is measured by the average innovation level
between 2005 and 2010.31 CurrControl is the measure of the degree of curriculum
control, combining information on the level of the education authority controlling
curriculum design and examination policies for students’ promotions, graduations,
and admissions. X is the vector of the control variables. In the basic regression, I
mainly include GDP per capita and average years of schooling. To reduce endoge-
nous issues, the average values between 1990 and 2005 are employed. Continent
comprises a set of dummy variables for continents.32 In addition, υi is the error
term, reflecting innovation factors that are idiosyncratic to country i, as well as
omitted variables, and misspecification of the functional form. According to the
argument, I predict that β1 < 0, indicating that more centralized curriculum control
is associated with a lower level of national innovation.
31The reason for choosing 2005 is that the effect of curriculum control in the 1980s and 1990s on
national innovation should work after 2000 even 2005 when these educated children become adults
and get careers. In addition, some important covariates, like rule of law, are only available in very
few countries before 2000. Also, most non-patent indicators, like innovative companies, brands, and
universities, are only available after 2005. I also try 2000 or 2010 as the cutoff year when the data
are available. The regression results are similar.
32Africa is the benchmark dummy.
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Table 2.9.2 displays the results using patent indicators (both USPTO and EPO)33,
and non-patent indicators34 as proxies of national innovation. No matter which in-
novation indicator is used, β1 < 0 always holds, where the coefficients of CurrControl
vary from -22.028 (Column (10)) to -53.062 (Column (6)). This suggests that the
centralized curriculum control is negatively correlated with innovation. Remark-
ably, CurrControl itself accounts for almost 30% of the cross-country variation in
innovation, when H-index of the patent in USPTO is used, reported in Column
(1). This implies that curriculum control is one of the key factors in national
creativeness.
As argued before, the reasons behind this relationship could be that centralized
official curriculum design enforced with high-stakes achievement tests reduces di-
versity in talents. Being creative means deviating from the norm. However, homo-
geneous learning experiences will lead to conformity, and to some extent, uniform
ways of thinking. Standardized testing rewards those who conform and penalizes
those who deviate. As a result, those who happen to do well on that this specific
assessment, exam, are considered good and successful, while those who do less well
are considered to be at risk, regardless of their other strengths.35 Those other talents
will eventually be devalued, suppressed, and left to wither. In addition, high-stakes
testing forces teachers and schools to focus on what is tested and spend less time
on what is not. Singling out a few subjects through national standards and testing
necessarily leads to a narrower curriculum and an overall depressed education expe-
rience.36 Consequently, common standards could result in distortions of the purpose
of education, which is not beneficial to cultivating a diverse and creative citizenry,
and not favorable to the development of national innovation in the long run.
33These include the Hirsch index, share of breakthrough inventions, and average citations per
patent.
34They includes the quality of publications (measured by average citations), famous innovative
companies per capita, well-known brands per capita, and prominent universities per capita.
35For example, a child who is extremely talented in art but cannot pass the reading test required
by the government is deemed inadequate. A child who can write very imaginative essays or fictions
but cannot write the way standardized tests want is also deemed inadequate. These “at-risk” children
are then forced to fix their “deficiencies” instead of developing their strengths.
36In Section 2.7, I show that students educated in more centralized curriculum-control environ-
ments enjoy their studies less and they have less self-confidence on learning.
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Figure 2.4.. AV Plot of national Patent Quality (Measured by the Hirsch index [H-index])
on Curriculum Control (Table 2.9.2, Column (2))
The relationship between curriculum control and innovation estimated in Column
(2) is depicted in the added variable (AV) plot in Figure 2.4. By removing the effects
of income, schooling, and continents, the visible negative link between curriculum
control and national innovation becomes very striking. However, several outliers
are also visible. Likewise, the United States is a visible outlier, as it has extremely
high innovation performance. Qatar could be another one. Such outliers, however,
are not what drives the results, as shown in the next section. Income levels in most
regressions are significantly and positively related to innovation. This is reasonable
since countries with more financial resources should have a stronger capacity to
innovate.
To summarize, the degree of controlling what children learn in school is negatively
associated with various innovation indicators, which is consistent with my argu-
ment. In the next section, I check whether the basic results hold by controlling for
various covariates, by using different sample sizes and regression models, as well
as by implementing outlier tests.
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2.5. Robustness Checks
In the first two subsections, I use regressions to condition on a range of national
characteristics and assess the independent relationship between CurrControl and
Innovation; moreover, I check whether β1 changes when the specific national char-
acteristic is considered. I use the H-index of patents (from the USPTO) as the
main national innovation indicator and display the results using other innovation
indicators in the appendix. In the next two subsections, different sample sizes,
regression models, and outlier tests are used for further robustness checks.
2.5.1. Controlling for Non-Human Capital Indicators
Innovation is complicated and affected by various factors. Market size may be one
of the key factors influencing innovation. A larger market size would bring more
profits for companies and incentives for innovation activities (Jones and Romer,
2010). In addition, a larger population promotes innovation by supplying a higher
potential quality of human capital. Endogenous growth theory emphasizes the role
of economies of scale in innovation.37 Empirically, Acemoglu and Linn (2004) and
Aghion et al. (2016) show that market size is a crucial factor for innovation in the
pharmaceutical and auto industries, respectively. Total population, as the proxy of
market size, is controlled and the result is reported in Column (2).38 The coefficient
of CurrControl is not significantly changed.
Akcigit, Grigsby and Nicholas (2017) find that densely populated U.S. states are
more inventive. The agglomeration literature has long argued that physical prox-
imity promotes creativity, the exchange of ideas, and the spillovers of knowledge
37Many fully specified idea-based growth models assume that innovation is an increasing function
of the number of people with whom an individual can share ideas. See Romer (1990); Grossman
and Helpman (1994).
38I also control for GDP as the measure of market size. The result is similar, as reported in the
appendix.
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capital among inventors.39 I control for the urbanization ratio and report the result
in Column (3).40 There is no change on my main concern.
One important way of expanding the market size is through access to other ge-
ographical regions. This increases both the market size for innovation and the
potential flow of knowledge spillovers. Perlman (2015); Donaldson and Hornbeck
(2016) find strong effects on invention and agglomeration from the 19th-century
development of railroads. Infrastructure indicators, including railway and road
density, as well as the share of internet users are controlled.41 From Column (4),
these indicators have little influence on the coefficient I am concerned.
There is a vast literature relating access to capital and innovation.42 Easier access
to credit enables the initiation of capital-intensive projects and provides funding
of R&D (Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005; Ang and McKibbin, 2007).
Private credit to GDP is controlled in Column (5).43 The coefficient of CurrControl
shows little change.44
One potential explanation for country-level innovation differences is that innova-
tive places are relatively more open to unconventional and disruptive technological
ideas. Those places are also more willing to encourage and protect inventions.
Religion and institutions are important dimensions through which societal attitudes
and environments shape innovation. A recent set of studies has directly addressed
the question of whether religiosity promotes or inhibits innovation.45 Following
39See Carlino and Kerr (2015) for a survey.
40By controlling for population density, I find no different result. It is displayed in the appendix.
41I extract the indicators from Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2017).
42Lamoreaux, Levenstein and Sokoloff (2004) find that the venture-style provision of capital
dramatically reduced financing constraints for inventors in Cleveland, an important Second Industrial
Revolution city. According to Kortum and Lerner (2000), venture capital had a strong causal impact
on patenting rates in the United States in the late 20th century.
43Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); Ang and McKibbin (2007); Madsen et al. (2010) use this
indicator as the proxy of national financial development.
44Capital that is more directly related to innovation is the amount of financial resources used
in the process of innovation. But it may be a “bad” control since CurrControl could affect R&D
spending. For example, researchers that are educated in decentralized education systems may have
flexible minds and other strong abilities that are crucial for innovation. It may be relatively easy for
such researchers to generate brand-new ideas and create breakthrough innovations. Investors should
be more willing to direct resources to these individuals for higher financial returns.
45Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni (2015) conclude that the relationship is robust and strongly
negative.
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Acemoglu, Akcigit and Celik (2014); Akcigit, Grigsby and Nicholas (2017), I con-
struct a Hirschman–Herfindahl Index (HHI) of religious membership to capture the
toleration of different beliefs within the country.46 The coefficient of CurrControl
changes little, as displayed in Column (6).
Institutions are important to innovation. For example, sound property rights protec-
tion encourages innovators to work on risky projects where the potential return is
higher and reduces uncertainty about possible appropriation.47 Moreover, effective-
ness in protecting innovators depends on strong legislative and political systems.
The country’s ability to implement the law depends on the quality of government
agencies, such as the judiciary, as well as political stability. Rule of law from
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project is considered in Column (7).
There is no change on the coefficient of curriculum control.48
In Column (9), the coefficient of CurrControl is still significant when the controls
in the previous columns are included together.
In summary, these results suggest that CurrControl could be an independent factor
that influences innovation, and the effect seems to be quite robust.
2.5.2. Controlling for Human Capital Indicators
Innovation relies on the high quality of talents in the country. In this subsection,
I test whether CurrControl independently influences innovation by controlling for
46Mathematically, HHIi,region = 1−∑share2i, j, where sharei, j is the proportion of the population
in country i believes in religion j. It captures the religious diversity, and therefore, the extent to
which different beliefs are tolerated within countries. This variable could measure the degree of
openness to disruptive ideas, as a conduit to innovation (Acemoglu, Akcigit and Celik, 2014).
47Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (2009) find that strong patent protection is associated with
higher returns to R&D. However, there are some controversies on the degree of patent protection on
innovation. See Chen and Puttitanun (2005), Qian (2007), and Madsen et al. (2010).
48In the appendix, a similar result is obtained when I control for private property rights protection,
which is extracted from Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI). In addition, civil
liberties, such as freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and travel, are likely to enhance the diffusion
of new ideas into and within a country. Protection of civil liberties presumably increases the variety
and improves the selection of ideas, both of which are the central elements in the processes of
technological change (Knutsen, 2015; Serafinelli and Tabellini, 2017). Civil liberty from Freedom
House is controlled, and the result is reported in the appendix. There is no remarkable effect on the
estimate I am concerned with.
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several indicators measuring different dimensions of human capital. The results are
displayed in Table 2.9.4.
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006), among others, think that innovation is
more related to higher education than the basic one. The quantity indicator measur-
ing higher education is sometimes also used as a proxy of quality of human capital
(Gallego, 2010). Average years of tertiary schooling is controlled, as reported in
Column (1). There is little change on the coefficient of curriculum control.
Migration could boost innovation by bringing new ideas, expertise, and special-
ized labor to the country. Recent empirical studies confirm that highly skilled
migrants promote the production of patents and knowledge creation (Hunt and
Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Kerr and Lincoln, 2010; Stuen, Mobarak and Maskus,
2012; Moser, Voena and Waldinger, 2014; Bosetti, Cattaneo and Verdolini, 2015).
The international migrant stock is controlled, and the result is displayed in Column
(2). Again, the result is robust.49
Hanushek and Kimko (2000); Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006); Breton
(2011); Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) emphasize that the quality rather than
the quantity of human capital is crucial for the economy. They argue that academic
performance, like the examination score, should be an appropriate proxy for the
quality of human capital. The international test score at the secondary school level
is used to capture the quality of human capital.50 The result is reported in Column
(3). The coefficient of CurrControl is stable.
When all these human capital variables are included in Column (4), the coefficient
of CurrControl is still negative and significant, implying that curriculum control
could shape the quality of human capital directly associated with innovation. The
smaller coefficient also suggests that some of these indicators could be potential
channels through which curriculum control affects innovation. For example, it is
49There is no influence on the coefficient of curriculum control if I control for the share of migrant
stock (divided by total population) instead of migrant stock.
50The data are from Altinok, Diebolt and Demeulemeester (2014). They merge all existing
regional and international student achievement tests and provide a data set of indicators measuring
the quality of student achievement for 111 countries between 1965 and 2010.
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likely that a decentralized curriculum design with flexible promotion and admission
policies will attract skillful immigrants who want their children to study in an
environment where students have enough time and opportunity to find and pursue
their interests, enhance their curiosity and creativity, and strengthen their abilities
of independent and critical thinking.51
2.5.3. Other Robustness Checks
2.5.3.1. Different Sample Sizes
In this subsection, I explore whether the result is influenced by the specified sample.
The findings are presented in Table 2.9.5.
The United States, Canada, and Australia have the most decentralized education
systems in the world. Innovative activities in these countries are also very energetic.
Column (1) documents that the negative and significant result is not only driven by
the Neo-Europes. When I exclude the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, the estimate is still significant. In Column (2), I further drop European
countries. Although it becomes smaller, the coefficient remains significant.
The countries with large populations should have relatively significant bodies of
talent. Even when education systems in populous countries are not decentralized,
the human capital for innovation embedded in the talented individuals may not be
seriously impaired, since intelligence quotient (IQ), one important factor shaping
human capital, to some extent, is innately determined by genes (Devlin, Daniels
and Roeder, 1997). This implies that the result may collapse in densely populated
countries. However, Column (3) shows that this is not the case. After removing
small countries52, the effect of CurrControl is almost unchanged.
Curriculum controls in poor countries, like many African countries, are quite cen-
tralized. Official curricula are usually designed by central governments and they are
51I do find that more the country with decentralized curriculum control in education system is
associated with more immigrant stocks. This pattern seems quite robust.
52I define that the country is small if its population is lower than the global median level.
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more willing to use national-level examinations to evaluate students. These poor
countries, in general, have few high-quality patents. To check whether the result is
driven by these poor countries, I only include relatively rich countries53 in Column
(4). There is little change in the estimate.
In short, I find that the results are robust in different sample sizes.
2.5.3.2. Outlier Tests
In this subsection, I check whether the result is impaired by removing extreme
observations. There are some visible outliers in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4. It is
necessary to check whether the results are disproportionately influenced by extreme
points. The observations with the standard deviation of regression residuals (from
Column (2) in Table 2.9.2) between the 5th percentile and 95th percentile are used
to run the regression. The result is displayed in Column (5). The coefficient of
CurrControl is still significant and does not change much.54
2.5.3.3. Other Regression Models
In this subsection, I use other regression models to explore the robustness of my
argument. Since the dependent variables are always non-negative, a regression
model commonly used to deal with censored data is the Tobit model. Column (6)
reports the result using this model. The estimate is quite similar to the corresponding
one in Column (2) in Table 2.9.2.This suggests that the link between curriculum
control and innovation is insensitive to the models used.55
53I define that the country is rich if its income level is higher than the global median level.
54The results are also robust by using other techniques to identify extreme observations, like
Cook’s distance and leverage. In addition, to mitigate the influences of the extreme observations,
the natural logarithmic form of the innovation indicator is used. I also directly exclude some
observations with extreme innovation levels (either extremely high or extremely low). The
coefficients of CurrControl are still highly significant. See the appendix.
55I also employ a truncated regression model to deal with this issue. In addition, three nonlinear
models (the zero-inflated negative binomial model, standard negative binomial model, and Poisson
model) are used. These models deal with the excessive number of zeros or over-dispersion. In all
these robustness checks, the significant and negative coefficients, β1, are obtained. See the appendix.
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Overall, the regression results are robust in almost all the regressions when condi-
tioning on different national characteristics, different sample sizes, and non-outliers,
as well as using distinct regression models. Therefore, the evidence in this section
confirms a strong correlation between curriculum control and innovation.56
Ansell and Lindvall (2013) emphasize whether teachers are state, regional, or mu-
nicipal employees, and the influences of different educational authorities on the
salaries of teachers are crucial for national control over education. In the appendix,
I also run the regressions using both curriculum control index and centralization
index in educational finance (see the building process in the appendix) and find that
both greatly affects innovation. Although these two indicators are overlapping, they
are different. For example, in Australia, curriculum control is quite decentralized,
but the federal government controls large financial resources for education. On
contrary, in China, the central government has the great influence on curriculum,
while regional and local governments are responsible for financing primary and
secondary education.
In the next section, I will provide the within-country evidence and explore the effect
of curriculum control on the occupation choices of immigrants in the U.S. who may
get educations from their original countries.
2.6. Within-Country Evidence: The U.S. Census
in 2000
Cross-country analysis may fail to control fully for source differences between
countries. However, I can examine the effect of curriculum control within a given
country, thereby holding other sources of country-fixed factors constant. Further-
more, by exploring within-country variation, I can rule out alternative explanations
based on differences in, for example, diffusion costs or geography.
56In the appendix, I use other innovation indicators to implement all these robustness checks. The
results are similar, although some are not so robust.
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2.6.1. OLS Regressions
My argument emphasizes that decentralized curriculum control in education cul-
tivates the creativity. This implies that people educated in such systems have a
high probability of choosing research-oriented occupations that require independent
thought and deviation from traditional ways of doing things. The unique feature
of the United States as a country of immigrants from all over the world makes it
an interesting object in studying the effect of curriculum control. This approach is
inspired by Roland and Gerard (2017), who exploit this feature to study the effect of
culture on economic growth and innovation. Following them, I use ethnicity, age,
gender, birthplace, year of immigration, and educational attainment from the 5%
public micro-data (IPUMS) of the U.S. Census in 2000. Ethnicity is based on the
respondent’s self-report country of ancestry. The sample includes only employed
males aged 25 to 60 who have non-missing information on ancestors (country of
origin).57
One of the important differences among people born in the United States or not is
that they receive schooling from different education systems. This difference could
affect their propensities to choose research-oriented occupations. To formally check
it, I estimate the following OLS regression:
ROOi = Xiθ +β1CurrControli+Borni+ εi (2.2)
where i indexes individuals; ROO is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if
an individual has a research-oriented occupation and 0 otherwise; Born is also a
dummy variable and is equal to 1 if an individual was born in the United States and
57Following Roland and Gerard (2017), I constrain the sample to the individuals with non-
missing ethnicity information because I focus only on individuals who associate with particular
countries (which could be different from the United States). I exclude women, those who are
unemployed, and other ages to minimize the various possible selection effects. In addition, I exclude
the individual who moved to the United State before the age of 18. These persons probably also
received some education in the United States.
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0 otherwise; CurrControli is the degree of curriculum control in education system
for individual i has experienced. It is curriculum control in the United States if
individual i was born there, while it is the one in the country of origin if individual
i was born outside the United States;58 and the vector X includes controls like age,
age squared, and a set of dummies for educational attainment, as well as other
variables for further robustness checks.
My argument predicts that β1 should be negative. Panel A of Table 2.9.6 presents
estimates of β1 in regression (2.2). In Column (1), I only control for the basic
covariates. The coefficient of βˆ1 is significantly negative, indicating that those
educated from decentralized curriculum-control countries are more likely to get
research-oriented occupations than the ones educated from centralized curriculum-
control countries.
Next, I add a set of dummies of ethnic groups (corresponding to the country of
origin). These dummies capture the fixed factors within each ethnic group, such as
culture and parenting styles. The coefficient of βˆ1in Column (2) is still significant
and negative.
βˆ1 could possibly capture other effects instead of the effect of curriculum con-
trol. For example, language differences could confound the result. Compared with
new immigrants, the natives are more skilled in communicating with others using
English. This advantage is beneficial for locals to find the jobs they prefer. In
Column (3), I control for the linguistic distance between the United States and the
country that individual i was born. The coefficient of curriculum control is still
highly significant.59 Finally, I include both dummies of ethnic groups and linguistic
distance. The curriculum control is still negatively associated with the propensity
of the individual to choose research-oriented occupations.
58Because of the lack of further information, I have to assume that those who were not born in
the United States are educated in their country of origins.
59The data of the linguistic distance index are from Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2017).
A high value represents a large difference in the languages between the United States and the country
individual i was born.
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2.6.2. Instrumental Variable and the IV Regressions
Although I show that curriculum control is associated with the individual’s creativ-
ity, measured by research-oriented occupation choice, still, some omitted variables
that are not considered may impair the results. In addition, it is possible that some
more fundamental variables simultaneously influence both individual’s creativity
and the education system.60 Therefore, an instrumental variable is needed to solve
these issues and identify the causal relationship between curriculum control and
creativity.
2.6.2.1. The Political Factors Influencing the Choice of Education
System
The education system is highly persistent. Figure 2.5 plots the relationships between
the primary education centralization index in the early period (between 1870 and
1939) and educational administrative centralization index, as well as curriculum
control index in the 1990s by controlling for continents effects. The primary edu-
cation centralization index in the early period is extracted from Ansell and Lindvall
(2013). They rely primarily on evidence of whether teachers were central, regional,
or municipal employees, as well as the influence that national school inspectors
and other national agencies had over hiring, promotions, salaries, and other em-
ployment conditions.61 The indicator that is closely related to their index should
be an administrative concentration in education, which measures central authorities
for hiring, firing, and setting terms of reference for local employment in education
60For example, industrial elites may have great powers to shape both the education system and
national economic development strategy. Beauchamp (1987) illustrates that business leaders in Japan
bluntly expressed the unhappiness in industrial circles with the democratically oriented schools
(transplanted from the United States) and called for an educational system that was more closely
allied to the needs of industry during the post-occupation period. In practice, it meant more and
better vocational courses and a higher degree of professionalization at the university level.
61They build this centralization index between 1879 and 1939 for 27 countries. It is a binary
variable that separates highly centralized national education systems—where teachers were state
employees or local and regional institutions had little influence over hiring decisions, promotions,
salaries, and employment conditions—from those controlled at the local or regional level. I average
the index from 1879 to 1939 and take it as the measurement of educational centralization degree for
each country in the early period.
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Figure 2.5.. Plots of the Centralization of Education (Left) and Curriculum Control (Right)
in the 1990s on the Centralization of Primary Education in the Early Period Conditioning
on Continent Dummies.
system without making any reference to lower level authorities (Ivanyna and Shah,
2014). The education centralization index in administration in the 1990s is built by
myself and normalized to the interval [0,1], where 1 is the most centralized and 0 is
the most decentralized.62
A strong visible positive link between centralization of primary education in the
early period and education centralization index in administration in the 1990s emerges
in Figure 2.5 (left), implying a high degree of persistence in cross-country differ-
ences.63 The pattern is also true between the centralization index in the early time
and the curriculum control index in the 1990s, showing in Figure 2.5 (right).
The results give hints for finding the historical roots education structure, curriculum
control degree. Lindert (2004) finds that the United States, Canada, and Prussia had
decentralized political systems in the 19th century, where local elites and citizens
controlled educational decisions and policies in politics. Even today, education
systems in these countries are quite decentralized. In other words, the decentralized
education system partly stems from decentralized federal systems (Goldin and Katz,
2008; Ansell and Lindvall, 2013). Gallego (2010) finds that the degree of political
62I build this variable by using the information from the book International encyclopedia of
national systems of education. See the details in the appendix.
63From the result of regressing the educational administrative centralization index in the 1990s
to the centralization of primary education in the early period, it explains 46% of the cross-country
variation.
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Figure 2.6.. Early Political Decentralization and Curriculum Control Conditioning on
Continent Dummies
decentralization64 has a positive and significant influence on more advanced levels
of schooling. Ansell and Lindvall (2013) demonstrate that federalism, which served
to protect the political interests of local actors from centralizing forces, negatively
influenced the centralization of primary education before World War II.
Condition on continent dummies, Figure 2.6 plots the link between early political
decentralization developments6566 and CurrControl, suggesting that a higher qual-
ity of political decentralization is associated with more decentralized curriculum
control.
The recent literature on political decentralization finds that a high quality of political
decentralization leads to greatly effective governance.67 It is possible that the high
64Gallego (2010) emphasizes that political decentralization is related more to the measure of
local democracy and argues that this distinction is important because the lack of local checks and
balances is one of the factors that explain why some theories predict a potentially negative effect of
decentralization on education and other social outcomes (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Bardhan,
2002; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2003). Political decentralization combines both centralization of local
authority and local democracy.
65I follow the definition of Gallego (2010). Political decentralization is measured by the local
or regional democracy development, defined by the degree that citizens could select their local or
regional governments. The data are from the V-Dem Project. See the details in the appendix.
66The initial or early time is defined as the period that the schooling starts to play a great role in
the formation of human capital. Cinnirella and Streb (2017) illustrate that the Second Industrial
Revolution can be seen as a transition period when it comes to the role of human capital. As
in the subsequent 20th century, the quality of basic education was associated with both workers’
productivity and firms’ R&D processes. It should be reasonable to set 1900 as an initial year. Ansell
and Lindvall (2013) also document that central governments sought to increase their influence over
the education systems during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
67For example, Albornoz and Cabrales (2013) find that decentralization is associated with
lower (higher) levels of corruption for sufficiently high (low) levels of political competition. See
Mookherjee (2015) for the recent literature review.
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Figure 2.7.. Early Civil Society Development and Curriculum Control Conditioning on
Continent Dummies
quality of local democracy would bring local citizens more confidence to govern by
themselves and support a decentralized education system. The quality of political
decentralization could be influenced by the active civil society and efficient compe-
tition in elections. Figure 2.7 describes the relationship between early civil society
development68 and CurrControl by controlling for continent dummies, indicating
that more active civil society in the early period is highly correlated with less
centralized curriculum control.
Widespread corruption is another important reason for implementing more central-
ized and rigid assessment policies. For example, to curb severe corruption, most ex-
Soviet countries have recently tended to use unified national entrance examinations
to select students for universities (Orkodashvili, 2010; Osipian, 2012; Orr et al.,
2017). In China, it is always a serious concern on the reform of admission policies
in higher educations, since the masses are worried that other methods besides uni-
fied examinations would lead to more corruptions and advantages for children of
wealthy parents (Dello-Iacovo, 2009; Liu, 2012). The similar concern also existed
68There are several indicators measuring civil society development in the V-Dem Project,
including the civil society participation index, the frequency of civil society organizations being
consulted by governments, and civil society organizations’ participatory environment. I build one
composite indicator by combining all of these variables through PCA. The data in 1900 are used to
measure early civil society development.
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in Japan during the 1960s (Beauchamp, 1987; Doyon, 2001). So, potential corrup-
tion during the early stage of schooling expansion may also influence the choice of
education system.6970
In short, political factors, such as political decentralization, corruption, and civil
society in the early period, could be potentially important factors influencing the
education system. The slow change of political institutions may also partially ex-
plain why the education system is persistent.
2.6.2.2. Exogenous Variations: Deviation of the CSI
The political factors considered are endogenous. My strategy is to find the exoge-
nous factor that affects these local institutions in the early period, thereby influenc-
ing the past and current education system, more specifically, curriculum control.
Equation 2.2 describes the relationship between CurrControl and individual’s cre-
ativity. In addition, I have
CurrControli = αC + γCEarlyIns_Struci+X
′
ipiC +υiC
EarlyIns_Struci = αP+ γPExoVari+X
′
ipiP+υiP
CurrControl denotes curriculum control at the current time, EarlyIns_Struc
measures local institutions during the early period, and ExoVar is the exogenous
variation that influences these local institutions. X is a vector of covariates that
affect all the variables.
The exogenous variation is inspired by the studies of Mayshar, Moav and Neeman
(2017); Ahmed and Stasavage (2017). Mayshar, Moav and Neeman (2017) argue
69In the equilibrium, it is possible that both centralized and decentralized education system are
associated with low level of corruption. Different societies choose distinct education systems based
on their initial social and political environments. For example, citizens in countries with low-level
corruptions may have more confidence to self-governance and prefer decentralized education
systems and flexible admission tools, while the masses in countries with high-level corruption would
prefer more centralized, rigid, and unified admission policies to curb corruption. Thus, corruption in
the early period could be a good predictor for the choice of education system.
70Unfortunately, there is no such indicator to measure the educational corruption during the initial
period.
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that the ability for the early central state to appropriate revenues from the agricul-
tural sector is influenced by the transparency of farming, which in turn, is affected
by geography and technology. In other words, the observability of agricultural
production can greatly influence the rise of local and central autocracy in the early
time.71
One of the exogenous variations that affects the observability of the farming sector
across regions in the early period is exogenous land productivity distribution within
the country. It could be captured by the standard deviation of the CSI, or σCSI , built
by Galor and Ömer Özak (2015).72 Taxation from agriculture should be the main
financial resources for the government before the industrialization. The taxation
revenue could be greatly influenced by σCSI . For example, the central ruler may
have difficulty collecting precise information on the agricultural sector when σCSI is
high. Because it becomes challenging for central officials to evaluate the reliability
of information related to local agricultural productions providing by local officials,
especially when there is no advanced technology to measure and predict weather
and climate, and the central government has to heavily rely on comparison with
other regions to mitigate information asymmetries. Thus, it may be not easy to
form a strong centralized state due to weak tax collection abilities. Furthermore, to
solve the issue of information asymmetry, the central ruler may have to share the
power with local governments or even non-rulers (Ahmed and Stasavage, 2017).
71They argue that the success of early central states, such as ancient Egypt, was due to the high
global transparency (through the irrigation system) that enabled the central authority to keep the
subordinated intermediary lords at bay and extract a larger share of revenue from the periphery to
the center.
72They report the number of calories that could be produced in a given area before and after the
Columbian Exchange. CSI provides the average caloric yield per hectare per year for each grid cell
on a resolution of 300 arc seconds (0.083 degrees or around 85 km2). The average is derived from
the caloric suitability of all 49 crops for which the Global Agro-Ecological Zones project of the Food
and Agriculture Organization provides global crop yield estimates and that can be grown in the area
of a state. They argue that by focusing on potential crop yield, based on agri-climatic characteristics
that are unaffected by human intervention, CSI could be viewed as an exogenous proxy for land
productivity.
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Figure 2.8.. σCSI and Curriculum Control Conditioning on Continent Dummies
In other words, lower transparency of farming could be related to more political
decentralization.73
In short, σCSI could be used as an exogenous variation that influences the early
political decentralization, through which, affects the education system.74 Higher
σCSI would be favorable to the establishment of more decentralized education struc-
ture. Figure 2.8 plots the relationship between σCSI and CurrControl in the baseline
sample conditioning on continent dummies.
2.6.2.3. IV Regression Results
I use σCSI as introduced in the previous subsection to instrument CurrControl.75 I
narrow the sample and only investigate individuals who were not born in the United
73Ahmed and Stasavage (2017) find that there is a correlation between exogenous localized
variation in potential agricultural suitability and the presence of council governance. In council
government, the power of the ruler is relatively constrained since the authority is vested in a council.
74I use σCSI during post-1500. This is more related to political development in the early period
(e.g., 1900). Plus, after the Columbian exchange, many of the crops were quickly transplanted
between the Old and New Worlds (Galor and Ömer Özak, 2015). Mayshar, Moav and Neeman
(2017) find increase the availability of crop after Columbian exchange has great influences on
political structures in some regions. In the rest of the paper, I mainly use the standard deviation
of the average calorie as the IV. The standard deviation of the maximum calorie is also employed,
the results are quite similar.
75I use the logarithmic form of σCSI , since there are no theoretical reasons for preferring the
level as a determinant of CurrControl rather than the log, and using the log ensures that the extreme
values do not play a disproportionate role.
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States. The advantage of exploring this sub-sample is that these individuals work in
the United States but get education from their own countries. Therefore, the effect
of σCSI on their occupation choices is probably mainly through schooling, rather
than other channels, such as political structures in their original countries.
The results are consistent with the argument, which is reported in Panel B of Table
2.9.6.76 The effects seem to be larger than those in the OLS ones. For example, the
first column is the basic 2SLS result and the coefficient of CurrControl is -0.086,
which is much larger (absolute value) than the one in the OLS (-0.010), indicating
that measurement error in CurrControl that creates attenuation bias is likely to
be more important than the reverse causality and omitted variables biases. From
the first stage, there is a strong and negative relationship between σCSI (log form)
and CurrControl, which is consistent with the analysis in the previous subsection.
A larger σCSI may be beneficial for constructing a more decentralized education
system.
2.7. Intermediate Channels
In this section, I investigate the roles of curriculum control on teaching practices,
learning experiences of students, and formations of people’s beliefs and values on
careers. Through these explorations, I give some preliminary evidence about the
micro-foundations of curriculum control on innovation.
I mainly estimate the following OLS regression in the following three subsections:
Yi = Xiθ +β1CurrControli+ εi (2.3)
i indexes individuals. Y is the variable I will explore. It could be the indicator mea-
suring teaching practice, student’s attitude to study, or career values. CurrControli
76In Column (2), I control for the indicator of individualistic culture from Hofstede and Hofstede
(2001), an important ethnic fixed factor, instead of a set of ethnic group dummies to avoid
multicollinearity.
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is the curriculum control index for the country that i is living. The vector X includes
the micro-variables related to i, which are specified in each subsection. Table 2.9.7
presents the estimates of β1 in regression (2.3).
2.7.1. The Effect of Curriculum Control on Teaching
Practices
More centralized curriculum control would lead to more teacher-centered instruc-
tional approaches in an effort to transmit the content required by the official cur-
riculum and tests. Peterson (1979); Bonawitz et al. (2011); Agrawal et al. (2011);
Kapur and Bielaczyc (2012); Kapur (2014, 2016); Zhao (2017) explain that these
teaching approaches are effective in promoting rapid and efficient learning of the
target material and may boost achievement test scores. However, they also find that
teacher-centered methods inhibit curiosity and creativity since instruction necessar-
ily limits the range of hypotheses children consider and their attempt to explore
novel situations.77
I employ the information about teaching practices on the percent of time lecturing
and group activities from the Progress in International Reading Literacy (PIRLS)
in 2006 to check my argument.78 Following Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer (2013),
I control for student characteristics (test scores in reading achievement, age, gen-
der, immigrant status, parental education, number of books at home, and parental
socioeconomic background), teacher characteristics (age, gender, education, and
experience), and class characteristics (class size, average, and standard deviation in
reading test scores) in regression (2.3). Columns (1)–(2) document the effects of
77Buchsbaum et al. (2011) show that, in situations where the experimenter adopted the role of an
instructor and directly gave instructions and demonstrations, children were more likely to imitate the
instructor than in other conditions. But, they were found to be less likely to explore and come up with
novel solutions. Students in the direct instruction condition were initially more successful in solving
well-structured problems (Kapur and Bielaczyc, 2012). However, in the end, their performance on
tasks that required deeper conceptual understandings was inferior to students under the learning
condition where learners persisted in generating and exploring representations and solution methods
for solving complex, novel problems.
78PIRLS is devoted to reading by fourth graders, and it reports detailed information on teaching
practices. The data are extracted from Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer (2013).
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curriculum control on teaching practices. The results suggest that teachers spend
more time conducting group discussions in more decentralized curriculum-control
education systems, while they tend to spend more time in lecturing in more central-
ized curriculum-control systems.
In the next three columns, I examine the robustness of the relationships by using
the teacher survey data from the Civic Education Study (CES) in 1999.79 The
survey includes the questions about teaching practices, such as the frequencies
of teachers lecturing, of students taking notes or group activities.80 By merging
with student survey data, student characteristics (age, gender, immigrant status,
number of books at home, and education of the parents), teacher characteristics (age,
gender, education, years of experience, trust, and attitudes toward cooperation), and
school characteristics (class size, public school, and social capital at the school
level) are controlled in regression (2.3). Column (3) shows a negative correlation
between curriculum control and the conducting of group discussions in the class. In
Column (4)–(5), there are positive associations between curriculum control and the
frequencies of teachers lecturing and students taking notes from the board.
These results are consistent with my argument. In a more centralized curriculum-
control educational environment, students work in groups less frequently and have
fewer opportunities to ask teachers questions. These teacher-centered instructional
approaches probably lead to cramming teaching styles. Rote learning methods will
popular among students (Au, 2007). Here, I provide some empirical evidence on
the effect of curriculum control on the popularity of critical thinking in teaching at
the country level. I use the following regression model:
CriticalT hinki = β0+β1CurrControli+β2X1990−2005+Continenti+υi (2.4)
79CES ran in 1999 in 25 countries to assess the level of civic knowledge of mostly 14-year-olds
in the eighth and ninth grades.
80The data are extracted from Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer (2013).
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Figure 2.9.. AV Plot of the Critical Thinking in Teaching on Curriculum Control (Table
2.9.8, Column (1))
It is similar to the regression model (2.1) except that the dependent variable is the
indicator measuring the critical thinking teaching in each country.81The results are
displayed in Table 2.9.8. The baseline result is shown in Column (1), implying
that more centralized curriculum control is associated with less critical thinking
in teaching. The relationship between curriculum control and critical thinking in
teaching estimated in Column (1) is depicted in the added variable (AV) plot in Fig-
ure 2.9. The visible negative link between curriculum control and critical thinking
teaching style is very striking. It echoes the findings using teaching survey data at
the individual level. I also present some robustness checks by controlling for other
covariates specified in each column. It indicates that the pattern is quite stable.
81The critical thinking teaching data is from the Executive Opinion Survey in The Global
Competitiveness Index Report in 2018. Response to the survey question “In your country, how
do you assess the style of teaching?” [1 = frontal, teacher based, and focused on memorizing; 7 =
encourages creative and critical individual thinking]. The score is normalized between 0 and 100.
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2.7.2. The Effect of Curriculum Control on Learning
Experiences of Students
Soaked in the centralized curriculum control system and instructed by the teacher-
center approach, it should be not surprising that students are less interested in
studying. Negative learning attitude weakens children’s curiosity and imagination.
In addition, when children are judged by a single criterion like test performance,
they are constantly asked to be compared with their peers. They are rewarded
or punished accordingly. The result is that most children will be worse than the
few top performers in the class, school, or city. Most children learn to internalize
a sense of inferiority and eventually lose self-confidence (Zhao, 2012; Loveless,
2006). This is not good for their career developments in the future, especially for
the careers rely more on creativity abilities. Bénabou and Tirole (2002) emphasize
that self-confidence is crucially important in engaging in creative work, such as
writing a great book, doing innovative research, or setting up a firm. Hirshleifer,
Low and Teoh (2012) find that firms with overconfident CEOs obtain more patents
and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and
development (R&D) expenditure.
The survey data from TIMSS in 2007 are used to investigate the influence of cur-
riculum control on the learning experiences of students, more specifically, the self-
confidence of students and their attitudes toward learning.82 The controls for stu-
dent, teacher, and classroom characteristics are similar to those used in CES. Col-
umn (6)–(7) report the effects of curriculum control on student’s attitude83 toward
science and self-confidence in studying it.84 Students learning in more centralized
82The data are extracted from Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer (2013).
83The positive attitude index is built by TIMSS, combining the information related to the
following statements: “I enjoy learning this subject,” “This subject is boring,” and “I like this
subject.” Response options were “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree” on a 4-point Likert scale,
with the variable of “This subject is boring” having a reverse scale.
84There are more observations in science survey data. Similar patterns are also obtained by using
survey data in math. See the appendix.
100
2.7 Intermediate Channels
curriculum-control educational environments have less positive attitude toward the
subject they learn, and they feel less confident.
2.7.3. The Effect of Curriculum Control on Career Values
Schooling shapes people’s beliefs, social values, and preferences (Algan, Cahuc and
Shleifer, 2013; Ito, Kubota and Ohtake, 2015; Cantoni et al., 2017). The rigidity
and prescriptiveness of the curriculum, along with the sustainability of the effects
over time, suppresses learners’ autonomy. Curriculum-based tests reward those who
conform and penalize those who deviate. As a result, students are taught to do
things in a certain way that helps them achieve high test scores, and they learn
not to deviate. However, asking questions and challenging the status quo are the
hallmarks of innovation, which are in direct conflict with the spirit of standardized
tests. Those who survive and thrive in a test-taking culture may have learned to
conform and internalized a sense of obedience. The beliefs and values shaped by
schooling will probably influence their careers and career values.
I explore the effect of curriculum control on career values by examining the values
that individuals report as being important to career. Career values are measured by
using the following survey question from the World Values Survey (WVS): “It is
important in a job to give an opportunity to use initiative.” Respondents respond
“yes” (denote 1) or “not” (denote 0) in the question. I also explore the nature of
their tasks at work. There are 10 levels, where 1 denotes mostly routine tasks while
10 denotes mostly not routine tasks.85
The respondent’s characteristics (gender, age, squared age, a set of dummies for
educational attainments and income levels) and the dummies for different survey
years are controlled in regressions using model (2.3). The results are reported in
Column (8)–(9) in Table 2.9.7. Individuals educated in a decentralized curriculum-
85I use the data from the fifth and sixth waves of the WVS.
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control system are more frequently doing creative tasks at work. They are more
likely to believe that it is important to use initiative in their jobs.
In the appendix, I also show that curriculum control is systematically associated
with parenting styles by examining the values that parents report as being important
to teach their children. The parents educated in a decentralized curriculum-control
system believed that imagination and independence were important for their chil-
dren, and they generally disagreed that obedience is a important quality.
2.8. Policy Application
It seems to be a consensus among researchers, policymakers, and the public that
schooling is an important pillar for innovation and economic prosperity. However,
it seems unclear which type of education is more beneficial to innovation.
Many policymakers, especially in the Western world, admire the impressive perfor-
mances of some Asian countries on international examinations (Xiang and Yeaple,
2018) and they implement the policies learned from these countries, like national
curriculum and high-stakes tests, and hope that these policies will improve the test
performances of their students, strengthen the quality of their human capital, and
eventually boost their national innovation and economic prosperity.86
Standard curricula with high-stakes tests will push teachers and students to con-
centrate on the knowledge the official curriculum describes and promote efficiency.
86For example, the United States introduced a national curriculum (the Common Core State
Standards) in 2010 to compete successfully in the global economy (Porter et al., 2011). Australia
marked a turning point in its educational history with the endorsement by Australian education
ministers of a national curriculum in 2010. The rationales behind it are similar to that in the United
States (Polesel, Rice and Dulfer, 2014). Another example is the United Kingdom. Recently, they
review their national curriculum and stressed the features of international comparison and efficiency,
as follows: “ensure that the content of our National Curriculum compares favorably with the most
successful international curricula in the highest performing countries; set rigorous requirements for
pupil attainment, which measure up to those in the highest performing countries in the world” (James
et al., 2011). For these countries with traditionally decentralized education structures, in the pursuit
of efficiency, equity, and national consistency, these reforms on the standards and curricula will
essentially serve the same educational diet for a whole nation and homogenize children’s learning
(Zhao, 2012).
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These policies may increase learning efficiency and could be favorable to the im-
provement of the test performances of students (Zhao and Meyer, 2013). However,
they are costly. There are side effects ignored by many policymakers. For instance,
Au (2007, 2008); Zhao (2012); Polesel, Rice and Dulfer (2014) argue that these
policies will lead to curriculum narrowing, thereby pushing teachers to schedule
more time to cover the material on the test and ignore the non-core knowledge in
the curriculum. Classroom instruction will be transformed into test preparation,
which may lead to higher popularity of rote learning, thereby suppress critical and
creative thinking, and diminishes students’ natural curiosity and joy for learning in
its own right. Some critics have observed the recent decline of creativity of children
in the United States and attributed it to the trend of more centralized curriculum
design and high-stakes exams (Liu and Neilson, 2011; Christensen, 2015).
This study empirically confirms that there is a huge hidden cost in implementing
centralized official curricula with high-stakes testing. Such practices impair cre-
ativity. I do not suggest that policymakers should ignore the low achievements
of children’s learning, or especially, their unsatisfactory performances in exami-
nations. However, they should be more cautious about the policies they develop
and be aware of the benefit they would gain and cost they would pay. Like medical
products, they can cause damage while providing a cure. A medicine that is effective
in treating heart problems for some people can be deadly to others. In other words,
what works for some may hurt others.
Zhao and Meyer (2013); Kamens (2016) suggest that, instead of focusing on cur-
riculum and test policies, the government should pay more attention to preschool
education and socioeconomic policies that alleviate inequality. In addition, one
of the important reasons that countries tend to implement more standard curricula
and more unified assessment policies is addressing the ills that plague education
systems, namely those of equity, quality, and efficiency (Beauchamp, 1987; Helms,
2008; Dello-Iacovo, 2009; Orkodashvili, 2010; Osipian, 2012). For example, Japan
quickly returned to a more centrally controlled education system after implementing
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the education reform by experts from the United States after World War II. Japanese
seem to enjoy “equality of opportunity” because of substantially equal physical
facilities throughout the country, a uniform curriculum administered by a single
Ministry of Education, equal access to the same textbooks, teachers of relatively
equal competence, and a uniform set of national standards (Beauchamp, 1987).
Similarly, many ex-Soviet countries, like Russia and Georgia, have recently tran-
sited to more centralized curriculum control and uniform university entrance exam
to solve the growing corruption in their education systems (Orr et al., 2017). Thus,
macro-policies beyond education reforms are needed to deal with these problems.
Otherwise, policymakers and the public will have the tendency to agree to more
centralized education policies to pursue efficiency, equity, and national consistency,
which will harm the innovation capacity and weaken economic growth in the long
run.
2.9. Conclusion
Innovation is the key long-term pillar for the economy, and it grows more important
when the country is approaching global technical frontiers (Romer, 1990; Aghion
and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti,
2006). Schooling is becoming increasingly indispensable for cultivating human
capital, which is crucial for innovation (Madsen et al., 2010; Zhao, 2012; Mad-
sen, 2014; Jones, 2016). This paper explored one specified educational structure,
curriculum control, in its effect on creativity. I found that a centralized curricu-
lum design paired with high-stakes achievement tests is negatively associated with
creativeness. Curriculum control seems to be an independent factor that affects
innovation, and this has not been explored by previous work.
The relationship still holds even when international test scores and tertiary schooling
are controlled, which highlights that curriculum control affects the quality of human
capital that is crucial for innovation. This dimension is not fully explained by the
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two indicators, both of which are the measures of quality of human capital. More
decentralized curriculum control, which has fewer negative effects on children’s
imagination, creativity, self-confidence, and critical thinking, is better for innova-
tion.
To solve the endogenous issue, I employed the exogenous land productivity dis-
tribution as the IV. This IV captures the exogenous difference of the observability
of agricultural productivity across regions within the country, which is proxied by
the standard deviation of CSI or σCSI built by Galor and Ömer Özak (2015). The
IV regressions identify that centralized curriculum control casually weakens the
individual’s creativity, measured by research-oriented occupations.
This study questioned education reforms in many developed countries that once had
decentralized education systems but implemented education policies like national
curricula and high-stakes tests in recent years. The adverse side effects of these
policies in education have been largely ignored. These adverse effects, including
curriculum narrowing, the spread of rote learning, talent homogenization, and sup-
pression of curiosity, would impair national innovation in the long run. The reform
taken in education should be more cautious.
Further research should theoretically explore the factors determine the equilibrium
of the education system. Equally importantly, the mechanisms through which the
curriculum control influences innovation need to be further investigated.
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Table 2.9.4.. Robustness Check: The Effect of Curriculum Control on Innovation by Controlling for
Human Capital Indicators
Dependent Variable: Patent’s Quality (H-index, USPTO)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control Variable: Immigrant TestTertiary Stock Score All
Curriculum Control (β1) -32.964*** -28.693*** -29.581*** -25.654***
(10.758) (8.468) (10.162) (8.887)
GDP per (Log) 3.914*** 2.823** 5.923*** 3.948**
(1.394) (1.114) (2.109) (1.822)
Avg Schooling (Log) 1.430 2.904 16.049** 8.795
(2.184) (2.186) (6.391) (6.274)
Tertiary Schooling (Log) 1.413 3.313
(1.332) (3.539)
International Migrant Stock (Log) 2.413*** 2.832**
(0.863) (1.159)
Test Score (Log) 36.888*** 32.318***
(9.489) (9.287)
Continent Dummies    
Observations 108 107 62 61
R-squared 0.496 0.574 0.624 0.687
Note: All regressions are cross-country with one observation per country. The dependent variable is H-index of
the patent from USPTO. The covariate specified in each column is controlled. Robust standard errors are in the
parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.9.5.. Robustness Check: The Effect of Curriculum Control on Innovation--Different Sample
Sizes, Outlier Obs. and Different Model
Dependent Variable: Patent’s Quality (H-index, USPTO)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Drop Drop Europe & Only Large Only Rich Drop Extreme Alternative
Neo-Europes Neo-Europes Pop. Countries Countries Observations Model: Tobit
Curriculum Control (β1) -19.474*** -14.704* -35.848** -30.467*** -25.317*** -34.650***
(5.649) (8.058) (14.664) (10.238) (4.302) (10.436)
GDP per (Log) 3.244*** 1.885 6.461*** 7.304* 3.377*** 6.506***
(1.226) (1.300) (1.958) (4.060) (0.833) (2.022)
Avg Schooling (Log) 2.219 3.844** 0.276 28.657*** 0.872 5.365
(1.861) (1.919) (2.326) (8.770) (1.534) (4.073)
Continent Dummies      
Observations 104 76 70 56 98 108
R-squared 0.470 0.374 0.537 0.572 0.583 -
Note: All regressions are cross-country with one observation per country. The dependent variable is H-index of the patent from USPTO. Robust
standard errors are in the parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.9.6.. The Propensity to Choose Research-Oriented Occupations in the United States
Panel A: OLS (Whole Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic Group Linguistic Distance
Control Variable: Dummies (from the U.S.) Index All
Curriculum Control (β1) -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 1,400,302 1,400,302 1,396,487 1,396,487
R-squared 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.054
Panel B: 2SLS (Sub-sample, Not Born in the U.S.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linguistic Distance
Control Variable: Culture (from U.S.) Index All
Second Stage: Regression of Research-oriented Occupation on Curriculum Control
Curriculum Control (β1) -0.086*** -0.270*** -0.071*** -0.233***
(0.015) (0.054) (0.012) (0.045)
First Stage: Regression of Curriculum Control on log σCSI
σCSI (Log) -0.024*** -0.008*** -0.031*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 265,969 252,995 262,202 250,683
R-squared 0.132 0.035 0.136 0.063
1st stage F-stat 2067 207.9 2707 330.7
Partial R2 0.00928 0.00121 0.0155 0.00182
Note: The table reports the estimates of parameter β1 in specification (2.2). The dependent variable is
a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the individual has a research-oriented occupation. The definition of
research-oriented occupations includes Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations (codes 160–196
in the 2000 Census occupational classification system recorded in the IPUMS variable OCC). Ethnicity
is based on the respondent’s self-reported ancestry or ethnic origin (IPUMS variable ANCESTR1). The
covariates controlled in each regression are specified in the paper. Robust standard errors are in the
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table
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C
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C
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U
rban-
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C
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R
eligion
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iversity
R
ule
Test
Pop.
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H
IIndex)
O
fL
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Tertiary
Score
C
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C
ontrol(β
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3. Economic Growth and
Democratization —The Legacy
of State History
3.1. Introduction
There is a large and growing literature on the links between the state capacity,
political regimes, and economic performance in both economic and political realms
(Acemoglu, 2005; Besley and Persson, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; John-
son and Koyama, 2017; Borcan, Olsson and Putterman, 2018).
One branch of studies focuses on the effects of the state institutions on growth and
contend that the strong state capacity, which provides indispensable public goods,
plays a great role in economic prosperity, most notably among states in East Asia
(Easterly, 1995; Mattingly, 2017), while a large body of work emphasizes that a lack
of state capacity is the main barrier to economic development in African countries.
The weak state has a limited capacity to tax and regulate and, consequently, to
support economic development (Aghion and Howitt, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2014;
Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno and Robinson, 2015).
Another branch of study stresses that it is important for economic growth that there
are checks and balances and limits on elites’ predatory behaviors (Papaioannou and
Siourounis, 2008a; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Gründler and Krieger, 2016;
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Acemoglu et al., 2019). However, it is still highly controversial whether democracy
has significant and positive effects on economic growth in poor countries (Hunting-
ton, 1993; Barro, 1999; Huang, 2012a; Acemoglu et al., 2019).
This paper discusses the links between state strength, political regimes, and eco-
nomic development. More specifically, I explore when the ruling elites in autocracy
provide public goods – in this context, public education – to influence the accumu-
lation of human capital and economic growth through state capacity1, as well as the
role of state development in democratization.
Human capital, one of the important engines for economic growth, is largely built
by public education systems (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Jones and Romer, 2010;
Jones, 2016). There are two types of education, general vs specific, discussed
in this paper. General education increases one’s general ability to master new
knowledge and technologies but is costly. By contrast, specific education improves
one’s specific ability is thus less costly. Such education is not broad enough to
facilitate further learning and to adopt new technologies (Becker, 1964; Bertocchi
and Spagat, 2004; Krueger and Kumar, 2004; Huang, 2012b). Equally important,
general education increases one’s general productivity in solving problems, im-
plying that it also enhances one’s skills in extracting gains and defending one’s
interests in political conflicts. Better educated people are more effectively organized
and more politically active (Bennett Jr, 1967; Meyer and Rubinson, 1975; Glaeser,
Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007; Huang, 2012b; Van de Werfhorst, 2017). However,
specific education does not necessarily improve one’s political rent-seeking skills
and organizational efficiency.
With this background, I establish a model to explore the effects of state capacity and
political regimes on economic performance. Initially, there are two groups, elites
and the masses, in a poor autocratic society. Individuals of these two groups are
1Note that I do not intend to claim that state capacity only works through education on growth
or that education and state capacity are the only two important factors related to growth. Rather, my
aim is to build a framework grounded in reasonable assumptions that focus on state capacity and
educational differences and lays a theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis.
114
3.1 Introduction
endowed with one unit of raw labor. In addition, elites also inherit their parents
large amounts of wealth that could be used to invest in both physical and human
capital (either specific or general). Human capital and physical capital are used
for production. Human capital could be accumulated in private or public education
system.
It is beneficial for the ruling elites in a poor autocratic country to provide public
specific education for the masses when the state is developed. Equipped with spe-
cific human capital, the masses would produce more by using mature technologies.
It allows the ruling class to collect greater tax revenues by strong and capable state.
In other words, by providing specific education to the masses, the privileged class
not only extracts more tax revenues but also promotes economic growth.
The ruling elites, however, may not support public general education for the masses
even though they equipped with general human capital could produce much more by
using advanced technologies. Because the general education is more costly. What’s
more important, getting general education improves the abilities of the masses to
defend their own interests. It would reduce the ruling elites’ political rents and
erode their political privileges. Moreover, when the masses have enough financial
resources to get the general education, elites may even impede the masses access
to such education by propaganda. The effectiveness of propaganda depends on the
capabilities of state apparatus. These policies would prolong their autocratic rule at
the cost of economic development, especially when the economy is approaching the
technological frontiers.
Unlike autocracy, democracy has different public education policies. In democracy,
when the state is powerful, the masses can extract wealth from elites to improve their
livings above subsistence levels as soon as possible. Using bequests, the masses
receive specific education first since it is less costly and then general education. It
ensures that the economy grows sustainably.
Although democracy has no advantage to provide public specific education in the
poor country, democracy would support general education and promote growth as
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general human capital gradually becomes the main engine of the economy. In
other words, democratic institutions work better at the later stage of economic
development.
It also implies that to ensure sustained economic growth, a political transition in
the autocratic country is needed when the country is rich. I thus turn to explore the
conditions related to political reform. More specifically, I mainly examine the role
of state development in democratization.
The effect of state development on democratization is subtle due to its conflicting
roles. On the one hand, a powerful state extracts a large share of income from
the masses, which incentives them to rebel. On the other hand, with strong state
apparatus, the ruling elites can easily repress their rebellions. The masses must face
this dilemma. It hints that there could be a non-linear relationship between state de-
velopment and democratization. Although the theoretical model cannot definitively
clarify the relationship, I find a robust hump-shaped relationship between state
development measured by the duration of statehood history and democratization
in the subsequent empirical study. In other words, the extractive capacity (one
dimension of state capacity) is dominant and provokes the masses to rebel when
state development is below some threshold, while the coercive capacity (another
dimension of state capacity) becomes the main driving force and dilutes the masses’
resistance when the state development is above the threshold.
Consequently, there is a paradox in the effects of the state development on economic
performance. In the early development stage, a powerful autocratic state bring
benefits to the whole economy by supporting public specific education. But as the
autocratic country becomes rich and the main growth source shifts to general human
capital, political reform would be needed. By removing the obstacles to support
general education and cultivate general human capital, democracy would further
promote economic growth. The strong state, however, which previously was of the
great benefit to the whole economy, becomes an impediment to democratization,
and thus retarding economic development later.
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Subsequent regression results confirm the predictions obtained from the theoretical
model. There are heterogeneous effects of state development and democracy on
the economic performance. In particular, state development has the great influence
on growth in the early stage, while democracy plays better role in the late stage.
Additionally, there is a hump-shape relationship between state development and
democratization.
There are several contributions in the study. It echoes the argument that powerful
state benefits economic growth, especially in the early stage, while democracy pro-
motes growth in the late stage (Evans, 1994; Easterly, 1995; Rodrik, 1997; Rodrik
and Wacziarg, 2005; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008a; Acemoglu, Gallego and
Robinson, 2014; Meyersson, 2015; Mattingly, 2017; Acemoglu et al., 2019). More
specifically, I emphasize the roles of state development, political regimes in the
accumulation of different types of human capital. Furthermore, I point out that
a well-developed autocratic state may be an obstacle to democratization, through
which hinders the economic performance when the country is rich. This find-
ing complements the study of Borcan, Olsson and Putterman (2018) and Lagerlöf
(2016), who find that the intermediate level of state development benefits the eco-
nomic performance most in the long run. In the model, I explain this phenomenon
by considering the capacity and willingness of the state to support different types
of education, as well as the hump-shaped effect of state development on political
reform. In addition, the finding of such non-linear relationship contributes to a
small group literature that explores the role of state development in democratization
(Hariri, 2012; Lagerlöf, 2016). I find that this inverted-U shaped association stems
from the conflicting effects between extract capacity and coercive capacity, both of
which are positively related to state development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on
state institution, democracy, and growth. Section 3 sets up the model, first analyzes
the roles of state development and democracy in economic performance through
public education, then looks at the political reforms. Section 4 provides data sources
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and descriptive statistics. In Section 5, I present the growth regression model and
test the theoretical prediction. Next, I turn to present the transition regression model
and mainly explore the role of the state development in democratization. Section 6
concludes. Main proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3.2. Literature Review
This paper belongs to a large amount of literature connecting state capacity, democ-
ratization, and economic development.
The highly developed state is able to enforce law and order, regulate economic ac-
tivity, and provide public goods. Less developed states are detrimental to economic
development because they discourage the ruler from investing in public goods due
to the limitation of collecting taxes (Besley and Persson, 2014; Acemoglu et al.,
2014; Hanson, 2014; Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno and Robinson, 2015; Dincecco and
Katz, 2016; Johnson and Koyama, 2017). A series of work argues that a key to the
economic success of East Asian economies is that they all had states with a great
deal of capacity (Evans, 1994; Easterly, 1995; Rodrik, 1997; Rodrik, Subramanian
and Trebbi, 2004; Mattingly, 2017), while the economic failure of many African or
Latin American nations is due to their limited state capacity (Evans, 1994; Herbst,
2000; Aghion and Howitt, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2014). This argument receives
empirical support from many studies (Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011;
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013a,b; Lu, Luan and Sng, 2016; Bandyopad-
hyay and Green, 2016), which confirm a positive association between state devel-
opment (or political centralization) and economic prosperity.
Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993); Benabou (1996); Lizzeri and Persico (2004); Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2012) argue that democracy contributes to economic growth
by implementing the rule of law, limiting the power of rulers, and incentivizing to
offer public goods. But it is still controversial. March and Olsen (1983); Olson
(1993); Besley and Coate (1998); Huntington (2006) are worried that democracy
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may strengthen the pressure of distorting redistribution, which leads to potential
political gridlock and weakens the positive effects of democracy on economic per-
formance. Both sides could find empirical evidence to support their arguments. Hel-
liwell (1994), Barro (1996), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), Giavazzi and Tabellini
(2005), and Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) find that democratization brings little
benefits to economic growth. But, more recent work (Papaioannou and Siourou-
nis, 2008a; Meyersson, 2015; Gründler and Krieger, 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2019)
finds that political reform promotes economic development. Aghion, Alesina and
Trebbi (2007b); Huang (2012a) attempt to reconcile both sides and emphasize that
democracy may have great effects on rich countries but not poor ones.
No matter state capacity or political democracy, the important channels through
which they work on economic growth are to provide the public education (Tavares
and Wacziarg, 2001; Lindert, 2004; Bates, 2006; Besley and Persson, 2011; Fukuyama,
2014). Education helps people accumulate human capital. A broad amount of
growth literature, typically abstracting political regimes, also emphasize the essen-
tial role of human capital in economic take-off and growth (Nelson and Phelps,
1966; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Galor and Moav, 2004; Glaeser, Ponzetto and
Shleifer, 2007; Campante and Glaeser, 2009). Moreover, human capital is not
only one important input of production but also one great factor determining the
country’s technology absorptive capacity and innovation (Madsen et al., 2010; Ang
and Madsen, 2011; Madsen, 2014). It becomes more important as an economy is
approaching the world technological frontier (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Acemoglu,
Aghion and Zilibotti, 2006).
Becker (1964); Bertocchi and Spagat (2004); Krueger and Kumar (2004); Huang
(2012b) emphasize that general human capital, which is cultivated through general
education, is closely related to the ability to learn new technology and innovation.
Moreover, general education not only improves one’s general abilities in learning
leading-edge knowledge and adopts new technologies but also strengthens one’s
skills of extracting gains and defending one’s interests when there are political
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conflicts (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007; Huang, 2012a; Van de Werfhorst,
2017). Therefore, the political privileges of ruling elites in the autocratic country
may be threatened when the masses receive the general education. In other words,
the masses equipped with general human capital could weaken the ability of elites
to collect the tax, and also raise the probability of ruling elites to become political
losers (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006b). Thus, it may be difficult for the autocratic
country to provide this type of public education even its state is well-developed
and has the capacity to support it. However, the democratic country would remove
obstacles for the cultivation of general human capital, which promotes the abilities
of the masses to adopt new technologies, igniting the new growth engine when the
economy is close to the world technological frontier.
To achieve sustainable economic growth in the autocratic country, the political
reforms may be needed when the country is rich and gradually relies more on
general human capital rather than specific one. I turn to discuss the literature on
democratization.
It is a little surprising that there are few studies about the role of state develop-
ment in democratization. It should be an important question. If strong state in
autocracy could boost economic growth, especially at the early growth stage (Bock-
stette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002; Lagerlöf, 2016; Borcan, Olsson and Putterman,
2018), and democracy promotes economic performance at the later growth stage
(Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi, 2007b), the political reform has to be implemented to
make sure the sustained economic growth when the economy gradually approach
technological frontiers. The role of state development in political reform should be
explored.
As I know, only Hariri (2012) and Lagerlöf (2016) show that early statehood is
associated with less democracy in modern times. In society with short statehood
history, the ruling class does not have very powerful capacity to control the masses.
It is relatively easy to transfer democracy when the masses are given the opportunity.
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In this article, I show that the link between state development and democratization
is a little subtle. It is hump-shaped.
3.3. The Model
3.3.1. The Basic Environment
There are overlapping generations with a fixed population. For simplicity, I normal-
ize it to 1. Each individual in generation t lives for two periods, investing human
capital in childhood (at time t) if there is a bequest and participating in production
at adulthood (at time t+1). They are homogeneous on their abilities.
Technology and Endowment. In every period the economy produces a single homo-
geneous good that can be used for consumption and investment. The production at
time t+1 is
Yt+1 = Hαt+1K
1−α
t+1 ,
where Ht+1 is the aggregate stock of human capital and Kt+1 is the aggregate stock
of physical capital. For simplicity, I assume that physical capital depreciates fully
after one period that is equivalent to an individual’s adulthood.
The total amount of human capital Ht+1 is composed of three distinct forms, the
amount of population receiving general education Lgt+1, task-specific education
Lst+1, no education and using raw labor (endowed by nature), Lut+1, respectively.
So,
Ht+1 = At+1Lgt+1+AtLst+1+Lut+1,
where Lut+1+Lst+1+Lgt+1 = 1. It means that the amount of population who receive
education cannot exceed the whole population. Here, At+1 > At > 1, indicating that
individual investing in general education is more productive. It could be understood
as workers with general human capital can access the current knowledge stock,
while those with specific human capital can only take advantage of the knowledge
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stock in the previous period. It captures a key difference between these two kinds
of human capital. General human capital allows one to transform new knowledge
into productivity, whereas specific human capital improves productivity by using
mature technologies (Becker, 1964; Bertocchi and Spagat, 2004; Krueger and Ku-
mar, 2004; Huang, 2012b). More importantly, this formula also emphasizes one
important characteristic of human capital proposed by Galor and Tsiddon (1997);
Galor and Moav (2004); Oded et al. (2011). Human capital is embedded in human.
There are natural restrictions that subject its accumulation at the individual level to
diminishing returns. Then, the aggregate stock of human capital would be larger if
the accumulation of human capital would be widely distributed among members
in society.2 The knowledge stock At grows at a constant rate, g, which means
At+1 = At(1+g).3
Preference. Individuals are identical in preferences, which are represented by a
log-linear utility function
uit+1 = (1−β )logcit+1+β log(z+bit+1),
where cit+1 is the adulthood consumption (at time t+1) of individual i in generation
t, bit+1 is one’s bequest for offspring, β ∈ (0,1) indicates the relative weight of
bequest, and z > 0 represents some threshold level of income.
The budget constraint is cit+1 + b
i
t+1 ≤ Iit+1, where Iit+1 is individual i’s income at
adulthood. As a result of utility maximization, one’s optimal bequest is bit+1 =
max{β (Iit+1−z(1−β )/β ),0}. So, only when an individual’s income is higher than
a certain level indicated by Z ≡ z(1− β )/β , would there be any resources left as
2Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009); Baten and Hippe (2018) provide empirical evidence and find
that inequality in land distribution has a negative correlation with human capital formation and the
long-run economic growth in the United States and Europe, respectively.
3A more realistic assumption is that the knowledge stock At grows at an endogenously
determined speed g such that gt+1 = Φ(Lgt), where Φ′ > 0 and Φ(0) is a small positive number.
It means the speed of knowledge accumulation is strictly increasing in general human capital Lgt ,
but constant with regard to the stock of specific skills. This reflects the fact that general human
capital is more effective in generating new knowledge than specific skills. My main conclusions still
hold under this assumption.
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bequest. The bequest bit+1 can be invested in physical capital or human capital for
the next generation.
Suppose individual i in generation t who equips with specific (general) human
capital is list+1 ∈ {0,1} (ligt+1 ∈ {0,1}). The aggregate general and specific human
capital are, correspondingly, Lgt+1 =
∫ 1
0 l
i
gt+1 di and Lst+1 =
∫ 1
0 l
i
gt+1 di.
Assume mikt represents the amount of resources invested in the physical capital for
individual i in generation t. The aggregate physical capital by domestic investment
is thus KDt+1 =
∫ 1
0 m
i
kt di. Specifically, when b
i
t < cst , m
i
kt = b
i
t ; when cst ≤ bit < cgt
and the individual decides to invest in specific education, mikt = b
i
t− cst ; when bit ≥
cgt and the individual decides to invest in general education, mikt = b
i
t− cgt .
3.3.2. The Political Economy Model
3.3.2.1. Autocratic Environment
In the beginning of the political economy, each individual i ∈ {e, p}, where e de-
notes that the individual belongs to the ruling elites, and p represents that the
individual belongs to the masses. Suppose the share of elites in society is ρ . The
total amount of population of the masses and elites are (1−ρ) and ρ , respectively.
Initially, there are B0 amount of wealth in society. Each elite member is endowed
with an identical amount of wealth be0 = B0/ρ . The masses are endowed no wealth.
Elites could invest physical capital, human capital (specific or general) but no in-
vestment activities are involved for the masses at the beginning.
At the beginning, elites control state apparatus. State capacities sourced from the
state apparatus are the abilities of state institutions to effectively implement of-
ficial goals (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985; Fukuyama, 2014). State
capacity is multi-dimensions. Generally, there are three interdependent dimensions:
extractive capacity, coercive capacity, and administrative capacity (Hanson, 2014;
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Johnson and Koyama, 2017).4 Relying on the state apparatus, ruling elites have
the capacities to collect tax, protest themselves against external and internal threats,
maintain internal order, as well as produce and deliver public goods and services.
I use a predetermined variable, duration of statehood history, as functions of these
three dimensions of state capacity.5 A long history of statehood enables the state
government to solidify power and create a strong bureaucracy, and to strengthen its
fiscal capability (Chhibber, 1997; Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002; Chanda
and Putterman, 2007; Putterman and Weil, 2010). So, statehood history is positively
associated with the three dimensions of state capacity.
In autocracy, the elite has political power and could tax the masses. The tax-
extracting ability of an elite member at time t+1 for generation t is λ eit+1 =
τ(legt+1)
d(l¯pgt+1,χ)
.
It is increasing in the elite’s general human capital, legt+1. d(l¯
p
gt+1,χ) denotes the
ability of the masses to counteract the elite’s political ruling and rent-seeking capac-
ity, which is increasing in the average general human capital of the masses, l¯pgt+1,
but decreasing in the state’s extract capacity originated from statehood history, χ .
χ ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 means the lowest state development and 1 means the
highest state development. For simplicity, I assume that d(l¯pgt+1,χ) = d(l¯
p
gt+1)/χ
and d(0,χ) = d(0)/χ = 1/χ for normalization. So, the tax capacity of an elite is
λ eit+1 =
χτ(legt+1)
d(l¯pgt+1)
= χξ ,
where ξ =
τ(legt+1)
d(l¯pgt+1)
∈ { τ(0)d(1) ,
τ(0)
d(δ ) ,
τ(0)
d(0) ,
τ(1)
d(1) ,
τ(δ )
d(0) ,
τ(1)
d(0)}, and 0 < δ < 1.6 Let
τ(0)
d(1) = ξ ,
τ(0)
d(δ ) = ξ δ ,
τ(0)
d(0) =
τ(1)
d(1) = ξ ,
τ(δ )
d(0) = ξ¯δ , and
τ(1)
d(0) = ξ¯ , it is easy to confirm that
4Extractive capacity is the ability to tax revenues. Coercive capacity is the ability to protect
against external and internal threats, maintain internal order. Administrative capacity is the ability
to collect information, to develop policy, to produce and deliver public goods and services. These
three dimensions are interdependent with each other. Extractive and coercive capacities are likely
prerequisites for higher levels of administrative capacity. A high level of extractive capacity requires
at least some level of administrative capacity. Coercive capacity requires revenues and administrative
reach into society. Moreover, all three of these dimensions require adequate information about, and
control over, territories and populations (Hanson and Sigman, 2013).
5I don’t explore the dynamic change of state capacity and the interaction of state capacity and
political regimes. Since state capacity is quite stable within the country, it could be a reasonable
assumption.
6It would be explained in the next section.
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ξ < ξ δ < ξ < ξ¯δ < ξ¯ . The tax-extracting ability of the state, controlled by elites, is
λ e_totalt+1 = ρλ
e
it+1 = ρχξ ,
λ e_totalt+1 measures the de facto extractive capacity of government ruled by elites. It
is composed of two parts, ρχ , unchangeable and determined by the state history;
τ(legt+1)
d(l¯pgt+1)
= ξ , changeable and influenced not only by the general human capital of the
ruling elites but also the general human capital of the masses.
An elite individual gets a tax revenue χξ Ip_totalt+1 , where I
p_total
t+1 denotes the aggregate
income of the masses. The total tax revenue of the elite group is χρξ Ip_totalt+1 . It is
clear that, ceteris paribus, a higher χ , meaning higher state development (indicates
stronger extractive capacity), will help elites collect more tax revenues.
General human capital enhances an individual’s political bargaining ability as rep-
resented by the tax-generating skill τ(legt+1) of the elite and the tax-evading skill
d(l¯pgt+1) of the masses, while specific human capital is not or at least less effective in
doing so. This is a natural implication of the essence of general human capital. Gen-
eral human capital increases one’s ability to transform knowledge into productivity
in whatever task at hand, the specific human capital, by contrast, only increases
one’s productivity in the specific task (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007; Huang,
2012b; Van de Werfhorst, 2017).
3.3.3. Economic Development and Educational Change
Production. Production is operated in a perfectly competitive environment. Given
the prices of the four factors {rt+1, wut+1, wst+1, wgt+1}, producers in period t +1
choose the amounts of physical capital and three types of human capital to maximize
profits. That is,
{K∗t+1,L∗ut+1,L∗st+1,L∗gt+1}= argmax Hαt+1K1−αt+1 −rt+1Kt+1−wst+1Lst+1−wgt+1Lgt+1−wut+1Lut+1
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s.t. Lut+1+Lst+1+Lgt+1 = 1,
where Ht+1 = Lut+1+At+1Lgt+1+AtLst+1. The inverse demand functions for these
production factors are
rt+1 = (1−α)k−αt+1,
wst+1 = αAtk1−αt+1 ,
wgt+1 = αAt+1k1−αt+1 ,
wut+1 = αk1−αt+1 ,
where kt+1 = Kt+1/Ht+1 =
Kt+1
Lut+1+At+1Lgt+1+AtLst+1
is the ratio between the stock of
aggregate physical capital and the aggregate human capital.
Suppose it is an open and small economy, capital is perfectly mobile internationally
and the world interest rate is constant over time at a global level. Then,
rt+1 = r,
where r is the interest rate in the global world. International capital mobility im-
plies therefore that the ratio of physical capital to human capital in production,
kt+1, is constant over time. In particular, kt+1 = k(r) =
( r
1−α
)− 1α , wu = wu(r) =
α
( r
1−α
)− 1−αα , wst+1 =wst+1(r,At)=αAt ( r1−α )− 1−αα , and wgt+1 =wgt+1(r,At+1)=
αAt+1
( r
1−α
)− 1−αα .
Investment in Human and Physical Capital. The general education is costly and
requests people to learn a broad and abstract knowledge base while the specific
education is cheap and only cover a narrow and practical knowledge (Huang, 2012b;
Van de Werfhorst, 2017). Suppose the learning costs of specific and general educa-
tion are cst and cgt , respectively. Specifically, I assume that cst = aswst+1 < cgt =
cst + agwgt+1, where 0 < as < 1, 0 < ag < 1, and cgt < wgt+1.7 It makes sure that
7This assumption is similar to Oded et al. (2011). They suppose that the acquisition of education
is associated with a fixed cost, which reflects the indivisibility of human capital formation. In their
setting, the fixed cost of education is a weighted average of the payments to labors in society.
126
3.3 The Model
the general education is much costlier than the specific one. This assumption also
guarantees that the masses with bequests would invest in specific education first
when the country is not rich and technology is not so advanced. In any period t,
the bequest bit ≥ 0, i ∈ {p,e}, is allocated among human and physical capital to
maximize the pretax income {Ii∗ut+1, Ii∗st+1, Ii∗gt+1} where8
Ii∗ut+1 = rb
i
t +wu,
Ii∗st+1 = r(b
i
t− cst)+wst+1, where bit− cst ≥ 0,
Ii∗gt+1 = r(b
i
t− cgt)+wgt+1, where bit− cgt ≥ 0,
Define ψ imn = Ii∗mt+1− Ii∗nt+1, where m,n ∈ {g,s,u}. The decision of investing either
specific and general human capital depends on whether ψ isu > 0 or ψ igs > 0, respec-
tively. As long as Assumption (1) and Assumption (2) are satisfied, individuals
would invest in specific (general) education when bt > cst (bt > cgt).
Assumption 1. as ≤ 1r
(
1− 1At
)
.9
Assumption 2. ag ≤ 1r
(
1− 11+g
)
.10
Let as = 1r
(
1− 1At∗
)
, when t > t∗, the technology used in society is higher than At∗ ,
indicating the return of human capital (specific and general) is high enough, they
would invest in specific human capital when bt > cst . Under these two assumptions,
without considering extractive revenues, the ruling elites would invest in general
education when At ≥ At∗, while the masses receive no education due to bpt = 0.
However, considering the extractive revenue, ruling elites would invest in general
8The decisions of the masses would be the same when after-tax incomes are analyzed. Although
they would keep larger share of income if the average level of general human capital of the masses
were improved, individual would not consider this effect and take the extractive share as given. The
decisions of elites on the investment of human capital should be earlier when the tax revenue is
considered. So, the conditions found here are sufficient ones.
9 If bit ≥ cgt , individual would invest in specific education when wst+1 −wu ≥ rcst ⇒ cst ≤
α(At−1)
r
( r
1−α
)− 1−αα ⇒ as ≤ 1r (1− 1At ).
10The person whose bequest is larger than cgt would invest in general education if wgt+1−wst+1≥
(cgt − cst)r⇒ ag ≤ 1r (1− AtAt+1 ) =
1
r (1− 11+g ), where cgt = cst +agwgt+1 = aswst+1+agwgt+1.
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human capital earlier. Especially, when the state development is higher, the im-
provement of the extractive ability of the elite by equipping general human capital
is larger, the elite would invest in general human capital earlier.11 Here, I focus on
the case that be0 > cg1, as ≤ 1r
(
1− 1A0
)
and ag ≤ 1r
(
1− 11+g
)
, which makes sure
that the ruling elites would invest in general education at the beginning.
As the economy grows, the ruling elites could find that it could be beneficial to
support public education for the masses under some conditions.
Elites Support Public Specific Education. Under autocracy, the ruling elites con-
trolling well-developed state may find that it is beneficial to support public specific
education for the masses with no bequests. The masses equipped specific human
capital will promote economic growth and enlarge the whole economy pie. The
elites could collect more tax revenues, although they have to finance the public
education system. The ruling elites try to maximize {piegt+1,piegt+1}, piegt+1is the
after-tax income of the elite by supporting no public education, and piegt+1, the
after-tax income of the elite by supporting public specific education, where
piegt+1 = wgt+1+(b
e
t − cgt)r+χξ¯ Ip_totalt+1 = wgt+1+(bet − cgt)r+χξ¯ (1−ρ)wu,
piegt+1 = wgt+1+
(
bet − cgt−
1−ρ
ρ
cst
)
r+χξ¯ I¯p_totalt+1
= wgt+1+
(
bet − cgt−
1−ρ
ρ
cst
)
r+χξ¯ (1−ρ)wst+1.
11Suppose after-tax income of the elite would be pieut+1 = wu + rb
e
t + ξχ(1− ρ)wu if there
is no investment in human capital, and piegt+1 = wgt + r(b
e
t − cgt) + ξ¯ χ(1− ρ)wu if the elite
receives general education. Thus, ∆piet+1 = pi
e
gt+1−pieut+1 = wgt −wu− r(aswst+1+agwgt+1)+(ξ¯ −
ξ )χ(1− ρ)wu = wuAt+1
(
1− 1At+1 − r
(
as
1+g +ag
)
+(ξ¯ −ξ )χ(1−ρ) 1At+1
)
. Without considering
the extractive revenue, when 1− 1At+1 − r
(
as
1+g +ag
)
≥ 0, it would be definitely beneficial for the
elite to invest in general human capital. 1− 1At+1 −r
(
as
1+g +ag
)
+(ξ¯ −ξ )χ(1−ρ) 1At+1 ≥ 0 has to be
satisfied if the tax revenue is considered, which is earlier to eligible. Besides, when state development
(χ) is stronger and the improvement of political rent-seeking capacity by general human capital,
measured by ξ¯ −ξ , is larger, it would be easier to be satisfied.
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Assumption 3. as ≤ 1r
(
1− 1At
)
ρχξ¯ .12
Since as = 1r
(
1− 1At∗
)
and ρχξ¯ < 1, the inequality would be more easily to satisfy
when At and χ are larger. Let as = 1r
(
1− 1At∗s
)
ρχξ¯ = 1r
(
1− 1At∗
)
, where t∗s =
t(χ,At∗),
∂ t∗s
∂χ < 0. When t > t
∗
s , the ruling elites would support public specific
education even bpt = 0. Intuitively, when the return of specific human capital is
higher, the ruling class would collect a larger share of revenues from the masses if
the state, measured by χ , is more powerful.
So, strong state will be beneficial for economic growth when the autocratic coun-
try is poor and the masses have no bequests. Specifically, let χ∗s = χ(At∗,At) =
1−1/At∗
1−1/At
1
ρξ¯
, where ∂χ
∗
s
∂At < 0. χ
∗
s is the threshold of state development. When χ ≥ χ∗s ,
ruling elites would support public specific education. Additionally, as technologies
progress, the cutoff would become lower and even less-developed state probably
finances specific education for the masses.
The Economy Grows Faster By Supporting Public Specific Education. When the
relative return of human capital is becoming relatively higher (i.e., At is large), the
aggregate stock of human capital would become larger by the support of ruling
elites on public specific education, then promote economic performance. Theo-
retically, it means GDP without public specific education, Yt+1, would be smaller
than Y˜t+1, where ruling elites provide the free public specific education to the poor.
It is easy to verify that Yt+1 = ρ[wgt+1 +(bet − cgt)r] + (1− ρ)wu is smaller than
Y˜t+1 = ρ
(
wgt+1+
(
bet − cgt− 1−ρρ cgt
)
r
)
+(1−ρ)wst+1 as long as wst+1−wu ≥
cstr. Assumption (1) guarantees that this inequality would be satisfied.
Intuitively, human capital cannot be separated from the human. The investment of
human capital is accumulated in each individual with the diminishing return. Then,
the aggregate stock of human capital would be larger if the accumulation of human
capital would be widely distributed among members in society (Oded et al., 2011).
12It would be worthy to support public specific education if cst ≤ ρχξ¯ (1−At )αr
( r
1−α
)− 1−αα ⇒ as≤
1
r
(
1− 1At
)
ρχξ¯ .
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Elites Don’t Support Public General Education. Unlike the situation that ruling
elites actively support specific education, they may be unwilling to support general
public education. Although this policy could enlarge the pie of the whole econ-
omy13, the extractive ability of the elite would be impaired by the masses equipped
general human capital. It is possible that the net tax revenues may be shrunk down.
Mathematically, I need to compare piegt+1, the income of the elite by supporting no
public education, and piegt+1, the income of the elite by supporting public general
education. The below assumption ensures that the ruling class doesn’t support
general education.
Assumption 4. ξ ≤ ξ¯1+g
(
1+ gAt
)
+ g(1+g)ρχ .
14
Assumption (4) requires ξ is small enough, which indicates that the improvement
of the general human capital of the masses would greatly enhance their abilities
to evade extractive tax. Note that, as the country uses more advanced technology
(means that At and At+1 are larger), Assumption (4) is more difficult to be satisfied.
But, considering that autocratic governments generally implement propaganda poli-
cies in education (Testa, 2018), which impairs the accumulation of general human
capital of the masses, it may be reasonable to assume that ruling class in autocracy is
not willing to support public general education. So, one of the sufficient assumption
to guarantee this is
Assumption 5. ξ ≤ 11+g
(
ξ¯ + gρ
)
.
13Suppose that Yt+1 and Y˜t+1 are GDP with and without supporting public general ed-
ucation. It is easy to find that Yt+1 = ρ[wgt+1 + (bet − cgt)r] + (1 − ρ)wu and Y˜t+1 =
ρ
(
wgt+1+
(
bet − cgt − 1−ρρ cgt
)
r
)
+(1−ρ)wgt+1. As long as wgt+1−wu ≥ cgtr, Yt+1 ≤ Y˜t+1 would
be satisfied. This is one of the assumption that makes sure the investment of general education is
valuable when bt is larger than cgt .
14The assumption that the ruling elites don’t support this type of education is piegt+1 −
piegt+1 =
1−ρ
ρ cgtr + χ(1− ρ)(ξ¯wu − ξwgt+1) ≥ 0, where piegt+1 = wgt+1 + (bet − cgt)r + χξ¯ (1−
ρ)wu, piegt+1 = wgt+1 +
(
bet − cgt − 1−ρρ cgt
)
r + χξ (1− ρ)wgt+1. Through some algebraic op-
erations, I can find that rcgt ≥ ρχα
( r
1−α
)− 1−αα (At+1ξ − ξ¯ ). After plugging cgt = aswst+1 +
agwgt+1 = α
( r
1−α
)− 1−αα (asAt + agAt+1) into the inequality, the following one would be ob-
tained: r(asAt + agAt+1) ≥ ρχ(At+1ξ − ξ¯ ) ⇒ ξ ≤ r(asAt+agAt+1)ρχAt+1 +
ξ¯
At+1
= rρχ
(
as
1+g +ag
)
+
ξ¯
At
. Next, I plug Assumption (2) and Assumption (3) and into this inequality. So, ξ ≤
r
ρχ
(
1
1+g
1
r
(
1− 1At
)
ρχξ¯ + 1r
(
1− 11+g
))
+ ξ¯At =
ξ¯
1+g
(
1+ gAt
)
+ g(1+g)ρχ
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As the country is becoming rich and bpt > 0, the autocratic government can reduce
the financial support but still ensures that bpt +
1−ρ
ρ m˜st = cst , where m˜st is the amount
of money each elite has to pay to support the public education for the masses. Elites
would not finance the masses anymore when bpt ≥ cst , since the masses can fully
bear expenditure on education. So, the role of state capacity in the promotion of
economic growth would become weak through public education.
Elites Implement Propaganda Policies In Education System. When bpt ≥ cgt , the
poor can afford the expenditure on general education. However, the autocratic
government realizes that the masses equipped with general human capital would
weaken their tax collection abilities and reduce their extractive revenues. They
could implement propaganda policies in the education system.15 In fact, authori-
tarian states often use public schools to promote compliance with autocratic power
structures and state-sanctioned ideologies. Curricula and textbooks there are gener-
ally embedded with propaganda, which aims to instill the masses social, moral, and
civic values that help solidify their rule (Lindert, 2004; Cantoni et al., 2017; Testa,
2018). Additionally, autocratic governments can also shape the education style by
not encouraging individual initiative and independent thinking (Fuchs-Schündeln
and Masella, 2016).
The effects of these policies are determined by the ability of the state to penetrate
the education system, collect information, channel the information it prefers to the
masses, and block those it dislikes from the masses. This ability is closely related to
the state’s administrative capacity. These policies could retard the effect of general
human capital of the masses on the improvement of their political anti-rent-seeking
skills or organizing efficiency. Influenced by propaganda policies, the masses could
not fully equip with the general human capital. Instead of receiving 1 unit by each
one, I suppose only δ ∈ (0,1) unit is obtained.16
15Propaganda is the collection of techniques to channel information in populations for the benefit
of certain groups or individuals at the expense of others (Marlin, 2007).
16It may be reasonable to assume that δ = δ (χ), where δ ′(χ) < 0, meaning the more powerful
state impairs the accumulation of general human capital of the masses more seriously. But, the
conclusions in growth part are not changed without these settings. The theoretical analysis in
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In other words, these propaganda policies impair not only the abilities of the masses
to defend themselves in political conflicts17, but also their labor productivity.18
These policies stabilize the autocratic system, but at the same time, would harm the
whole economy when the general human capital is gradually becoming the main
engine of growth.
To sum up, in the early development stage, autocracy itself may not impede eco-
nomic growth, and the powerful state could promote growth by support public
specific education. But, in the late stage, when the masses can support general
education, autocracy may discourage the accumulation of general human for the
masses capital and inhibit economic development, and the powerful state may not
benefit economic growth.
Democracy, Education Policy, and Economic Performance. In democracy, the masses
could transfer some financial resources from elites by the extractive capacity of
the state. It would speed up the accumulation of bpt when the masses have no or
few bequests. Through bequests, the masses indirectly finance their offspring, and
improve both the income level of the masses and the whole economic growth when
their offspring can finance themselves for education by these bequests. The stronger
the state is, the more the bequests of the masses would be accumulated, the earlier
that bpt > cst(b
p
t > cgt) would be satisfied, and also the earlier the masses would
receive the education.
When bpt ≥ cgt , the role of the state capacity by transferring revenue to the masses
to support education, as well as to promote economic performance would become
weak. But democracy, by eliminating the restrictions in education, still has strong
political transition part is still similar to the case without considering these propaganda policies,
although it would become more complicated.
17When the masses have no general human capital, their relative collective action ability is
ϕ(l¯pgt+1)
ϕ(l¯egt+1)
= ϕ(0)ϕ(1) = φ .
ϕ(1)
ϕ(1) = φ¯ and
ϕ(δ )
ϕ(1) = φδ are, correspondingly, their relative collective action
ability with and without propaganda policies, where φ < φδ < φ¯ .
18Fuchs-Schündeln and Masella (2016) find that propaganda-based education in East Germany
negatively impacted labor productivity after reunification.
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and positive influences on the accumulation of general human capital and economic
development. According to this analysis, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose Assumption (1)–(4) hold, there are heterogeneous effects
of political regimes and state development on economic growth in different stages
of economic development.
• In the early stage of economic development, autocracy itself may not impede
economic growth and strong state could boost growth by supporting public
specific education when the masses cannot afford it.
• In the late stage of economic development, however, autocracy has no incen-
tive to support general education and may impair the masses to receive it
through propaganda, which would inhibit economic growth. The role of state
in development becomes weaker as the masses could afford the education by
themselves. Democracy, by supporting general education, will play a greater
role in economic development.
To achieve sustainable economic development, the political transition is needed in
the autocratic country when it becomes rich. I discuss this in the next section.
Specifically, I would like to investigate the role of state development in democrati-
zation.
3.3.4. The Environment of Political Transition
The establishment and transition of political regimes are shaped by the powers
balance between the two groups (elites, and the masses). Consistent with the hori-
zon of economic decisions in the overlapping generation model, the length of an
individual’s adulthood, which corresponds to one period in the model, is also used
as the horizon for a political decision.
The fighting capability of the ruling class originated from the wealth and human
capital is
vet+1 = ϕ(l¯
e
gt+1)I
e_total
t+1 . (3.1)
133
Chapter 3 Economic Growth and Democratization
The Masses
(pi pt+1,pi
e
t+1)
Not Revolt
The Ruling Elites
(pi prt+1,pi
e
rt+1)
q(xt+1)
(pi pst+1,pi
e
st+1)
1−q(xt+1)
Repress
(pi pct+1,pi
e
ct+1)
Compromise
Revolt
Figure 3.1.. The Political Game Between the Ruling Elites and the Masses
The fighting capability of the mass class originated from the wealth and human
capital is
vpt+1 = ϕ
(
l¯pgt+1
)
Ip_totalt+1 . (3.2)
I assume that fighting capability mainly depends on the group wealth and average
level of general human capital. It increases in the total pretax incomes in the groups.
ϕ(·) is the group’s organizing effectiveness and increases in the average general
human capital in the group due to the ability to find methods to solve coordination
problems.
The Action and Payoff of Political Transition. The transition of political regime
follows the political game described in Figure 3.1.
In each period, the masses may choose either to obey the current political order or
to revolt. In response to revolt, the incumbent rulers, ruling elites, can either repress
the masses, or compromise. When compromise is proposed and accepted, the
political regime transits from autocracy to democracy. This will lead to a peaceful
transition to the democratic regime. After the democratization, the policies would be
made by the median voter, a representative member of the masses. However, when
elites choose to repress, the masses may either surrender immediately so that the
autocracy continues as before or continue to revolt so that an open fight breaks out,
where the result of fighting is determined by the fighting capabilities of two parties
(as given by equation (3.1) and equation (3.2)) and the incumbency advantage of the
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ruling elites influenced by the effectiveness of state apparatus. The relative fighting
power of the masses group19 is denoted by
xt+1 =
vpt+1
vet+1
=
ϕ
(
l¯pgt+1
)
Ip_totalt+1
ϕ(l¯egt+1)I
e_total
t+1
= Iˆtotalt+1 φt+1,
where Iˆtotalt+1 =
Ip_totalt+1
Ie_totalt+1
, φt+1 =
ϕ(l¯pgt+1)
ϕ
(
l¯egt+1
) , and φt+1 ∈ {ϕ(0)ϕ(1) , ϕ(0)ϕ(0) , ϕ(δ )ϕ(1) , ϕ(1)ϕ(1)}. Let φ =
ϕ(0)
ϕ(1) , φδ =
ϕ(δ )
ϕ(1) , φ¯ =
ϕ(0)
ϕ(0) =
ϕ(1)
ϕ(1) , it is easy to verify that φ < φδ < φ¯ .
The probability of the elite group winning the fight and preserving the current polit-
ical regime with repression is determined by a standard contest function (Skaperdas,
1992; Huang, 2012a):
Pr(elite,win) =
υ(χ)vet+1
υ(χ)vet+1+ v
p
t+1
=
1
1+υ−1(χ)xt+1
= q(xt+1),
where υ(χ) indicates the effectiveness of the ruling group’s repressive apparatus.
It is a form of incumbency advantage as it increases the incumbent’s winning prob-
ability in the fight beyond its fighting capability originated from the wealth and
human capital vet+1. I suppose that υ(χ) measures the coercive capacity of state
apparatus. It is the function of state development20, where υ ′(χ) > 0, υ(χ) > 1,
and limχ→0υ(χ) = 1.
Under the autocratic regime, individual in the masses have to pay tax λ e_totalt+1 I
p
t+1,
and each elite receives a net tax revenue λ eit+1I
p_total
t+1 . Their payoffs under no revolt
are their after-tax incomes
pi pt+1 = (1−λ e_totalt+1 )Ipt+1,
19I ignore the random shock (the unexpected events, e.g. natural disasters, the sudden death of the
ruler.) that influences the ability of collective action of the masses. Brückner and Ciccone (2011);
Jia (2014); Chen (2015) find that some unexpected events could solve the plight of collective actions
of the masses and trigger the political change. However, these random factors don’t impair the main
conclusions.
20Hariri (2012) documents that powerful precolonial state is harder to be colonized because cen-
tralized authority under a single ruler enabled polities to respond decisively and mount coordinated
resistance. It is natural to assume that the duration of statehood history is one of the key factors that
determines the coercive capacity of the state.
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piet+1 = I
e
t+1+λ
e
it+1I
p_total
t+1 .
When compromise is achieved, the masses gain political power. This means the
masses stop paying the exploitative tax λ e_totalt+1 I
p
t+1 and can extract revenue from
elites. Each elite has to pay tax λ p_totalt+1 I
e
t+1, and each member in the masses receives
a net tax revenue λ pit+1I
e_total
t+1 . Specifically, their payoffs under compromise are
pi pct+1 = I
p
t+1+λ
p
it+1I
e_total
t+1 ,
piect+1 = (1−λ p_totalt+1 )Iet+1.
When the revolt is repressed successfully, the incomes of the two groups are
pi prt+1 = pi
p
t+1/θt+1,
piert+1 = pi
e
t+1,
where θt+1 = θ(l¯gt+1) = θ
(
(1−ρ)l¯pgt+1+ρ l¯egt+1
)
> 121, indicating that the fight-
ing cost increases in the average general human capital in society.22 For simplicity,
I assume that the losers have to pay the fighting cost.
When the revolt succeeds, the masses gain political power, so that their incomes are
pi pst+1 = pi
p
ct+1,
piest+1 = pi
e
ct+1/θt+1.
It is useful to find the conditions when the masses revolt, and that the ruling elites
would compromise when facing the rebellions of the masses. The following propo-
sition illustrates these conditions.23
21θt+1 ∈ {θ(0),θ(ρ),θ(ρ+(1−ρ)δ ),θ(1)}. Let θ(0) = θ0, θ(ρ) = θρ , θ(ρ+(1−ρ)δ ) = θδ ,
θ(1) = θ1. It is easy to verify that θ0 < θρ < θδ < θ1.
22To simplify the analysis, I normalize the repression costs of specific human capital and physical
capital to 0, the loss of general human capital should be larger than other capital types in the fighting.
23See the detailed analysis in Appendix C.1.
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Proposition 3.2. The masses will revolt when
xt+1 ≥ xp∗t+1,
where xt+1 = Iˆtotalt+1 φt+1, x
p∗
t+1 =υ(χ)
(
1
λ e_totalt+1
−1
)(
1− 1θt+1
)
− λ
p_total
t+1
λ e_totalt+1
φt+1, λ e_totalt+1 =
ρχτ(legt+1)
d(l¯pgt+1)
, and λ p_totalt+1 =
(1−ρ)χτ(lpgt+1)
d(l¯egt+1)
. When the masses revolt, the compromise
would be realized when
xt+1 ≥ xe∗t+1,
where xe∗t+1 =
1
1
υ(χ)
(
1
λ p_totalt+1
−1
)(
1− 1θt+1
)
− λ
e_total
t+1
λ p_totalt+1
1
φt+1
.
When the relative wealth of the masses, Iˆtotalt+1 , and their relative collective action
capacity, φt+1, are higher, the rebellion and the subsequent political reform may
occur with larger probability. At the same time, the peaceful democratization also
would more probably happen.
Next, I will explore the effects of the state capacity (extractive capacity χ , and
coercive capacity, υ(χ)) on democratization.
The Non-linear Effects of State Capacity on Democratization. According to Propo-
sition (3.2), to analyze the influence of state capacity on political reform, I should
check its effects on xp∗t+1 and x
e∗
t+1. Equivalently, I only need to investigate χ and
υ(χ) on the effects of Lp∗t+1 = υ(χ)
(
1
λ e_totalt+1
−1
)(
1− 1θt+1
)
(for the masses) and
Le∗t+1 =
1
υ(χ)
(
1
λ p_totalt+1
−1
)(
1− 1θt+1
)
(for elites). It is easy to verify that ∂L
e∗
t+1
∂χ < 0.
As the state is stronger, the ruling elites are more willing to repress.24
The effect of state capacity on the action choices of the masses is a bit complicated.
Through some algebraic operations, I obtain
∂Lp∗t+1
∂χ
=
Θt+1υ(χ)(1−ηt+1χ)
ηt+1χ
(
υ ′(χ)
υ(χ)
− 1
χ(1−ηt+1χ)
)
,
24Since
∂xe∗t+1
∂Le∗t+1
< 0, then
∂xe∗t+1
χ > 0 when
∂Le∗t+1
∂χ < 0. As the state is more powerful, x
e∗
t+1 becomes
larger. It would be more difficult to satisfy the condition xt+1− xe∗t+1 ≥ 0.
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where ηt+1 =
ρτ(legt+1)
d(l¯pgt+1)
, Θt+1 = 1− 1θt+1 .
The sign of
∂Lp∗t+1
∂χ is determined by the sign of
υ ′(χ)
υ(χ) − 1χ(1−ηt+1χ) . Intuitively, I have
to compare two opposite effects of state capacity on Lp∗t+1. On the one hand, a higher
extractive capacity of the state means more brutal exploitation and fewer share of
after-tax incomes are left to the masses, which induces them to rebel; On the other
hand, higher coercive capacity of the state indicates a lower probability that the
masses would win the fighting if they revolt. The masses must face the dilemma.
Theoretically, υ
′(χ)
υ(χ) − 1χ(1−ηt+1χ) < 0 if χ is small and close to zero if limχ→0υ(χ)<
+∞. It is a reasonable assumption that the marginal improvement of coercive
capacity should be not infinite even when the state development is very low and
around 0. It means
∂Lp∗t+1
∂χ < 0. This implies that conditioning on a small χ , the
masses would be more willing to revolt as χ become larger and elites are more
likely to compromise. However, it is difficult to conclude that this trend would be
continuous. Two different scenarios are demonstrated in the Figure 3.2.25 In the first
scenario, the effect of state development on democratization is non-linear. There is a
threshold, χ∗. The net effects of state development on political reform are different
below and above this cutoff. In the second scenario, υ
′(χ)
υ(χ) − 1χ(1−ηt+1χ) < 0 holds
between 0 and 1, implying that higher state development benefits political reform.
In reality, most of the countries that have long statehood histories are autocracy or
democratized very later26, which may imply that their coercive capacities are so
strong and eventually leads to the silence of the masses.27 Hariri (2012) finds that
precolonial state development was an impediment to the development of democ-
racy outside Europe since the country with higher state development in precolonial
time facilitated the repression of internal opposition. Besides, it also fended off
25There are some other scenarios. For example, these two curves υ
′(χ)
υ(χ) and
1
χ(1−ηt+1χ) , could
intersect multiple times between 0 and 1. I explore this possibility in the empirical analysis.
26Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) observe that many countries located in Africa become
democracy earlier and easier, most of which have low state development. In contrast, the countries
located in East Asia, having a long history of agricultural civilization and developed state, don’t have
democratization or reform very late.
27One sufficient condition is υ
′(1)
υ(1) − 11−ηt+1 > 0, which makes sure that
υ ′(χ)
υ(χ) − 1χ(1−ηt+1χ) > 0
when χ is very high.
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Figure 3.2.. Two Scenarios: The Conflict Effects of Extractive Capacity and Coercive
Capacity on Democratization
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1
1−η
υ(0)
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: υ
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Europeans more effective and then the diffusion of European institutions and ideas
became more difficult. So, at least in some range, when state capacity is strong, it
is difficult for the masses to rebel, which indicates that υ
′(χ)
υ(χ) − 1χ(1−ηt+1χ) > 0 when
χ is high enough.
It may be useful to first check the state development in current autocracies and
democracies in different regions. Compared with Sub-Saharan Africa and the Amer-
ican continent, Asia and Europe share relatively similar natural environments and
are favorable to diffusion of agricultural technologies, then have longer agricultural
civilizations and stronger state capacity (Diamond, 1998). I categorize countries
into two groups: the old world28 and the new world.29 In each group, the countries
are further classified into democracy and autocracy during the third democratization
wave30 according the data from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b). Figure 3.3
describes the state capacities measured by state antiquity among these groups.31
28They include East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Middle East & North Africa, and
South Asia.
29They include North America, Latin America & Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
30I ignore the countries that democratized before 1970. In the subsequent empirical study, I also
focus on the third wave cases.
31The measure of state antiquity (StateHist) is developed by Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman
(2002). See the detail in Section 3.4.
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Figure 3.3.. State Capacity and Democratization
0.15
0.23
0.55
0.50
0
.2
.4
.6
A
vg
. S
ta
te
 C
ap
ac
ity
The New World The Old World
Source: StateHist, WDI, PS (2008)
Between The Old AND New World
Average State Capacity In Democracy and Autocracy
Autocracy Democracy
The state development in democracy is higher than the one in non-democracy in the
new world while the opposite is true in the old world. In addition, state develop-
ment in the old world is much higher than the one in the new world. Table 3.6.1
documents the statistical description.
It seems to imply that the intermediate level of state capacity is most favorable
for the democratization. In the new world, most countries have relatively shorter
agricultural civilizations and less developed states. Higher state development ben-
efits political reform. In the old world, however, countries have longer agricultural
civilizations and much more powerful states. Lower state development is favorable
for political transition.
From the scattered evidence, it is possible that υ
′(χ)
υ(χ) − 1χ(1−ηt+1χ) > 0 when χ is
high enough and the following assumption is satisfied.
Assumption 6.

υ ′(χ)
υ(χ) ≤ 1χ(1−ηt+1χ) i f χ ≤ χ
∗,
υ ′(χ)
υ(χ) >
1
χ(1−ηt+1χ) i f χ > χ
∗.
When χ is smaller than χ∗, the threshold of revolting (xp∗t+1) will become smaller as
χ increases due to the dominant effect of the extractive capacity of the state. The
masses are more willing to overthrow tyranny. However, once χ exceeds χ∗, xp∗t+1
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will become larger as χ further increases due to the dominant effect of the coercive
capacity of the state. The masses are less willing to rebel because they are more
likely to be repressed. In other words, there is resistance where there is oppression,
but there is silence where there is extremely harsh repression. I summarize these in
the following conjecture.
Conjecture 3.1. If Assumption (6) holds, there would be a threshold χ∗. Below it,
the extractive capacity of the state is dominant and the masses are more willing to
rebel as χ is higher, while the coercive capacity of the state is dominant beyond that
threshold and they have to endure the oppression system as χ is further higher. So,
the relationship between state development and democratization should be hump-
shaped.
I will test this conjecture in the later section. Additionally, linear and cubed rela-
tionships between state development and political reform will be also tested for the
robustness checks.
Next, I briefly discuss the effect of the distribution of wealth, accumulation of
general human capital of the masses, and natural resources on democratization.
The Effects of Distribution of Wealth on Democratization. The wealth distribution
contributes to the political change. For example, suppose t is not far from t0 and bet
is so small that cst < bet < cgt . It is possible that xt+1 > x
p∗
t+1 would be satisfied and
the masses would revolt very early.
The Effects of Distribution of General Human Capital on Democratization. At first
glance, it seems that the masses equipped with general human capital should benefit
democratization. But, it is not so obvious. On the one hand, the masses get general
education would improve their relative fighting power xt+1and they tend to gain
more once in democracy, which would motivate them to revolt; On the other hand,
general education also improve their anti-rent-seeking abilities and they would keep
more share of income in autocracy, which would demotivate them to revolt. It is not
clear which one dominates.
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The Effects of Natural Resources on Democratization. For simplicity, the natural
resources are only endowed for the ruling elites in autocracy. Assume that the total
natural revenue is Rt+1 ≥ 0. It is easy to verify that ∂x
i∗
t+1
∂Rt+1
= 0, where i ∈ {e, p}. I
only need to analyze ∂ Iˆ
total
t+1
∂Rt+1
. Since Iˆtotalt+1 =
Ip_totalt+1
Ie_totalt+1 +Rt+1
, then ∂ Iˆ
total
t+1
∂Rt+1
< 0. It means that
the rebellions of the masses would delay and elites are more willing to repress in
cases of political conflicts in the autocratic country with more natural resources.
3.4. Data and Statistical Description
To measure the level of state development, I employ state antiquity index (StateHist)
developed by Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002), which fits the setting best.
StateHist index ranges from 0 to 1. A higher value indicates higher state devel-
opment.32 It is fixed within the country. I am interested in the effect of state
development, χ , on economic performance and political transition.
The dependent variable in the growth regression model is the annual log difference
in GDP per capita. The data is from World Development Indicators of World Bank
(2015 edition) covering the period 1960-2010. The dichotomous democracy data
extracted from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b)-then PS - is mainly used as the
proxy of political regime in the paper.33 The democracy indicator that measures
many things may overlap the concept of the state development. PS try to bal-
ance narrow definition (CGV, BMR, and Polity IV) and broad definition (Freedom
House) of democracy (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Papaioannou and Siourounis,
2008b). Additionally, I don’t analyze the conditions of the stability of democracy
and the effect of political stability on growth in the model. It is equivalent to
assume that democracy is permanent. Therefore, democracy from PS is the best
32StateHist is built based on the assumption that the longer the statehood history is, the more
authoritative the state institutions become. There are three factors increasing StateHist: the amount
of time a government above the tribal level existed during 1 to 1950; the amount of time the
government was not controlled by foreign authorities; and the share of territory of the current
country that was ruled by this government (Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002; Chanda and
Putterman, 2007; Putterman and Weil, 2010; Borcan, Olsson and Putterman, 2018).
33Following them, I focus on permanent democratization. Democracy = 1 if they regard the
country as permanent democracy or always democracy, Democracy = 0 for autocratic countries.
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one and consistent with the model. In the robustness checks, democracy data from
Acemoglu et al. (2019) (ACE), Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) (CGV), Boix,
Miller and Rosato (2013) (BMR), Freedom House (FH) and Polity IV (POL), are
also used.34
The important variables in the model are the learning costs of specific and general
education. Past school enrollment rates (primary, secondary, and tertiary) are used
as the rough proxies for learning costs. Enrollment rates are determined by many
variables, including the return of human capital, education policies of governments,
various fees, and family backgrounds, etc,. One of the key factors influencing
enrollment rates is the learning cost.
The dependent variable in the political transition regression is a dummy variable
in 197335 constructed by using PS data set. It equates to 1 if the autocratic country
experienced democratic transition between 1973 and 2010 (dichotomous democracy
indicator changes from 0 to 1) and 0 otherwise. The distribution of human capital
may influence the relative power of the masses. Educational inequality could be
a proxy of the human capital gap between the masses and elites. This indicator is
extracted from V-Dem Project.36 The rest of the indicators, including the covari-
ates used in growth and political transition regressions, and their data sources are
displayed in Appendix A.6.
Table 1.7.1 in Appendix C.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the main indi-
cators used separately for democracies and non-democracies. The raw data show
several well-known patterns, including, for example, that democracies are richer and
34I extract all these data from Acemoglu et al. (2019). The first three democracy indicators are
the dichotomous type, while the last two are not. They transfer non-dichotomous type into the
dichotomous one. For Freedom House, the country is coded as democracy if it is “free” or “partial
free”. For Polity IV, it is coded as democracy if democracy score is positive.
35The reason to use the situation in 1973 is that countries start to transit to democracy during the
third democratization wave after that year.
36Educational Gini (Gh) combines information of average year schooling and percentages of
the population in different education levels. Mathematically, Gh = 12H¯
3
∑
i=0
3
∑
j=0
|xˆi− xˆ j|nin j, where H¯
represents average years of schooling in the population aged 15 years and over, i and j (i 6= j) denote
different levels of education, ni and n j represent the attainment per level of education, and xˆi and xˆ j
are the cumulative average years of schooling at each education level. See the details from Checchi
(2006) and Castelló-Climent (2008).
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have more educated populations. One interesting thing is that education inequalities
are much smaller in democratic countries. There seems to be no difference in state
development between non-democracies and democracies.
3.5. Regression Models and Results
3.5.1. Growth Regressions
To test the main conclusion summarized in Proposition 3.1, I use the following
growth regression model:
git =β1Democracyit +β2StateHisti+β3Democracyit ∗EconLeveli1980+
β4StateHisti ∗EconLeveli1980+
3
∑
j=1
α jgit− j +ϕyit−4+
4
∑
j=1
γ jXit− j +µλi+δt + εit ,
(3.3)
where git = 100∗(yit−yit−1), y is the log form of GDP per capita, EconLeveli198037
is the economic level of country i in 1980.38 I use secondary enrollment rate as the
main proxy of economic level. In the robustness checks shown in the appendix ,
other economic level indicators, such as GDP per capita, average years of secondary
schooling, technological distance39, and percentage with secondary schooling are
used. StateHisti, representing state development, is a time-invariant variable. Xit− j
are the vector of control variables. I mainly control learning costs, represented by
past (4 lags) enrollment rates (3 levels). λi includes the country fixed factors that
37To easily explain the coefficients, I normalize the economic level indicators into a unit interval,
where 0 denotes the lowest economic level while 1 denotes the highest one.
38The reason to choose the economic level in 1980 is that it eases the endogenous issue.
Additionally, there are not so many missing data in 1980. The results are robust by using other
year data as the proxies of the economic level. See the robustness checks in Appendix C.6.
39It is defined as the ratio of income level between the given country and the United States.
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are popularly used in growth literature.40 δt denotes time effects. Random error is
represented by εit .
In the first column of Table 3.6.2, only the indicators related to democracy are
included in the regressions. Both democracy and its interaction with economic
level are positive but not significant. In the next column, state development and
its interaction are further added, the signs of democracy and its interaction are un-
changed. State development has a significantly positive and large effect on growth
while its interaction with economic level is negative but insignificant. It seems to
imply that as the economy level is high, the stimulating effect of state development
on economic development is weakened.
In the model, the learning costs of education are emphasized. Enrollment rates
(primary, secondary and tertiary), denoted by
4
∑
j=1
γ jXit− j, are used to roughly mea-
sure them. These indicators are further incorporated and reported in Column (3).
State development plays great roles in the economy when the country is poor while
the effect of democracy is negligible. However, as the economy develops, the
roles of democracy and state development in economic growth are reversed, where
democracy gradually becomes a strong impetus while capable state retires to the
secondary role. It is consistent with Proposition 3.1. This is the baseline result
and the pattern does not change after the 4 lagged investment rates (log form) are
controlled.41
Autocracy could perform well when it owns a powerful state during the early devel-
opment stage. It well explains why four tigers, followed by China and Vietnam, all
of which own long statehood histories, achieve economic miracles when they were
or are autocracies, whereas African and Latin democratic countries, many of which
40They include latitude, average distance to sea coast or river, the share of tropical land, the share
of population living in the tropic areas, dummy indicator imply the colonial situations, language
fractionalization index, religion fractionalization index, ethnic fractionalization index, the share of
Muslims population, the share of Buddhist and Confucian population, the executive constraint in
the independent year, region indicators (following the World Bank classification). The detailed data
source could be found in Data Appendix C.8.
41I also control other indicators that are commonly used in growth literature, such as fertility
rate, trade share (%, GDP), government spending (%, GDP), inflation rate, and life expectancy. The
patterns still hold. See the results in Table C.3.5 in the appendix.
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have no such strong states, don’t achieve impressive economic performances. The
ruling elites have great incentives to offer some basic public good, in the setting,
specific education, to equip the masses in the autocratic country when the state is
powerful. It could help the masses master the mature technologies, which not only
incentives economic performance but also benefits ruling elites by collecting more
tax revenues.
However, when the country becomes richer and is approaching technological fron-
tiers, general human capital, which is good at absorbing advanced technologies and
also contributes to innovation, would become the engine of the economy. Compared
with democracy, autocracy may not willing to provide public general education
to equip the masses because it would erode the extractive power of the elites and
their ruling foundations. Democracy would become more and more important when
innovations rather than imitations play greater roles in the economy since it supports
the freedom of education and releases the productivity.42
The baseline results are also robust by using other economic level indicators43,
other democracy indicators44, and IVs45. So, it may be safe to say that the baseline
results are valid. Autocracy with the well-developed state could promote economic
prosperity when the country is poor while the democracy could greatly stimulate
economic growth when the country is rich. To grow sustainably, democratization
may be needed for the autocratic country. What role does state development play in
democratization? I explore the transition regressions in the next subsection.
42In the appendix, I show that democratization dramatically improves the academic freedom and
information freedom measured by various indicators extracted from V-Dem Project.
43See Appendix C.2.1.
44See Appendix C.2.2.
45See Appendix C.2.3.
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3.5.2. Transition Regressions
In this subsection, I explore whether the state development in the autocratic country
has a great influence on the political transition. More specifically, I would like to
explore the non-linear relationship between state development and democratization.
In the model, I make a conjecture that the state development has a hump-shaped link
with democratization.46 The inequality of human capital between the masses and
elites may also matter for the political transition. Natural resources play negative
roles in political reform.
To test these predictions and hypothesis obtained from the model, I follow Papaioan-
nou and Siourounis (2008b) and use a similar probit model:
P(Democratizationi = 1|SCi,Edui,1973,EduGinii,1973,Xi,1973,λi) =
G(β0SCi+β1SC2i +β2Edui,1973+β3EduGinii,1973+β4Xi,1973+β5λi+ εi),
(3.4)
where Democratizationi is a dummy variable. It equates to 1 if the autocratic
country i has the political reform47 between 1973 and 2010, 0 otherwise. Edui
represents the level of human capital. I use three enrollment rate indicators. The
average schooling years in population48 is used for robustness check.
The distribution of human capital, influencing the relative power of the masses, may
affect democratization. EduGinii, measuring the inequality of education, could be a
proxy of the human capital gap between elites and the masses. Population and GDP
measure the country size, which may be related to state capacity; Urbanization ratio
and GDP per capita measure the level of economic development and some dimen-
46I also check whether they have a linear or cubed relationship in the appendix. See Table
C.5.1 - C.5.6. In the linear model, I don’t find the significant effect of state development on
political transition in almost all regressions. When incorporating SC, SC2, and SC3, however, the
state-development-related coefficients are significant in some regressions. However, the values
of these coefficients indicate that the state development plays a significant but negative role in
democratization when 0 < χ ≤ 1 in all these cases. It seems to imply that only SC considered in
the regression should be better. However, I already showed that linear relationship between SC and
democratization is not clear and the results are not consistent. I believe that it is not a good regression
model when SC, SC2, and SC3 are controlled.
47Political reform data is extracted from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b).
48It is from Barro-Lee education data set.
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sions of economic structures; Oil dummy represents natural resources.49 They are
incorporated in Xi. I also control for the indicators measured country fixed factors
denoted by λi in robustness checks.50 For all variant indicators, the values in 1973
are used in the regressions.
In the first column of Table 3.6.3, only SC, SC2 and secondary enrollment rate
are used in the regression. An inverted-U relationship between state development
and democratization is confirmed. Further controlling for 3 enrollment rates and
education inequality, this non-linear association is not affected, which are shown
in Column (2) and (3). Column (3) is the baseline result. The turn point of the
effect of SC on democratization is around 0.4, Below it, higher state development
induces political reform, while the opposite is true beyond this turn point. It is
consistent with the patterns shown in Figure 3.3 and Table 3.6.1. The baseline
result also implies that education inequality plays a negative and significant role in
democratization.
In the next two columns, urbanization ratio, GDP per capita are controlled sep-
arately. The hump-shaped relationship between state development and political
reform still holds. Primary and tertiary enrollment rates have opposite impacts on
the political transition. The possible reason is that the masses with higher education
may have more general human capital while they with lower education may only be
equipped with specific human capital.
In Column (7), the natural resource, measured by the oil dummy, is added in the
regression. Consistent with the prediction of the model, it is difficult for the country
with more natural resources to transit to democracy.
The regression result is reported in Column (8) by controlling for population and
GDP, measuring the country size. No clear effects of country size on democratiza-
49It equates to 1 for all current and former OPEC members, 0 otherwise.
50I follow Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) and include latitude, average distance to sea
coast or river, the share of tropical land, the share of population living in the tropic areas, dummy
indicator implying the colonial situations, language fractionalization index, religion fractionalization
index, ethnic fractionalization index, the share of Muslims population, the share of Buddhist and
Confucian population, the executive constraint in the independent year. Please see the details from
Data Appendix C.8.
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tion are found. All these variables are added in the regressions and the results are
shown in the last two columns.51 The predictions are still robust.
3.5.2.1. Robustness Checks: Controlling for Various Fixed Factors
To check whether the predictions hold after adding various fixed factors, instead of
employing the three enrollment rates, I controlling for average schooling years in
regressions.52 First, I replicate the regression results in Table 3.6.3. The results are
displayed in the odd columns in Table 3.6.4. The results are consistent with Table
3.6.3. The effect of average year of schooling on democratization is not clear. It
may imply that this indicator, at most, measures the mixed of specific and general
human capital. Next, various fixed factors are controlled and results are reported
in the even columns, finding that they are quite similar to the corresponding ones
without controlling for these fixed factors.
The results are also robust by using other regression model53, other democracy
indicators, and IVs for democracy.54
To sum up, below some threshold (around 0.4-0.5), higher state development leads
to a larger probability of democratization, while the relationship is reversed when
the state development is beyond that threshold. In other words, there is resistance
where there is oppression, but there is silence where there is severe suppression.
More equality distribution of human capital contributes to political reform. Natural
resources are negatively related to the establishment of the democratic system.
51I don’t add GDP, GDP per capita, and population into regression at the same time due to the
multicollinearity issue.
52The main reason for using one indicator as the proxy of the average level of human capital in
regression is that it is impossible to estimate the coefficients using the three education indicators due
to the failure of convergence.
53See results in Appendix C.4.1
54See results in Appendix C.4.2
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3.6. Conclusion
This paper establishes a simple model in which the coevolution of economic and
political development is driven by state strength, the distinct technical features of
the two types of human capital (specific and general), and the potential political
conflicts between elites and the masses.
During the early economic development stage, an autocratic and powerful state may
find that it is beneficial to support public specific education that generates little
threat to the political privileges of the ruling elites. The masses equipped with
specific human capital take advantage of well-established technologies to make the
whole economic pie larger. It allows the ruling elites to extract greater tax revenues
by the strong state apparatus.
As the economy grows and approaches the world’s technological frontiers, the
economy gradually relies more on general human capital rather than specific one,
because general human capital has the advantage to adapt and use advanced tech-
nologies. However, the ruling elites in the autocratic country are not willing to
support public general education since the masses with general human capital would
improve not only their productivity but also, more importantly, their skills in defend-
ing their own interests in the case of political conflicts. To maintain their rule, the
ruling class may implement propaganda policies to weaken the influence of general
education on the masses even when they can afford general education. It will inhibit
the economic performance.
When the state is not so powerful, political democratization is achieved and eco-
nomic progress is continuous supporting by the democratic institutions. Otherwise,
political conflicts may occur, which would lead to repression as well as to sub-
sequent economic stagnation. The empirical section has shown that the powerful
state has great impacts but political regimes (autocracy vs. democracy) has little
impact on economic growth during the early development stage, while democracy
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has greater positive effects but the state itself has weak effects on growth in the late
development stage.
This paper highlights the subtle role of state development in smoothing political
transitions that facilitate economic development. For example, an intermediate level
of state development is favorable to political reform. In a society with a very long
statehood history, it is difficult for the masses to prevail when they revolt because the
ruling elites controlling the powerful state apparatus can effectively repress them.
Expecting it, the masses are not willing to revolt. In a weak state, however, the
extractive ability of the state is not so high, the masses suffer little loss and have
no urgent desire to revolt. A political transition may not occur even though they
might have a relatively high probability of prevailing. The masses are willing to
rebel when the state development is at a medium level. In this scenario, they
endure relatively larger losses from exploitative taxes and have a greater chance
of prevailing due to the relatively limited coercive ability of the ruling elites. This
implies a hump-shaped link between state development and democratization.
This paper’s analytical framework may also prove useful in understanding the long-
term effects of state development on economic performance. A long state history
may benefit growth when an autocratic country is poor, but it will eventually become
a stumbling block when the country is rich and a political transition is needed for the
sustainable economic development. This echoes the study of Lagerlöf (2016) and
Borcan, Olsson and Putterman (2018) on the non-linear relationship between state
development and economic prosperity. In the model, I explain this phenomenon
by considering the capacity and willingness of the state to support various types of
public education, as well as the non-linear effect of state development on political
reform in modern society.
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Table 3.6.1.. The Statistical Description on State Capacity in the Old and New World
Old World New World
Obs Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs Mean Std. Dev. p-value
Total 47 0.496 0.216 56 0.208 0.175
Autocracy 20 0.553 0.201 21 0.150 0.091
Democracy 27 0.454 0.221 35 0.243 0.203
Difference: Auto - Dem 0.099 0.060 -0.093 0.027
Table 3.6.2.. Heterogeneous Effects of Democracy and State Capacity on Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Dem & Dem&SC& Add Edu
Growth Rate Interaction Interaction Add Edu & Invest
Democracy (Dem) 0.110 0.101 -1.214 -0.932
(0.941) (0.843) (0.896) (0.895)
Dem*EconLevel 0.806 1.007 3.515** 2.841*
(1.356) (1.363) (1.568) (1.564)
State Capacity (SC) 3.224*** 4.865*** 5.239***
(1.136) (1.256) (1.506)
SC*EconLevel -2.131 -4.220** -4.451**
(1.611) (1.766) (2.003)
Observations 4194 3883 2942 2804
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.195 0.223 0.201
Note: This table presents estimates of the effects of democracy and state
capacity on annual GDP per capita growth. Normalized economic level indicator
(secondary enrollment rate in 1980) interacted with Democracy (PS) and State
Capacity (StateHist) are controlled. 4 lagged education indicators (log form),
including primary, secondary, and tertiary rates are controlled in the third column.
4 lagged investment rates (log) are further added in the fourth column. In all
specifications, various factors are considered to control for country and year
fixed effects. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A. The First Chapter Appendix
A.1. The List of Countries Ranked by GDP at Democratic
Transition
Table A.1.1.. The List of Countries Ranked by GDP at Democratic Transition in 1960-2010
Country Democratic GDP Percentile Country Democratic GDP PercentilePeriod at Transition (%) Period at Transition (%)
Mozambique 1994-2010 171.1502 1 Guatemala 1986-2010 2073.067 51
Ethiopia 1995-2004 182.9408 2 El Salvador 1982-2010 2092.554 52
Burundi 2003-2010 207.8334 3 Ukraine 1994-2010 2173.163 53
Liberia 2004-2010 272.1501 4 Fiji 1970-2005 2207.626 54
Sierra Leone 2001-2010 305.0988 5 Colombia 1960-2010 2213.223 55
Malawi 1994-2010 318.2459 6 Belize 1981-2010 2262.883 56
Mali 1992-2010 363.9949 7 St. Vincent 1979-2010 2287.068 57& Grenadines
Nepal 1991-2010 370.3171 8 Dominican Republic 1978-2010 2347.866 58
Niger 1991-2010 384.5782 10 Panama 1960-1967 2350.482 60
Sierra Leone 1961-1966 398.1468 11 Kiribati 1979-2010 2456.222 61
Bangladesh 1991-2010 404.564 12 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 1991-2010 2461.609 62
Central African 1993-2002 410.1606 13 Marshall Islands 1991-2010 2627.455 63Republic
Madagascar 1993-2008 437.1914 14 Peru 1960-1967 2629.225 64
Botswana 1966-2010 483.0933 15 Paraguay 1993-2010 2736.968 65
Guinea-Bissau 1994-2010 602.3344 16 Congo, Rep. 1992-1996 2766.262 66
Lesotho 1993-2010 688.4974 19 Turkey 1961-2010 2996.58 69
Pakistan 1988-1998 718.3286 20 Namibia 1990-2010 3507.484 70
Kyrgyz Republic 2005-2010 747.5656 21 Macedonia, FYR 1991-2010 3630.235 71
Kenya 2002-2010 836.2352 22 Peru 1980-2010 3749.998 72
Comoros 1990-2010 841.7672 23 Bulgaria 1991-2010 3798.164 73
Senegal 2000-2010 877.9714 24 Panama 1994-2010 4683.453 74
Ghana 1996-2010 905.201 26 Serbia 2006-2010 4896.824 76
Cabo Verde 1991-2010 934.6758 27 St. Kitts and Nevis 1983-2010 5280.635 77
Zambia 1991-2010 1002.85 28 Romania 1990-2010 5345.854 78
Georgia 1995-2010 1011.536 29 Antigua and Barbuda 1981-2010 5556.531 79
Zimbabwe 1978-1986 1040.175 30 Trinidad and Tobago 1962-2010 5589.407 80
Thailand 1974-2010 1046.25 31 Suriname 1988-2010 5799.678 81
Djibouti 1999-2009 1078.589 32 South Africa 1994-2010 5896.009 82
Moldova 1994-2010 1089.854 33 Poland 1990-2010 5953.034 83
Nicaragua 1990-2010 1143.267 35 Russian Federation 1993-2003 7056.162 85
Albania 1992-2010 1243.135 36 Argentina 1983-2010 7173.555 86
Nigeria 1999-2010 1247.828 37 Suriname 1975-1979 7612.023 87
Nigeria 1960-1965 1297.827 38 Korea, Rep. 1988-2010 7688.563 88
Papua New 1975-2010 1306.062 39 Cyprus 1975-2010 7726.054 89Guinea
Mongolia 1993-2010 1363.651 40 Slovak Republic 1993-2010 7792.297 90
Bolivia 1982-2010 1519.169 41 Mexico 1997-2010 7947.241 91
Honduras 1982-2010 1573.672 43 Palau 1994-2010 9434.41 93
Armenia 1991-2010 1598.556 44 Croatia 2000-2010 10572.83 94
Guatemala 1966-1973 1726.455 45 Portugal 1976-2010 10779.3 95
Guyana 1992-2010 1741.748 46 Czech Republic 1993-2010 12277.41 96
Nigeria 1979-1983 1926.418 47 Venezuela, RB 1960-2008 12468.84 97
Vanuatu 1980-2010 2070.262 48 Spain 1978-2010 17343.84 98
Indonesia 1999-2010 2071.238 49 Bahamas, The 1973-2010 19434.7 99
Note: GDP per capita data are from WDI (2015).
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A.2. The List of Strong and Weak Democracies Grouped by
Combined Development Indicators
Table A.2.1.. Strong and Weak Democracies Grouped by Combined Development Indicators at Democratic Transition
Countries with Weak Democracy (39) Countries with Strong Democracy (46)
Bangladesh Mozambique Albania Mexico
Benin Namibia Antigua and Barbuda Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Botswana Nepal Argentina Moldova
Burundi Niger Armenia Mongolia
Central African Republic Papua New Guinea Bahamas, The Nicaragua
Colombia Peru Belize Nigeria
Congo, Rep. Senegal Bulgaria Panama
Cyprus Sierra Leone Cabo Verde Paraguay
Djibouti Solomon Islands Croatia Poland
Ethiopia South Africa Czech Republic Portugal
Fiji Suriname Dominica Romania
Guinea-Bissau Uganda Dominican Republic Russian Federation
Haiti Vanuatu Georgia Slovak Republic
Honduras Zambia Ghana Spain
Kenya Zimbabwe Guatemala Vincent and the Grenadines
Kyrgyz Republic Guyana Suriname
Lesotho Indonesia Thailand
Liberia Kiribati Trinidad and Tobago
Madagascar Korea, Rep. Turkey
Malawi Macedonia, FYR Ukraine
Mali Marshall Islands Venezuela, RB
Note: The five indicators used to categorize strong and weak democracy are GDP per capita,
secondary enrollment rate, tertiary enrollment rate, Gini coefficient, and natural resources.
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A.3. Further Robustness Checks for Growth
Regressions
A.3.1. More Robustness Checks to the Baseline Results
Table A.3.1 contains more robustness checks to the baseline results. In Panel A,
the missing values of GDP at political transitions before 1960 are filled with data in
1960. The number of countries goes up to 180. In Panel B, the original democracy
data from Acemoglu et al. (2019) are used, where the gap between Strong and Weak
Democracy is significant even at the 30% cutoff. In Panel C, a higher cutoff in
polity score, 5, is used to construct the democracy dummy, which is also adopted in
other studies (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007; Polity, 2014). The number of
countries increases to 138, and the coefficients of Strong Democracy become a bit
larger, varying from 0.626 (in Column (1)) to 0.908 (in Column (5)). In Panel D, we
check our results by using Freedom House data set. The cutoff, 3.5, is employed to
build the dichotomous democracy indicator.1 When the threshold of initial GDP is
set below the percentile 25, the effect of Strong Democracy on growth is larger than
1% and is significantly higher than Weak Democracy. In Panel E, more growth lags
(6, 9, 12, and 15, respectively) are further controlled in the benchmark regression.
In all of these panels, the overall results remain similar to those in the main paper.
There are further check the robustness. In Table A.3.2, per capita GDP residual
at democratization is used to categorize Strong Democracy and Weak Democracy.
The residual GDP information is obtained by removing the year effect through the
regression. This process could further reduce the concern that per capita GDP (real)
is not comparable in different time or it tends to autocratically grow over time. The
1It seems to be relatively high if the cutoff is 5 (the cutoff between “Partial Free” and “Not
Free”). For example, there are more than 20% inconsistent observations between the democracy
from Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) and Freedom House, where the latter categorizes more than
90% of these controversial observations into democracy but Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) classifies
these into autocracy. When the cutoff is set at 3.5, the different observations are reduced to less than
10%.
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results are quite similar to the ones using per capita GDP to group these two types
of democracy.
In Table A.3.3, we use an alternative indicator to capture the economic structure,
Economic Complexity Index (ECI). ECI is a measure of the relative knowledge
intensity of an economy. It is built by considering the knowledge intensity of the
products it exports (Hausmann et al., 2014). Using it to categorize the types of
democracy, the patterns are similar to the ones in baseline results, except that an
appropriate cutoff is the percentile 15.
In Table A.3.4, we allow the degree of de jure qualities of political institution
(proxied by polity score or Freedom House score [normalized between 0 and 1]) in
periods of democracy (i.e., when the democratization dichotomous variable is equal
to one) to affect the performances of Strong Democracy and Weak Democracy on
economic growth by interacting the democracy quality indicator. Our results still
hold.
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Table A.3.1.. The Baseline Results: More Robustness Checks 1
GDP Percentiles in Political Transition Period as Cutoffs
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth p15 p20 p25 p30 p35 p40
Panel A: Filling Missing GDP Data by Values in 1960
Strong Democracy 1.137*** 1.238*** 1.044*** 0.821*** 0.921*** 0.821**
(0.301) (0.323) (0.325) (0.307) (0.321) (0.352)
Weak Democracy 0.084 0.137 0.619* 0.883** 0.800** 0.872**
(0.412) (0.345) (0.372) (0.386) (0.373) (0.338)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0243 0.0104 0.3432 0.8936 0.7957 0.9104
Countries 180 180 180 180 180 180
Observations 6261 6261 6261 6261 6261 6261
Panel B: Original Democracy Indicator Used without Smoothing
Strong Democracy 1.023*** 1.112*** 1.116*** 1.204*** 1.117*** 1.115***
(0.292) (0.303) (0.313) (0.334) (0.335) (0.363)
Weak Democracy -0.018 -0.134 0.106 0.143 0.434 0.511
(0.450) (0.409) (0.367) (0.321) (0.364) (0.353)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0307 0.0063 0.0179 0.0106 0.1268 0.197
Countries 152 152 152 152 152 152
Observations 5399 5399 5399 5399 5399 5399
Panel C: Democracy Indicator from Polity Data with 5 as Cutoff
Strong Democracy 0.626* 0.685** 0.812** 0.819** 0.908** 0.856**
(0.320) (0.339) (0.356) (0.379) (0.395) (0.402)
Weak Democracy -0.424 -0.253 -0.436 -0.211 -0.234 -0.004
(0.485) (0.356) (0.342) (0.357) (0.354) (0.366)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0665 0.0427 0.0085 0.0433 0.0299 0.1072
Countries 138 138 138 138 138 138
Observations 5062 5062 5062 5062 5062 5062
Panel D: Democracy Indicator from Freedom House with 3.5 as Cutoff
Strong Democracy 1.139** 1.268** 1.258** 0.826* 0.977** 1.011**
(0.481) (0.528) (0.544) (0.428) (0.453) (0.487)
Weak Democracy -0.266 -0.181 0.004 0.642 0.502 0.532
(0.389) (0.323) (0.376) (0.491) (0.455) (0.419)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0239 0.0183 0.0538 0.7374 0.3766 0.3661
Countries 160 160 160 160 160 160
Observations 4548 4548 4548 4548 4548 4548
Panel E: Controlling Different Lags of Growth
3 lags 6 lags 9 lags 12 lags 15 lags
Strong Democracy 1.394*** 1.394*** 1.663*** 1.277*** 1.636***
(0.362) (0.382) (0.449) (0.450) (0.518)
Weak Democracy 0.048 0.039 0.075 -0.065 -0.18
(0.382) (0.387) (0.443) (0.469) (0.558)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0039 0.0047 0.0066 0.0234 0.011
Countries 153 153 151 149 146
Observations 5419 5006 4582 4152 3719
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications. From Panel A to Panel D, three lags of
growth rates and the fourth lag of GDP per capita are controlled. In Panel E, more lags of growth rates and corresponding
GDP per capita are included. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are
reported in the parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.3.2.. More Robustness Check: Using Residual GDP to Group Strong and Weak Democracy
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Growth Rate p10 p15 p20 p25 p30 p35 p40 p45 p50
GDP per Capita (Residual) in Political Transition Period as Cutoffs
Strong Democracy 1.073*** 1.153*** 1.289*** 1.394*** 1.197*** 1.140*** 0.950** 1.031*** 0.906**
(0.322) (0.344) (0.343) (0.362) (0.366) (0.398) (0.366) (0.385) (0.409)
Weak Democracy 0.054 0.184 -0.02 0.048 0.559 0.705* 0.895** 0.851** 0.926**
(0.562) (0.439) (0.451) (0.382) (0.414) (0.400) (0.422) (0.396) (0.379)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0848 0.0525 0.0105 0.0039 0.1882 0.3997 0.9164 0.7251 0.9705
Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
Observations 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.151 0.1514 0.1516 0.1509 0.1507 0.1506 0.1507 0.1506
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates and the fourth lag of GDP per
capita. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
Table A.3.3.. More Robustness Check: Using ECI to Group Strong and Weak Democracy
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Growth Rate p10 p15 p20 p25 p30 p35 p40 p45 p50
Economic Complexity Index (ECI) in Political Transition Period as Cutoffs
Strong Democracy 1.284*** 1.433*** 1.485*** 1.424*** 1.591*** 1.292*** 1.286** 1.247** 1.488***
(0.431) (0.444) (0.464) (0.481) (0.530) (0.479) (0.499) (0.526) (0.560)
Weak Democracy -0.424 -0.447 -0.186 0.226 0.269 0.700 0.763 0.823* 0.724
(0.528) (0.469) (0.484) (0.493) (0.458) (0.563) (0.509) (0.486) (0.458)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0053 0.0015 0.0063 0.0498 0.0393 0.3820 0.3990 0.4940 0.2290
Countries 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Observations 3,926 3,926 3,926 3,926 3,926 3,926 3,926 3,926 3,926
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.159 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.157 0.157 0.158
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates and the fourth lag of GDP per
capita. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table A.3.4.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth: Interacted With Democracy Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per Capita in Political Transition Period at P25 as Cutoff
Interacted with Democracy Quality Specified in Each Column
Dependent Variable: Normalized Normalized Normalized Normalized
Growth Rate Polity Freedom House Civil Liberty Political Right
Strong Democracy Interacted 1.829*** 2.141*** 2.009*** 1.854***
with Democracy Quality (βS) (0.518) (0.607) (0.625) (0.516)
Weak Democracy Interacted -0.023 0.007 0.083 -0.009
with Democracy Quality (βW ) (0.449) (0.589) (0.632) (0.415)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.00467 0.00782 0.0198 0.00355
Countries 134 153 153 153
Observations 4,878 4,697 4,697 4,697
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.161 0.161 0.162
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates
and the fourth lag of GDP per capita. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the
country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure A.1.. Growth Residual Distribution
A.3.2. Dropping Extreme Observations
Figure A.1 shows the growth residual distribution from the baseline regression.
There are indeed some extreme observations. In the graph, the lowest number
-100 is far below the 1st percentile level -19, while the highest residual 95 is well
above the 99th percentile at 15. The 5th percentile value is -12 while the 95th is
11. To avoid the influences of such extreme values, we run the baseline regression
using observations with standardized residuals between the 1thpercentile and the
99th percentile (then p99) as well as other ranges. The results are displayed in Table
A.3.5. When a small amount of extreme observations are dropped (the first column),
the patterns are the same as the baseline one. However, as more outlier observations
are removed as in Column (2)-Column (6), the coefficients of Weak Democracy
become significantly negative, indicating that Weak Democracy may actually hurt
economic performance. And the differences between Strong and Weak Democracy
become much more striking. This pattern is also robust to other regression setups
reported in the paper.2
2Results are available upon request.
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Table A.3.5.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth without Extreme
Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropping Extreme Observations with Residuals outside Specified Ranges
Dependent Variable: Growth P1-P99 P5-P95 P10-P90 p15-p85 P20-P80 P25-P75
Strong Democracy 0.957*** 0.801*** 0.623** 0.738*** 0.763*** 0.803***
(0.284) (0.261) (0.253) (0.261) (0.249) (0.228)
Weak Democracy 0.051 -0.453* -0.635** -0.570** -0.807*** -0.742***
(0.312) (0.234) (0.259) (0.282) (0.279) (0.266)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0216 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
Countries 5311 4879 4337 3795 3253 2711
Observations 153 153 153 152 152 150
Adjusted R2 0.1904 0.2486 0.2961 0.3355 0.379 0.4407
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates and
the fourth lag of GDP per capita. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A.3.3. Calculating Long-Run Growth Impact
The growth regression model we used is:
git = βSDStrongit+βW DWeakit+α1git−1+α2git−2+α3git−3+ϕyit−4+λi+δt+εit .
To find the impact of democracy on income in the long run, we re-arrange the
regression model after substituting git = 100(yit− yit−1) into the above equation
100yit = βSDStrongit +βW DWeakit +100(1+α1)yit−1+100(α2−α1)yit−2+
100(α3−α2)yit−3+(ϕ−100α3)yit−4+λi+δt + εit .
Suppose when t→+∞, the income level will reach the long run equilibrium values,
y∗S for Strong Democracy and y
∗
W for Weak Democracy, respectively. Then the long-
run growth effect of Strong Democracy is obtained by
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LongE f f ectDStrong = 100(y∗S− y0)
=
100βˆS
100−100(1+ αˆ1+ αˆ2− αˆ1+ αˆ3− αˆ2+0.01ϕˆ− αˆ3)
=
100βˆS
−ϕˆ
=
100βˆS
ˆ| ϕ | ,
since ϕˆ < 0 is always true for the coefficient of the 4th-lagged GDP per capita.
Similarly, the long-run growth effect of Weak Democracy is
LongE f f ectDWeak = 100(y∗W − y0) =
100βˆW
−ϕˆ =
100βˆW
ˆ| ϕ | .
A.3.4. Sensitivity Analysis for Separating the Effects of
Democratizations and Reversals
An implicit assumption in the baseline regression is that the effects of democratiza-
tion and the reversal are of the same magnitude but with opposite signs. To check
whether this assumption is reasonable, we consider the following generalization of
our model:
git = βSDemStrongit + γSSReversalit +βW DemWeakit
+ γWWReversalit +
3
∑
j=1
α jgit− j +ϕyit−4+λi+δt + εit ,
(A.1)
where DemStrong, DemWeak, SReversal, WReversal represent respectively the
cumulative number of strong democratization, weak democratization, and their re-
versals for country i at time t. We need to check whether βS+γS = 0 and βW +γW =
0 to assess whether their effects are indeed of the same magnitude but with the
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opposite signs. The two conditions do hold in Table A.3.6, where results of this
generalized model are presented using different cutoffs.
Table A.3.6.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth with Reversals
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth p15 p20 p25 p30 p35 p40
DemStrong 1.071*** 1.235*** 1.353*** 1.243*** 1.221*** 0.890**
(0.363) (0.371) (0.387) (0.397) (0.425) (0.390)
SReversal -1.334*** -1.554*** -1.634*** -1.108** -1.088** -0.858*
(0.509) (0.549) (0.552) (0.439) (0.456) (0.447)
DemWeak 0.162 0.041 0.011 0.399 0.528 0.860*
(0.515) (0.446) (0.405) (0.429) (0.419) (0.447)
WReversal -0.600 -0.251 -0.245 -1.373 -1.440 -1.540
(1.818) (1.266) (1.265) (1.111) (1.082) (1.041)
Coef.Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.1036 0.0160 0.0051 0.093 0.1893 0.9546
Coef.Test (p-value): βS + γS = 0 0.6296 0.5833 0.6288 0.7822 0.7905 0.9516
Coef.Test (p-value): βW + γW = 0 0.8183 0.8741 0.8595 0.3988 0.4176 0.5300
Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153
Observations 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419 5419
Adjusted R2 0.1507 0.1511 0.1513 0.1508 0.1507 0.1504
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates
and the fourth lag of GDP per capita. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country
level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A.3.5. The Process of Building IVs
Suppose the genetic distance of country j to country i is Genei j. It is normalized to
the interval [0, 1] by a reverse order based on
Ĝenei j =
max{Genei j}−Genei j
max{Genei j}−min{Genei j} ,
and then used to calculate the genetic weight δi j via
δi j =
Ĝenei j
∑k∈Gik 6=i Ĝeneik
to ensure that the weights sum up to 1 for each country i, where Gi is the set of
genetically related countries of country i. Through this transformation, the closer
the genetic distance between country i and country j, the higher the weight of
country j for country i. Finally, the genetic weighted instruments D̂Strong
F,IV
it and
D̂Weak
F,IV
it are computed as follows
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D̂Strong
F,IV
it =
j∈Gi
∑
j 6=i
δi jDStrong jt ,
D̂Weak
F,IV
it =
j∈Gi
∑
j 6=i
δi jDWeak jt .
The Regional Democratization Wave IVs are constructed as follows. Let R denote
a set of regions. Each country i belongs to one region r, where Nrt is the number
of countries in region r at time t. The two instrumental variables DStrongF,IVit and
DWeakF,IVit are calculated via
DStrongF,IVit =
1
Nrt−1 ∑j 6=i,i∈R, j∈R
DStrong jt ,
DWeakF,IVit =
1
Nrt−1 ∑j 6=i,i∈R, j∈R
DWeak jt .
Alternatively, if only countries with the same initial political institution in the region
are influential, we can calculate another set of IVs in a similar way. Let the initial
political institution of country i is Dit0 , where t0 is the initial time of the sample.
N′rt is the number of countries in the same region with the same initial political
institution. Then, D˜Strong
F,IV
it and D˜Weak
F,IV
it are calculated via
D˜Strong
F,IV
it =
1
N′rt−1 ∑j 6=i,i∈R, j∈R
D jt0=Dit0
DStrong jt ,
D˜Weak
F,IV
it =
1
N′rt−1 ∑j 6=i,i∈R, j∈R
D jt0=Dit0
DWeak jt .
A.3.6. IV Regressions by Using Alternative Cultural and
Regional Information
In the main paper, we report results using genetic distance from Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2016) and regional data provided by WDI to build IVs. Here, we use
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alternative genetic distance from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) and regional data
provided by Quality of Government Dataset (QOG) to construct IVs. The results
are still similar, which are shown in Table A.3.7.
Table A.3.7.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on GDP Growth: Using Other
Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth Rate Genetic Distance Region Region(QOG)+Initial
(all groups) (QOG) Political Institution
Strong Democracy 4.563 4.736* 3.102**
(7.046) (2.463) (1.335)
Weak Democracy -0.969 0.881 0.066
(4.061) (1.889) (1.739)
Democracy -3.634 3.601* 2.706**
(9.303) (1.930) (1.174)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.236 0.236 0.0944 0.0944 0.116 0.116
Hansen test (p-value) 0.0484 0.0910 0.000142 0.00151 0.000413 0.00112
F Tests in First Stage (p-value):
IV for Strong Democracy 2.526 2.155 6.555
IV for Weak Democracy 1.256 3.516 2.700
IV for Democracy 1.396 5.555 12.57
Partial R2 for Strong Democracy (p-value) 0.0135 0.0970 0.199
Partial R2 for Weak Democracy (p-value) 0.0564 0.143 0.108
Partial R2 for Democracy (p-value) 0.00257 0.0692 0.128
Countries 144 144 149 149 148 148
Observations 5,248 5,248 5,237 5,237 5,149 5,149
Note: All columns present results using the 2SLS method. A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in
all specifications as well as three lags of growth rates and the fourth lag of GDP per capita. Standard errors robust against
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A.4.2. World Governance Indicators for Africa’s
Democracies
This table compares Benin and Ghana with other African democratic countries.
Table A.4.1.. World Governance Indicators for Africa’s Democracies: Average from 1996 to
2010
Freedom Polity Rule of Control of Government Regulatory Voice and
Country House Score Law Corruption Effectiveness Quality Accountability
Benin 2.10 6.33 -0.47 -0.58 -0.44 -0.38 0.26
Ghana 2.20 5.60 -0.10 -0.16 -0.05 -0.15 0.22
Other Democratic
Countries in Africa
Cabo Verde 1.23 9.33 0.46 0.73 0.09 -0.18 0.79
Lesotho 3.17 6.67 -0.13 0.01 -0.24 -0.53 -0.14
Namibia 2.30 6.00 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.19 0.36
Senegal 3.13 5.33 -0.16 -0.25 -0.23 -0.23 0.03
South Africa 1.67 9.00 0.09 0.42 0.61 0.55 0.68
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A.4. More Evidence on Benin and Ghana
A.4.1. Graphs Related with Two Countries: Benin and
Ghana
These graphs plot the institutional qualities in Benin and Ghana, with a focus on
the average performances before and after democratization. To precisely explore
the effect of political transition on the influence of these indicators, we remove the
dynamic effects of the corresponding indicator and income, as well as the effect of
time trend.
Figure A.2.. Institutional Quality Indicators in Benin
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Figure A.3.. Institutional Quality Indicators in Ghana
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A.5. Further Robustness Checks for Mechanism
Regressions
A.5.1. The Effects on Rule of Law
To explore the effects of Strong Democracy and Weak Democracy on the rule
of law measured by other indicators in the literature, we use the cross-country
regression model from Sunde, Cervellati and Fortunato (2008) mi = βSDStrongi+
βW DWeaki +αλi + εi, where mi is the average level of rule of law between 2005
and 2010,3 and λi is the vector of other control variables. Rule of law indicators are
from Skaaning (2010), Freedom House, Worldwide Governance Indicator, Welzel
(2013), and Quality of Governance data set. Results in Table A.5.1 show that the
rule of law is much higher in Strong Democracy than Weak Democracy, and their
gaps are always significant.
A.5.2. The Effects on Human Capital Related Indicators
The first three columns in Table A.5.2 replicate results on human capital in Table 10
of the paper using the same smaller sample. The main pattern still holds, where even
though enrollments of primary and secondary schools are increased more in Weak
Democracy, the human capital stock is lower. Note that the human capital stock per
capita combines information on average schooling, return of education, as well as
labor share in the whole population. In Column (4), we find that Weak Democracy
reduces the labor participation rate4, while Strong Democracy does not. This result
may reconcile the seemingly inconsistent results between different indicators of
human capital.
3We choose 2005 as the baseline year because afterwards there is no change in political
institutions in most countries, and most indicators for rule of law are available only from 2000.
4Labor participation rate is the proportion of the population aged 15 and older and economically
active.
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Table A.5.1.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on Rule of Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Worldwide Quality
Rule of Law Indicator Bertelsmann Freedom Governance Christian of
Stiftung House Indicator Welzel Governance
Strong Democracy 3.046*** 6.856*** 0.880*** 0.177*** 0.117***
(0.268) (0.593) (0.165) (0.033) (0.040)
Weak Democracy 2.110*** 4.837*** 0.332* 0.065* 0.015
(0.352) (0.786) (0.185) (0.037) (0.038)
Tropical Land Share 0.038 -2.996 -0.196 -0.025 -0.225
(1.062) (3.235) (1.073) (0.220) (0.243)
Tropical Population Share -0.675 0.829 -0.457 -0.104 0.034
(1.019) (3.168) (1.039) (0.213) (0.233)
Language Fractionalization -0.143 1.656 0.017 -0.004 0.013
(0.542) (1.216) (0.345) (0.071) (0.068)
Religion Fractionalization 1.016** 2.314** 0.397 0.071 0.069
(0.507) (1.001) (0.294) (0.060) (0.064)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.045 -3.420** -0.881** -0.167* -0.167*
(0.644) (1.362) (0.435) (0.089) (0.087)
Oil Dummy (OPEC Related) 0.126 0.226 0.468 0.096 0.023
(0.305) (1.059) (0.389) (0.080) (0.075)
Coef. Test (p-value): βS = βW 0.0098 0.0174 0.0061 0.0051 0.0097
Observations 95 127 127 125 104
Adjusted R2 0.585 0.641 0.411 0.399 0.415
Note: Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A.5.2.. Effects of Strong and Weak Democracies on Human Capital Indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Log of Log of Log of Labor
Dependent Variable: Human Capital Primary Secondary Participation
per capita Enrollment Enrollment Rate
Strong Democracy 0.002 1.192* 1.859 0.069
(0.003) (0.632) (1.208) (0.083)
Weak Democracy -0.006* 5.197*** 3.471*** -0.291**
(0.003) (1.951) (1.091) (0.145)
Coef.Test (p-value):βS = βW 0.1164 0.0435 0.2975 0.0243
Countries 80 80 80 125
Observations 1371 1371 1371 3751
Note: A full set of country and year fixed effects are controlled in all specifications as well as four lags
of GDP per capita and dependent variables. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A.6. Data Sources
Indicators from World Development Indicators (2015 Edition): Birth Rate, Death
Rate, Enrollment Rates, Fertility Rate, GDP per capita, Government Spend-
ing Share of GDP, Inflation Rate, Industry Share of GDP, Investment Rate,
Life Expectancy, Mortality Rate, Natural Resources Share of GDP, Population
Growth Rate, Regional Area (WDI), Trade Share of GDP, Urbanization Rate,
Agriculture Share of GDP, Labor Participation Rate, Manufacturing Share of
GDP.
Indicators from Quality of Government Data Set: HRV (Transparency) Index,
Economic Freedom, Forms of Democracy5, Ethnic Fractionalization, Language
Fractionalization, Religion Fractionalization, Rule of Law, Regional Area (QOG).
Indicator from World Bank Governance Index Data Set: Rule of Law, Control
of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Voice and Ac-
countability.
Indicators from Acemoglu et al. (2019): Democracy, Market Reform Index, So-
cial Unrest, Tax Revenue, TFP, Tropics Land Share, Tropics Population Share.
Indicators from Aisen and Veiga (2013): Human Capital per capita, Physical
Capital per capita, Regime Instability Index, Within Regime Instability Index,
Violence Index.
Alternative Democracy indicators are from Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013), Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b), and Polity IV.
Democratic Capital (Democratic Stock) is extracted from Gerring et al. (2005).
Hyperinflation is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the inflation rate (CPI)
exceeds 50%, and 0 otherwise.
5We combine Regime Institutions (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010), Political System (The
Database of Political Institutions), and Institution (Bormann and Golder, 2013) to construct dummy
variables of Parliamentary Democracy, Mixed (semi-presidential) democracy and Presidential
democracy. Electoral System (Bormann and Golder, 2013) and Electoral Family (Norris, 2009)
are used to generate three dummy variables to represent Majoritarian Election System, Proportional
Election System, and Mixed System.
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Two rule of law related indicators are from Nardulli, Peyton and Bajjalieh (2013):
Legal Infrastructure refers to a set of entities and processes that are essential to
the creation, development, and operation of a viable legal order. Infrastructures
include legal educational programs, vehicles to conduct formalized legal discourse,
and bodies that regulate legal professionals.
Legal Order refers to a distinctive type of rule-based governance, one that relies
on (1) transparent and formally institutionalized rules to order human behavior and
interactions and (2) the structured deployment of coercion to enforce rules.
Net Gini Coefficient is from Solt (2016).
Soviet-Related Countries include Ex-Yugoslav countries, Ex-Soviet countries, and
Soviet satellite countries. Ex-Yugoslav countries include: Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovenia. Ex-Soviet countries include:
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russian Federation, Belarus, Moldova,
Ukraine. Ex-Soviet satellite countries: Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic.
Two Genetic Distance related indicators are from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016):
Weighted Genetic Distance (main group) represents the expected genetic distance
between two randomly selected individuals, one from each country. Individual is
only selected by the main group in each country.
Weighted Genetic Distance (all groups) represents the expected genetic distance
between two randomly selected individuals, one from each country. Individual is
selected from all groups in each country.
Political Corruption Index is from V-Dem Project Coppedge et al. (2017). The
index is the average of public sector corruption index, executive corruption index ,
the indicator for legislative corruption, and the indicator for judicial corruption.
Oil Dummy is from Cervellati et al. (2014), indicating members and former mem-
bers of OPEC.
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Share of Labor in Agriculture is from Wingender (2014). The share of the labor
force employed in agriculture.
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B. The Second Chapter Appendix
B.1. The Construction Processes for the Key
Indicators
B.1.1. Curriculum Control Index
To measure the degree of curriculum control, I collect information about differ-
ent levels of educational authorities influence the formation of the official cur-
riculum and achievement examinations mainly from International Handbook of
Education Systems (published in 1983), International Encyclopedia of National
Systems of Education (published in 1995), and World Data on Education: Sixth
Edition 2006-2007 (UNESCO). I construct the indicator in the three periods: the
1980s, the 1990s, the 2000s. The documents in different periods could also be used
to check whether the education system is persistent. Additional materials are also
used, including: International Perspectives on Higher Education Admission Policy:
A Reader (published in 2016), Education at a Glance (1999-2017), Curriculum
Survey (2003, 2007) in Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS), The Education Systems of Europe (published in 2007), International En-
cyclopedia of Education (published in 2010), World Higher Education Database,
and Helms (2008).
First, I build an indicator O f f icialCurr jit to measure different educational author-
ities controlling the design of the official curriculum. i indexes the country, j
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indexes the specified educational cycle, including primary, lower secondary, and
upper secondary education, t indexes the time period. As described in Section 2.3.1,
after identifying the centralizing and decentralizing forces in each educational cycle,
I code O f f icialCurr jit from 1 to 7, where 1 is the most decentralized and the local
government and the school are the main authorities to design official curriculum
while 7 is the most centralized and the central government dominates the design
process. To measure the overall control of the official curriculum in the country, I
construct an indicator, O f f icialCurrit by averaging O f f icialCurr jit in these three
educational cycles.
Next, I construct an indicator ExamControl jit to incorporate different educational
authorities control and design exams. In each cycle, students generally take several
exams for different purposes. The exam, in many countries, is an important crite-
rion for assessing whether students can be promoted to the next grade. It is also
used to evaluate whether students could graduate from schools in most countries.
Another important role of the exam is to select students to enter the next education
cycle. I combine the information about exam control for promotion, graduation,
and admission of the next cycle to build ExamControl jit . For example, in upper
secondary school, the information on exam control includes exam policies within
the cycle (for promotion), and at the end of the cycle (for graduation and for college
admissions).1
As described in Section 2.3.1, after identifying the centralizing and decentralizing
forces in each educational cycle, I code ExamControl jit from 1 to 9, where 1 means
no exam2, 2 means that the school designs the exam, while 9 means that the central
government dominates the exam design. Like the previous one, I build an indicator
ExamControlit to capture the overall exam control by averaging ExamControl jit in
these three educational cycles.
1These exams would force both teachers and students to pay more attention to the knowledge
that would be tested. They tend to homogenize the learning experiences of students.
2I focus on the achievement exam, since this exam type is closed related to the official
curriculum, and code the aptitude exam as no exam. Only a few countries use the aptitude exam
as an important criterion for selecting students, such as the United States and Sweden.
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The interconnection of O f f icialCurrit and ExamControlit determine what children
actually learn in school. To construct the index CurrControlit to measure the cur-
riculum control degree in country i during period t, I use the technique of principal
component analysis (PCA) to combine these two indicators. I extract the first
component and normalize it between 0 and 1, where 0 is the most decentralized
and 1 is the most centralized.3
In many developed countries, such as the United States, other criteria except for the
exam are also used for admission. Some of these criteria, such as work experience,
recommendation letter, personal statement, interview, and extracurricular activities,
can measure the potential abilities of students.4 These admission policies are im-
portant because they motivate teachers and students don’t only focus on the official
curriculum and examination and could benefit student’s all-round development.
However, it is difficult to know whether these criteria are important or not in the
admission process. In addition, most documents I find don’t describe such policies.
As a supplement, I construct an additional indicator OtherCriteriaik to capture these
criteria except for the exam by using the document Education at a Glance 20125,
where i indexes the country, and k indexes the specified criterion for the college
admission. The data are only available for about 30 countries. Four levels, not
important, low important, moderately important, and very important, are set for
these criteria. To be consistent with the encoding of the previous two indicators,
OtherCriteriaik is equal to 1 if criterion k is very important, 2 if it is moderately
important, 3 if it is low important, 4 if it is not important, and 5 if it is not used
as the criterion. By averaging all these criteria, I build one index OtherCriteriai to
measure the importance of the criteria except for the exam in the college admission.
3There are other ways to combine these two indicators. For example, after normalizing
O f f icialCurrit and ExamControlit in the unit interval, I can use the average of these two indicators
as the measurement of curriculum control degree. In addition, the multiplication of these two could
also be a proxy of curriculum control degree. I find the similar patterns using these two alternative
curriculum control indexes. See the appendix.
4The admission policies, such as family income, ethnic, and disable, aiming to protect the poor
or vulnerable groups to maintain social justice, are not directly related to the abilities of students.
5It collects the criteria used by tertiary institutions to determine access to the first stage of tertiary
education in main OECD countries during 2011.
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I composite one new indicator by combining the information of O f f icialCurrit ,
ExamControlit , and OtherCriteriai using PCA. After normalizing it to the unit
interval, I use it for further robustness checks. The results are consistent with the
baseline ones, which are reported in the appendix.
B.1.2. Patent Indicators
I mainly use the patent data from USPTO.6 In robustness checks, EPO data are also
used. More and higher-quality patents in the country imply the stronger techno-
logical strengths. The number of patents granted per capita is not a good measure
of innovation, as there are no citations for approximately 80% of patents (Hall,
Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001; Squicciarini, Dernis and Criscuolo, 2013), implying
that most of which may have little value. I use 3 indicators to measure the quality
of patent in the country, including the Hirsch index, the share of breakthrough
inventions, and the average citations per patent. To minimize the truncation issue, I
only count the amounts of citations within 5 years after the patent is granted.7
Hirsch index (H-index), initially constructed by Hirsch (2005), is recently intro-
duced in economics. H-index is defined as a number h which at least h patents have
at least h citations. This measure balances the quantity and quality of patents and
de-emphasizes the patent with high citations (Ellison, 2013; Kwon, Lee and Lee,
2017). To build H-index for each country-year, I calculate H-index by using patents
and their citations in all sectors. In the regressions, I mainly rely on the average of
H-index between 2005 and 2006 as the proxy of national innovation.8
The share of breakthrough patents in each country-year is employed to indicate the
quality of patents in the country. The breakthrough patent is defined as the one with
6The data are from Kwon, Lee and Lee (2017). They revise some mistakes in USPTO files and
match the patent’s inventor with nationality, which extremely reduces the burden of my work.
7The patent receives most of the citations within 5 years (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001;
Squicciarini, Dernis and Criscuolo, 2013). Squicciarini, Dernis and Criscuolo (2013) find that
patents in different sectors have quite different citation patterns and they suggest that it is better
to build different quality-related indicator across industries. In the alternative construction process,
I also construct these indicators at the industry level. The regression results are even better.
8Due to the truncation issue, only the data up to 2006 could be used.
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the top 5 % citations in its technological field.9 After identifying these superstar
patents, I divided the amount of these patents by the total patents in each country-
year. In regressions, I use its average between 2005 and 2006 as the measurement
of innovation. One drawback of this indicator is that it would dramatically bias up
patent’s quality of the country that has a few patents but occasionally owns one or
two breakthrough ones.10 One strategy I used is to drop the extreme observations
that are above the percentile 99.
The average citations of patents in each country-year is used. It is created by the
total citations divided by the total patents in the country each year. The average
level in the last two years is used to run regressions. Like the previous indicator,
this indicator overestimates the innovation of the country that has several patents but
occasionally owns one or two patents with extreme high citations. I use the same
strategy to remove these observations.
B.1.3. Non-Patent Indicators
B.1.3.1. Publication Indicators
The academic publication could be one of the important dimensions of national
creativity. I use country-level data from SCImago Journal & Country Rank data set
(SJR). SJR is a publicly available portal that includes the journals and country scien-
tific indicators developed from the information contained in the Scopus® database
(Elsevier B.V.). Citation data is drawn from over 21,500 titles from more than
5,000 international publishers and country performance metrics from 239 countries
worldwide. Citations per document and Hirsch index between 2005 and 2010 are
used to measure the quality of publication quality in the country.11
9Acemoglu, Akcigit and Celik (2014) also use it as the measure of the quality of innovation.
10I find that some countries have fewer than 10 patents but one or two of them are breakthrough
ones in some years. However, even in the United States, the most innovative country in the world,
averagely only less than 5% patents could be identified as breakthrough ones each year. Therefore,
the inclusion of extreme observations can seriously pollute the regression results.
11See the details from their website: https://www.scimagojr.com/aboutus.php/.
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B.1.3.2. University Rankings: Top Universities Per Capita
The amounts of worldwide top universities of the country should be an important
dimension that indicates its creativity. Research strength (measured by publications
of its academic staffs) is an indispensable element of becoming a top university.
But other factors, such as coordination and connection among different disciplines
for interdisciplinary researches, and ongoing incentives for its academic develop-
ment, are also very important and demonstrate the management and organizational
creativity.
I use the number of global top 500 universities per capita in the country as the
proxy to measure national creativity. There are several data sources used, including
Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), QS World University Rank-
ings, CWTS Leiden Ranking, and University Ranking by Academic Performance
(URAP). Different data sources focus on different aspects of the university, but one
of the common factors that all of them consider is the publication.
ARWU considers every university that has any Nobel Laureates, Fields Medalists,
highly cited researchers, or papers published in Nature or Science. In addition,
universities with a significant amount of papers indexed by Science Citation Index-
Expanded (SCIE) and Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) are also included.12
The data is available from 2004 to 2017. I mainly use it to construct the indicator
as the proxy of national creativity.
The following three data sets are used for further robustness checks. The results
are quite similar, which are available upon request. QS World University Ranking
compiles using six simple metrics that capture university performance, including
academic reputation, employer reputation, faculty-student ratio, citations per fac-
ulty, international faculty ratio, and international student ratio.13 The CWTS Lei-
den Ranking is based exclusively on bibliographic data from the Web of Science
12See the detail Methodology from the website: http://www.shanghairanking.com/
ARWU-Methodology-2017.html/.
13See the detail Methodology from the website: https://www.topuniversities.com/
qs-world-university-rankings/methodology/.
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database produced by Clarivate Analytics. They use the science citation index
expanded, the social sciences citation index, and the arts as well as humanities
citation index.14 University Ranking by Academic Performance (URAP) focuses
on academic quality. The ranking is completely based on objective data obtained
from reliable open sources. The system ranks the universities according to multiple
criteria, which capture the scientific productivity, quality, and international accep-
tance.15
B.1.3.3. Brand (Innovative Company) Rankings: Top Brands
(Innovative Companies) Per Capita
Patent or academic articles could be seen as the intermediate process of innovation.
Whether it could be transferred to the new and commercially successful products
depends on entrepreneurship. Only the entrepreneurs, who take risks and have great
abilities to integrate and coordinate different inputs to new products, as well as
have superb marketing skills, could succeed and create great businesses. Therefore,
the number of famous brands or innovative companies in the country16 indicates
broader dimensions of innovation, including scientific innovation, organizational
and management innovation, and marketing innovation. I pool several data sources
to calculate the number of brands and innovative companies for each country, re-
spectively.17
For brand rankings, I use the information from BrandFinance, Forbes, FutureBrand,
Interbrand, European Brand Institute, and SyncForce.
14See the detail Methodology from the website: http://www.leidenranking.com/
information/indicators/.
15See the detail Methodology from the website: http://www.urapcenter.org/2017/
methodology.php?q=3/.
16I don’t use some popular company rankings that focus on scales, assets, sales etc., because
these rankings do not directly consider the company’s innovation abilities.
17The data for most of these rankings are only available the top 100 or even 50 brands or
innovative companies in the global world. Many countries have no companies in rankings. But it
doesn’t mean that there is no innovation capacity there. To reduce the potential bias, I pool different
ranking sources together.
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BrandFinance calculates the brand value using the Royalty Relief methodology
which determines the value a company would be willing to pay to license its brand
as if it did not own it. This approach involves estimating the future revenue at-
tributable to a brand and calculating a royalty rate that would be charged for the use
of the brand.18
Forbes estimates the brand values on their financial merits instead of consumer
surveys. They rely on revenue and earnings before interest and taxes. They allocate
a percentage of those earnings to the brand based on the role brands play in each
industry.19
Interbrand ranks the brand considering whether it is truly global, whether it has
successfully transcended geographic and cultural boundaries, and whether it will
have expanded across the established economic centers of the world and entered the
major growth markets.20
European Brand Institute uses an in-house methodology to calculate value and rank-
ings based on factors including market value, brand revenue, and overall sales.21
FutureBrand builds the FutureBrand Index based on the assumption that there is a
difference between perception and financial performance of companies. To con-
struct the ranking, 3,004 members of the “informed public” – i.e. people in profes-
sional jobs, including top leaders and managers – in 17 countries around the world
(among them the US, Germany, UK, France, Japan, China and South Africa) were
asked to rate the global top 100 companies by market capitalization on 18 attributes,
e.g. “Trust”, “Respect”, “Authenticity”, “Personality” and “Innovation”.22
18See the detail Methodology from the website: http://brandirectory.com/
methodology/.
19See the detail Methodology from the website: https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kurtbadenhausen/2017/05/23/the-worlds-most-valuable-brands-2017-by-the-numbers/
#52d98e9303d1/.
20See the detail Methodology from the website: http://interbrand.com/best-brands/
best-global-brands/methodology//.
21See the detail Methodology from the website: https://www.rankingthebrands.com/
The-Brand-Rankings.aspx?rankingID=221&nav=category/.
22See the detail Methodology from the website: https://www.branding-institute.com/
rated-rankings/rated-ranking-futurebrand-index-2015/.
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SyncForce ranks the brand or company based on all Ranking listings on their web-
site. The position per brand is based on the number of listings, the position per
ranking and the importance of a certain ranking (global, continental, national).23
For top innovative company rankings, I use information from Thomson Reuters
(also named Clarivate), Forbes, BCG, MIT review, and Fast Company.
Thomson Reuters (Clarivate) analyzes patent and citation data across four main cri-
teria: volume, success, globalization, and influence. It ranks companies or institutes
by using data source from Derwent World Patents Index, Derwent Innovation, and
Derwent Patents Citations Index.24
Forbes relies on investors’ ability to identify firms they expect to be innovative
now and in the future. Companies are ranked by their innovation premium: the
difference between their market capitalization and a net present value of cash flows
from existing businesses (based on a proprietary formula from Credit Suisse HOLT).
The difference between them is the bonus given by equity investors on the educated
hunch that the company will continue to come up with profitable new growth.25
BCG ranking is based on a survey of 1,500 senior executives representing a wide
variety of industries in every region and on respondents’ picks and three financial
measures: three-year growth in total shareholder return, revenue, and margins.26
MIT review claims not to have counted patents, but “rather have asked whether a
company had made strides in the past year that will define its field” and to “highlight
where important innovations are happening right now”. The companies listed are
23See the detail Methodology from the website: https://www.rankingthebrands.com/
The-Brand-Rankings.aspx?rankingID=30&nav=category/.
24See the detail Methodology from the website: http://top100innovators.clarivate.
com/content/methodology/.
25See the detail Methodology from the website: https://www.forbes.com/sites/
innovatorsdna/2015/08/19/how-we-rank-the-worlds-most-innovative-companies-2015/
#13e574165f8c/.
26See the detail Methodology from the website: http://newsyoucanuse.axa.com/
what-to-make-of-bcgs-new-50-most-innovative-companies-list//.
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nothing more than a subjective evaluation of a non-representative small group: MIT
Technology Review’s editorial staff.27
Fast Company creates topographical maps of innovation across more than 40 sectors
of the economy to identify the most relevant trends—along with the companies
instigating or best capitalizing on them.28
The brief statistical description of various bands and innovative companies rankings
is reported in Table B.1.1. I count the amount of brands and companies that are once
included in these listings after removing the duplicate ones, which is reported in the
second to last column. It seems that brand rankings only change slightly between
years, which is demonstrated in the last column. It is reasonable because building a
famous brand may require a long time.
After removing the replicated observations and calculating the number of well-
known brands (innovative companies), I divide them by the total population of the
country. These two indicators, top brands and top innovative companies per capita,
are used as the proxies of national innovation.
Table B.1.1.. Statistical Description on Brands and Innovative Companies
Obs. in Total Net Net Obs.
Total Obs.Data Source Time Period Each Year Obs. Obs.
Brand
BrandFinance 2007-2017 500 5250 1035 0.197
Forbes Brand 2013-2017 100 500 128 0.256
SyncForce 2007-2017 100 1100 277 0.252
Interbrand 2007-2017 100 1100 146 0.133
European Brand Institute 2011-2017 100 700 131 0.187
FutureBrand Index 2014-2016 100 300 125 0.417
Clarivate 2011-2017 100 700 196 0.280
Innovative Forbes 2014, 2015, 2017 100 300 160 0.533
Company BCG 2010, 2012-2016 50 250 110 0.440
MIT review 2011-2016 50 300 203 0.677
Fast Company 2010-2012, 2015-2016 100 500 207 0.414
27See the detail Methodology from the website: https://www.branding-institute.com/
rated-rankings/rated-ranking-50-smartest-companies-2015/.
28See the detail Methodology from the website: https://www.fastcompany.com/3056777/
how-fast-company-picked-2016s-most-innovative-companies/.
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B.1.4. Financial and Administrative Centralization Index in
Education
I mainly rely on the book, International Encyclopedia of National Systems of Ed-
ucation (published in 1995), to build the indicators measuring financial and ad-
ministrative centralization in education. World Survey of Education–International
Handbook of Education Systems (published in 1982) is as a complementary mate-
rial. International Encyclopedia of National Systems of Education documents which
level of government has the main responsibility to support basic education (the
primary and secondary). In most cases, it does not separately discuss the financial
responsibilities in primary and secondary education. The building process is similar
to the one of building O f f icialCur. I identify all governments that play roles in
financing basic education and classify them into centralizing and decentralizing
forces. The indicator is categorized into 7 levels, where 1 is the most decentralized
(only the local government finances education), 7 is the most centralized (only the
central government supports education), and 2-6 are at the intermediate levels. I
normal this indicator into the unit interval, where 0 is the most financial decentral-
ization and 1 is the most centralization in education.
Using the same materials and method, I also construct administrative centralization
in education. Although International Encyclopedia of National Systems of Educa-
tion explicitly discusses the administration in education, there is no clear definition
on it. Administration in education could be a broad concept that includes the devel-
opment of examination and grading standards, earmarked grants, teacher training,
school inspectorates, regulation of teacher salaries, and employment conditions. It
may be a narrow concept that only refers to hiring, firing, and setting terms of
reference for educational employees. Considering related information in different
countries is provided by different experts, there would be measurement errors in
this index.
207
B
.2.
Further
Robustness
Checks:
U
sing
H
-index
as
Innovation
Table
B
.2.1..R
obustness
C
heck:T
he
E
ffectofC
urriculum
C
ontrolon
Innovation
C
ontrolling
forO
therC
ovariates
D
ependentV
ariable:Patent’s
Q
uality
(H
-index,U
SPTO
)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
C
ontrolV
ariable:
Pop.in
Property
C
ivil
G
D
P
L
argerC
ity
B
roadcast
R
oad
R
ight
L
iberty
C
urriculum
C
ontrol
-26.146***
-35.589***
-35.235***
-34.409***
-31.150***
-31.317***
(9.366)
(12.643)
(11.542)
(12.217)
(11.011)
(11.322)
G
D
P
per(L
og)
2.188*
4.835**
1.484
6.162***
1.853
3.586***
(1.121)
(1.886)
(1.943)
(1.501)
(1.410)
(1.301)
A
vg
Schooling
(L
og)
3.395
1.133
2.894
-0.212
1.864
1.937
(2.169)
(2.228)
(2.615)
(3.656)
(1.960)
(1.825)
G
D
P
(L
og)
2.480***
(0.655)
Pop.Share
in
L
argerC
ities
(L
og)
1.654
(1.772)
B
roadband
Subscriptions
(L
og)
1.830***
(0.618)
R
ailw
ay
D
ensity
(L
og)
0.013
(0.011)
R
oad
D
ensity
(L
og)
0.025*
(0.014)
Property
R
ights
0.204***
(0.063)
C
ivilL
iberty
-2.217***
(0.816)
C
ontinentD
um
m
ies






O
bservations
108
83
97
72
107
108
R
-squared
0.551
0.520
0.535
0.567
0.520
0.512
N
ote:
A
llregressions
are
cross-country
w
ith
one
observation
percountry.T
he
dependentvariable
is
H
-index
ofthe
patentfrom
U
SPTO
.
T
he
covariate
specified
in
each
colum
n
is
controlled.R
obuststandard
errors
are
in
the
parentheses
*
p
<
0.1,**
p
<
0.05,***
p
<
0.01.
208
Table B.2.2.. Robustness Check: Further Outlier Tests, Alternative Regression Model
Dependent Variable: Patent’s Quality (H-index, USPTO)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Positive Outlier Tests: Drop Extreme Residuals Truncated
Dependent Dependent Outside Values Cooked Distance Leverage Regression
Curriculum Control -2.347*** -35.265*** -22.038*** -21.457*** -21.457*** -77.704**
(0.467) (10.998) (4.169) (4.640) (4.640) (31.979)
GDP per (Log) 0.628*** 4.890** 2.563*** 3.511*** 3.511*** 19.841*
(0.184) (2.025) (0.874) (0.895) (0.895) (10.917)
Avg Schooling (Log) 0.396 6.238 1.464 0.573 0.573 93.389**
(0.308) (4.215) (1.643) (1.533) (1.533) (46.254)
Continent Dummies      
Observations 108 85 103 103 103 85
R-squared 0.671 0.496 0.556 0.540 0.540 -
Note: All regressions are cross-country with one observation per country. The dependent variable is H-index of the patent from USPTO.
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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ote:
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ll
regressions
are
cross-country
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ith
one
observation
per
country.
T
he
dependent
variable
is
H
-index
of
the
patent
from
U
SPTO
.In
the
baseline
regression,only
incom
e
and
averaging
are
controlled.In
robustness
checks,othercovariates
specified
in
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ns
are
controlled.R
obuststandard
errors
are
in
the
parentheses
*
p
<
0.1,**
p
<
0.05,***
p
<
0.01.
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Table B.3.2.. Further Robustness Check (Control Human Capital Covariates): Curriculum Control and
Innovation measured by Other Indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control Variable: Tertiary Schooling Immigrant Stock Test Score All
Panel A: Breakthrough Patent Share (USPTO) As the Dependent Variable
Curriculum Control -37.026*** -32.325*** -31.450*** -28.552**
(8.920) (7.967) (11.739) (11.982)
Observations 108 107 62 61
Panel B: Avg. Citations (USPTO) As the Dependent Variable
Curriculum Control -50.413*** -39.913*** -33.265** -25.439*
(11.345) (9.716) (13.022) (14.495)
Observations 108 107 62 61
Panel C: H-index (EPO) As the Dependent Variable
Curriculum Control -52.215*** -44.305*** -55.565*** -48.332***
(11.443) (9.731) (12.293) (11.166)
Observations 108 107 62 61
Panel D: Breakthrough Patent Share (EPO) As the Dependent Variable
Curriculum Control -53.696*** -50.841*** -54.981*** -52.081***
(9.560) (10.282) (12.694) (13.687)
Observations 108 107 62 61
Panel E: Avg. Citations (EPO) As the Dependent Variable
Curriculum Control -37.067*** -36.506*** -43.862*** -42.049***
(6.834) (8.137) (9.457) (10.695)
Observations 108 107 62 61
Panel F: Avg. Citations of Publication As the Dependent Variable
Curriculum Control -30.447*** -33.022*** -22.614*** -26.542***
(6.981) (7.884) (6.792) (7.359)
Observations 108 107 62 61
Panel G: Innovative Companies per capita As the Dependent Variable
Curriculum Control -28.831** -27.156** -28.359 -26.493
(14.066) (13.560) (19.765) (20.824)
Observations 108 107 62 61
Panel H: Famous Brands per capita As the Dependent Variable
Curriculum Control -23.714** -22.844** -24.836 -26.640
(11.167) (11.162) (16.079) (16.995)
Observations 108 107 62 61
Panel I: Amounts of Famous Universities per capita As the Dependent Variable
Curriculum Control -40.940*** -36.855*** -38.671*** -35.836**
(8.863) (9.587) (12.903) (14.148)
Observations 108 107 62 61
Note: All regressions are cross-country with one observation per country. The dependent variable is specified in each
panel. The covariate specified in each column is controlled. Continent dummies are controlled in each regression. Robust
standard errors are in the parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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B.4. Potential Channels: Further Evidence–The
Effect of Curriculum Control on Parenting
Styles
The beliefs and values shaped by schooling not only influence their work charac-
teristics and career values but also influence parenting styles, as well as affect the
investments to instill values in their children.
I explore the effect of curriculum control on parenting styles by examining the
values that parents report as being important to teach their children. Parenting styles
are measured by using the following survey question from the World Values Survey
(WVS)29: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at
home. Which, if any, do you consider especially important?” Respondents are then
given a list of the following eleven traits: (i) Obedience, (ii) feeling of responsibil-
ity, (iii) tolerance/respect for others, (iv) unselfishness/generosity, (v) imagination,
(vi) independence, (vii) self-expression, (viii) determination/perseverance; (ix) hard
work, (x) thrift, and (xi) religious faith. Respondents respond “yes” to any of the
traits they feel are important to instill in their children. I mainly focus on the
effects of curriculum control on imagination, obedience, and independence, which
are crucial for creativity.
The respondent’s characteristics (gender, age, squared age, a set of dummies for
educational attainment and income level) and the dummies for different survey years
are controlled in regression using model (2.3). The results are reported in Column
(3)–(5) in Table B.4.1. Parents educated in a decentralized curriculum-control sys-
tem believe that imagination and independence are important for their children, and
they generally disagree that obedience is an important quality.
I also show that parents who receive schooling in a flexible system tend to be-
lieve that “feelings of responsibility,” “tolerance/respect for others,” “determina-
29I use the data from the fifth and sixth waves of the WVS.
214
tion/perseverance”, and “unselfishness” are important, while “hard work”, “thrift”,
and “religious faith” are not. They have no strong preferences for other qualities.
These results are presented in Column (6)–(12).
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B.5. Data Source
Indicators from World Development Indicators (2015 Edition): GDP, Population,
GDP per capita, Urbanization Rate, International Migrant Stock, Domestic
Credit to Private Sector (%, GDP), Population in Urban Agglomerations of
More Than 1 Million (%, population), Individuals using the Internet (%, pop-
ulation), Fixed Broadband Subscriptions (per 100 people).
Indicators from Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2017): Paved Roads Net-
work Density (km per sq km of land area), Paved Roads Network Density
(km per 1000 inhabitant), Rail Network Density (km per sq km of area), Rail
Network Density (km per 1000 inhabitants), Share of Protestants in the Pop-
ulation, Share of Roman Catholics in the Population, Share of Muslims in the
Population, Share of Other Religions in the Population, Dummy for OECD
(2000), Continent Dummies, Linguistic Distance Index (plurality languages).
Indicators from Galor and Ömer Özak (2015): Average Crop Yield (post-1500CE),
Standard Deviation of Average Crop Yield (post-1500CE), Individualism.
Indicators from Quality of Government Data Set: Property Rights Protection,
Language Fractionalization, Religion Fractionalization, Ethnic Fractionaliza-
tion, Religion Share (%, population), Civil Liberty.
Indicators from V-Dem Project: Local Election Quality, Regional Election Qual-
ity, Civil Society Development.30
Indicators from Barro and Lee (2013): Percentage of Population with Primary
Education, Percentage of Population with Secondary Education, Percentage
of Population with Tertiary Education, Average Years of Schooling Attained,
Average Years of Tertiary Schooling Attained.
Indicators from Roland and Gerard (2017): the United States Census Data.
30The first one is built by combining two indicators that measure “local government elected”
and “sub-national elections free and fair” using PCA. The second one is constructed by combining
two indicators that measure “regional government elected” and “sub-national elections free and
fair” using PCA. The last one is built by combining three indicators that measure “civil society
consultation”, “civil society participatory environment”, and “engaged society” with PCA.
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The indicator from Altinok, Diebolt and Demeulemeester (2014): Test Perfor-
mance in Secondary Education.
Indicator from World Bank Governance Index Data Set: Rule of Law.
All data about CES, TIMSS, and PIRLS are from Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer
(2013).
Career, Values, and Parenting Styles are from WVS data.31
31They could be downloaded from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp.
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C. The Third Chapter Appendix
C.1. The Proof of Proposition 3.2
First, let’s find the condition that the masses start to revolt. They will revolt if the
expected payoff of revolting should be larger than no action. So,
(1−λ e_totalt+1 )Ipt+1 ≤ q(xt+1)
(1−λ e_totalt+1 )Ipt+1
θt+1
+(1−q(xt+1))
(
Ipt+1+λ
p
it+1I
e_total
t+1
)
⇒ (1−λ e_totalt+1 )θt+1≤ q(xt+1)(1−λ e_totalt+1 )+θt+1 (1−q(xt+1))
(
1+λ p_totalt+1
Ie_totalt+1
Ip_totalt+1
)
⇒ (1−λ e_totalt+1 )θt+1≤ q(xt+1)(1−λ e_totalt+1 )+θt+1 (1−q(xt+1))
(
1+
λ p_totalt+1
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ϕ pt+1
ϕet+1
)
⇒ (1−λ e_totalt+1 )θt+1≤
1−λ e_totalt+1
1+ xt+1υ−1(χ)
+θt+1
xt+1υ−1(χ)
1+ xt+1υ−1(χ)
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ϕ pt+1
ϕet+1
)
⇒ xt+1 ≥ υ(χ)
(1−λ e_totalt+1 )(θt+1−1)
λ e_totalt+1 θt+1
− λ
p_total
t+1 ϕ
p
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λ e_totalt+1 ϕ
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(
1
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−1
)(
1− 1
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)
− 1−ρ
ρ
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Suppose xp∗t+1 = υ(χ)
(
1
λ e_totalt+1
−1
)(
1− 1θt+1
)
− 1−ρρ
λ p_totalt+1
λ e_totalt+1
ϕ pt+1
ϕet+1
. Therefore, when
xp∗t+1− xt+1 ≤ 0, the masses will revolt.
Next, I turn to find the condition that elites decide to repress. Similarly, the expected
payoff of the repression for the ruling elites should be larger than the compromise.
Then,
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.
Then, elites would compromise when xt+1 > xe∗t+1 if the masses revolt.
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C.2. Robustness Checks in Growth Regressions
C.2.1. Using Other Economic Level Indicators
In the baseline regressions, secondary enrollment rate in 1980 is used as a proxy of
economic level. I employ GDP per capita, technological distance, average years
of secondary schooling, and percentage with secondary schooling as alternative
proxies of economic level. The results are reported in Table C.2.1.1 Heterogeneous
effects of democracy and state development on growth could be observed, which is
consistent with the patterns shown in Table 3.6.2.
C.2.2. Using Other Democracy Indicators
In the baseline regressions, the democracy data from Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2008b) is used. Considering the results may be sensitive to the democracy indi-
cators chosen, in Table C.2.2, alternative dichotomous democracy indicators, from
Acemoglu et al. (2019) (ACE), Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) (BMR), Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) (CGV), Polity IV (POL), and Freedom House (FH),
are employed to implement the regressions. The main patterns are the same. In
addition, the significant and negative effect of democracy on growth in the poor
country could be found when democracy indicators from Polity IV and CGV are
used. So, the results are not sensitive by using different democracy indicators.
C.2.3. Using IVs for Democracy
One possible concern is that democratization may be an endogenous process, in-
fluenced by economic level (Gründler and Krieger, 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2019).
Following recent studies (Acemoglu et al., 2019), regional democratization waves
1Economic level indicators in 1975, 1990, 2000, 5 years past, and the previous year are also
used for further robustness checks. The results are reported in Appendix C.6.
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are used to construct IVs.2 The results are reported in Table C.2.3. P-values of
the first stage and Sargan test are displayed at the bottom of the table. The state
development is beneficial to growth, especially in the poor country, while democ-
racy strongly boosts economic performance in the rich country. The coefficients of
Dem∗EconLevel are larger than the ones in the baseline OLS regressions, indicating
that there could be a downward bias introduced by time-varying unobservable or the
possibility of attenuation in the previous estimates due to measurement error in the
index of democracy.
2The regional classification is from Quality of Government data set (QOG). The whole world
is divided into 10 areas. See the details in Data Appendix. The four lags of the average level of
democracy in foreign countries within the same region are employed to build instrumental variables
of democracy. Similarly, the four lags of average foreign democracy interacted with economic level
indicators are used to as the IVs of interaction between democracy and economic level.
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Table C.2.1.. Heterogeneous Effects of Democracy and State Capacity on Growth by Controlling for Different
Interaction Terms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EconLevel in 1980 is Specified in Each Column
Dependent Variable: GDP per Technological Avg Secondary Percentage with
Growth Rate Capita Distance Year Schooling Secondary Schooling
Democracy (Dem) -0.272 0.869*** -0.332 -0.449
(0.691) (0.312) (0.665) (0.759)
Dem*EconLevel 3.939** 8.868** 2.592** 2.516*
(1.902) (4.144) (1.268) (1.371)
State Capacity (SC) 3.417*** 2.272*** 7.054*** 6.436***
(0.969) (0.640) (1.627) (1.714)
SC*EconLevel -4.584** -12.425*** -7.349*** -5.861***
(1.839) (4.040) (2.191) (2.151)
Observations 2761 2761 2760 2760
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.216 0.241 0.239
Note: This table presents estimates of the effects of democracy and state capacity on annual GDP per
capita growth by using economic level indicators to build interaction terms. Normalized economic level
indicator (in 1980), which are specified in each column, interacted with Democracy (PS) and State Capacity
(StateHist) are controlled. 4 lagged education indicators (log form), including primary, secondary, and
tertiary rates are controlled. In all specifications, various factors are considered to control for country and
year fixed effects. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table C.2.2.. Heterogeneous Effects of Democracy and State Capacity on Growth by Using Different Democracy
Indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy Indicator is Specified in Each Column
Dependent Variable:
Growth Rate ACE CGV BMR POL FH
Democracy (Dem) -1.124* -1.751** -0.929 -1.076** 0.069
(0.621) (0.687) (0.757) (0.533) (0.817)
Dem*EconLevel 3.399*** 3.388*** 2.636* 2.990*** 0.995
(1.144) (1.187) (1.365) (0.977) (1.261)
State Capacity (SC) 4.458*** 4.078*** 4.023*** 4.549*** 3.805***
(1.055) (0.996) (1.077) (1.029) (0.987)
SC*EconLevel -3.328** -2.684* -2.504 -3.406** -2.582*
(1.557) (1.565) (1.655) (1.582) (1.540)
Observations 3189 3038 2955 3184 3189
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.211 0.21 0.218 0.216
Note: This table presents estimates of the effects of democracy and state capacity on annual GDP
per capita growth using different Democracy indicators specified in each column. Normalized
economic level indicator (secondary enrollment rate in 1980) interacted with Democracy and
State Capacity (StateHist) are controlled. 4 lagged education indicators (log form), including
primary, secondary, and tertiary rates are controlled. In all specifications, various factors are
considered to control for country and year fixed effects. Standard errors robust against at the
country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.2.3.. Heterogeneous Effects of Democracy and State Capacity on Growth by Instrumenting Democracy
Dependent Variable: Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracy from: PS ACE CGV BMR POL FH
Democracy -0.097 -0.048 -2.421 -2.44 1.267 -2.082
(1.921) (2.442) (2.012) (3.380) (3.543) (7.229)
Dem*EconLevel 7.247** 8.270** 9.762** 10.838** 9.982** 4.688
(3.489) (3.775) (4.034) (4.863) (4.986) (5.635)
State Capacity (SC) 6.900*** 5.932*** 6.410*** 5.883*** 6.158** 3.919***
(2.042) (1.774) (1.922) (2.116) (2.417) (1.063)
SC*EconLevel -7.249** -5.110** -4.522* -3.438 -5.716* -2.37
(2.947) (2.450) (2.444) (2.519) (3.268) (1.818)
IVs for Democracy 0.056 0.0188 0.0209 0.155 0.1362 0.4009
IVs for Dem*EconLevel 0.2624 0.0386 0.0223 0.0808 0.4982 0.0563
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.0241 0.1176 0.1723 0.7484 0.0555 0.1668
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.15 0.161 0.15 0.043 0.217
Observations 2942 3186 3035 2952 3181 3098
Note: This table presents estimates of the effects of democracy and state capacity on annual GDP per capita
growth by instrumenting democracy. political regimes (democracy used is specified in each column) of the countries
within same region (categorized by QOG) are used to build IV. 4 lagged foreign democracy variables are used in
the first stage of 2SLS regressions. Sargan test and corresponding p-value are reported for overidentification issue.
Normalized economic level indicator (secondary enrollment rate in 1980) interacted with Democracy and State
Capacity (StateHist) are controlled. 4 lagged education indicators (log form), including primary, secondary, and
tertiary rates are controlled in each column. In all specifications, various factors are considered to control for country
and year fixed effects. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.3. Further Robustness Checks for Growth Regressions
C.3.1. Using Economic Level Indicators in Other Years
Table C.3.1.. Heterogeneous Effects of Democracy and State Capacity on Growth by Controlling for Economic
Level Indicators in 1975
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EconLevel in 1975 is Specified in Each Column
Dependent Variable: GDP per Technological Avg Secondary Percentage with
Growth Rate Capita Distance Year Schooling Secondary Schooling
Democracy (Dem) -0.222 0.685** -0.287 -0.502
(0.549) (0.264) (0.672) (0.794)
Dem*EconLevel 3.568** 7.677* 2.788** 2.770*
(1.728) (4.306) (1.354) (1.451)
State Capacity (SC) 3.345*** 2.121*** 5.939*** 5.717***
(0.841) (0.620) (1.590) (1.651)
SC*EconLevel -4.908** -12.948** -6.111*** -5.138**
(1.895) (4.981) (2.179) (2.094)
Observations 2623 2623 2724 2724
Adjusted R2 0.218 0.216 0.241 0.24
Note: This table presents estimates of the effects of democracy and state capacity on annual GDP per
capita growth by using economic level indicators to build interaction terms. Normalized economic level
indicator (in 1975), which are specified in each column, interacted with Democracy (PS) and State Capacity
(StateHist) are controlled. 4 lagged education indicators (log form), including primary, secondary, and
tertiary rates are controlled. In all specifications, various factors are considered to control for country and
year fixed effects. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.3.2.. Heterogeneous Effects of Democracy and State Capacity on Growth by Controlling for Economic
Level Indicators in 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EconLevel in 1990 is Specified in Each Column
Dependent Variable: GDP per Technological Avg Secondary Percentage with
Growth Rate Capita Distance Year Schooling Secondary Schooling
Democracy (Dem) -0.758 0.751*** -0.875 -1.142
(0.629) (0.284) (0.913) (1.023)
Dem*EconLevel 4.326** 4.583** 3.192** 3.169**
(1.678) (1.895) (1.505) (1.539)
State Capacity (SC) 3.441*** 2.817*** 7.020*** 5.849***
(0.826) (0.647) (1.830) (1.866)
SC*EconLevel -2.902** -6.254*** -6.881*** -4.869**
(1.434) (1.743) (2.361) (2.251)
Observations 2918 2918 2760 2760
Adjusted R2 0.222 0.221 0.241 0.239
Note: This table presents estimates of the effects of democracy and state capacity on annual GDP per
capita growth by using economic level indicators to build interaction terms. Normalized economic level
indicator (in 1990), which are specified in each column, interacted with Democracy (PS) and State Capacity
(StateHist) are controlled. 4 lagged education indicators (log form), including primary, secondary, and
tertiary rates are controlled. In all specifications, various factors are considered to control for country and
year fixed effects. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table C.3.3.. Heterogeneous Effects of Democracy and State Capacity on Growth by Controlling for Economic
Level Indicators in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EconLevel in 2000 is Specified in Each Column
Dependent Variable: GDP per Technological Avg Secondary Percentage with
Growth Rate Capita Distance Year Schooling Secondary Schooling
Democracy (Dem) -0.901 0.748*** -0.749 -0.643
(0.569) (0.283) (0.893) (0.812)
Dem*EconLevel 4.699*** 4.832** 3.047** 2.719**
(1.601) (1.953) (1.480) (1.335)
State Capacity (SC) 2.832*** 2.709*** 7.470*** 5.397***
(0.848) (0.652) (2.032) (1.695)
SC*EconLevel -1.584 -5.903*** -7.601*** -4.694**
(1.379) (1.898) (2.618) (2.189)
Observations 2949 2949 2764 2764
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.224 0.241 0.24
Note: This table presents estimates of the effects of democracy and state capacity on annual GDP per
capita growth by using economic level indicators to build interaction terms. Normalized economic level
indicator (in 2000), which are specified in each column, interacted with Democracy (PS) and State Capacity
(StateHist) are controlled. 4 lagged education indicators (log form), including primary, secondary, and
tertiary rates are controlled. In all specifications, various factors are considered to control for country and
year fixed effects. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.3.4.. Heterogeneous Effects of Democracy and State Capacity on Growth by Controlling for 5-Lagged
Economic Level Indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EconLevel in 2000 is Specified in Each Column
Dependent Variable: GDP per Technological Avg Secondary Percentage with
Growth Rate Capita Distance Year Schooling Secondary Schooling
Democracy (Dem) -0.837 0.756*** -0.467 -1.223
(0.751) (0.274) (0.981) (1.312)
Dem*EconLevel 4.703** 4.197** 2.488 3.226
(2.172) (1.839) (1.661) (1.955)
State Capacity (SC) 4.277*** 2.714*** 6.275*** 6.035***
(0.832) (0.628) (1.680) (2.123)
SC*EconLevel -5.190*** -7.408*** -6.116*** -5.203*
(1.443) (1.865) (2.273) (2.789)
Observations 2936 2936 2745 2745
Adjusted R2 0.224 0.222 0.240 0.239
Note: This table presents estimates of the effects of democracy and state capacity on annual GDP per
capita growth by using economic level indicators to build interaction terms. Normalized economic level
indicator (5-lagged), which are specified in each column, interacted with Democracy (PS) and State Capacity
(StateHist) are controlled. 4 lagged education indicators (log form), including primary, secondary, and
tertiary rates are controlled. In all specifications, various factors are considered to control for country and
year fixed effects. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.3.2. Controlling For Other Growth Covariates
Table C.3.5.. Heterogeneous Effects of Democracy and State Capacity on Growth by Controlling for Growth
Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Control Control Control Control Control
Growth Rate Fertility Trade Gov. Spending Inflation Life Exp.
Democracy (PS) -0.898 -0.709 -0.538 -1.273 -0.995
(0.874) (0.901) (0.873) (0.879) (0.876)
State Capacity 4.223*** 6.016*** 5.790*** 5.098*** 4.462***
(1.215) (1.679) (1.773) (1.261) (1.292)
Dem*EconLevel 2.600* 2.721* 2.284 3.562** 2.926*
(1.527) (1.541) (1.534) (1.528) (1.515)
SC*EconLevel -3.610** -5.119** -5.314** -4.654*** -3.783**
(1.690) (2.072) (2.322) (1.766) (1.766)
Adjusted R2 0.229 0.213 0.212 0.222 0.228
Observations 2942 2844 2803 2923 2942
Democracy (CGV) -1.179* -1.775** -1.421** -1.783** -1.535**
(0.685) (0.753) (0.671) (0.690) (0.660)
State Capacity 4.240*** 4.767*** 5.122*** 4.334*** 3.854***
(0.984) (1.416) (1.483) (0.996) (1.147)
Dem*EconLevel 2.278* 3.424*** 2.591** 3.416*** 2.860**
(1.182) (1.230) (1.110) (1.175) (1.130)
SC*EconLevel -3.208** -2.966 -3.969* -3.157** -2.511
(1.428) (1.875) (2.054) (1.554) (1.632)
Adjusted R2 0.218 0.202 0.194 0.210 0.218
Observations 3038 2938 2900 3019 3038
Democracy (ACE) -0.837 -0.932 -0.588 -1.147* -1.119*
(0.605) (0.632) (0.630) (0.601) (0.598)
State Capacity 4.460*** 4.916*** 5.266*** 4.665*** 4.221***
(1.042) (1.527) (1.593) (1.052) (1.124)
Dem*EconLevel 2.631** 3.115*** 2.465** 3.395*** 3.138***
(1.105) (1.119) (1.137) (1.103) (1.103)
SC*EconLevel -3.644** -3.420* -4.347** -3.718** -3.106*
(1.458) (1.941) (2.130) (1.541) (1.569)
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.210 0.204 0.218 0.226
Observations 3189 3087 3049 3170 3189
Democracy (BMR) -0.444 -0.901 -0.486 -0.936 -0.761
(0.729) (0.743) (0.758) (0.739) (0.761)
State Capacity 4.302*** 4.618*** 5.136*** 4.293*** 3.920***
(1.042) (1.533) (1.613) (1.077) (1.200)
Dem*EconLevel 1.598 2.581* 1.783 2.607** 2.216
(1.341) (1.306) (1.360) (1.308) (1.343)
SC*EconLevel -3.157** -2.675 -3.896* -3.005* -2.438
(1.507) (2.025) (2.216) (1.645) (1.692)
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.202 0.194 0.209 0.217
Observations 2955 2856 2818 2937 2955
Democracy (POL) -0.701 -0.563 -0.486 -1.113** -1.071*
(0.542) (0.570) (0.527) (0.520) (0.546)
State Capacity 4.593*** 4.752*** 5.274*** 4.773*** 4.299***
(1.048) (1.512) (1.576) (1.027) (1.081)
Dem*EconLevel 2.068** 2.111** 1.917** 3.015*** 2.658***
(1.008) (0.955) (0.920) (0.963) (0.966)
SC*EconLevel -3.744** -3.274 -4.293** -3.822** -3.155**
(1.505) (1.976) (2.154) (1.567) (1.572)
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.209 0.204 0.218 0.225
Observations 3184 3082 3044 3166 3184
Democracy (FH) 0.339 0.203 0.700 0.066 0.542
(0.786) (0.836) (0.814) (0.823) (0.804)
State Capacity 3.963*** 4.094*** 4.606*** 4.036*** 3.588***
(0.997) (1.440) (1.506) (0.984) (1.022)
Dem*EconLevel 0.312 0.696 -0.070 1.031 0.204
(1.204) (1.251) (1.214) (1.270) (1.216)
SC*EconLevel -3.126** -2.524 -3.653* -3.020** -2.447
(1.411) (1.910) (2.077) (1.518) (1.492)
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.206 0.201 0.216 0.223
Observations 3189 3087 3049 3170 3189
Note: This table presents estimates of the effects of democracy and state capacity on annual GDP per
capita growth by controlling for growth covariates. Democracy indicator is used specified in each panel.
Normalized economic level indicator (secondary enrollment rate in 1980) interacted with Democracy
and State Capacity (StateHist) are controlled. 4 lagged education indicators (log form), including
primary, secondary, and tertiary rates are controlled in each column. Other covariates are controlled
specified in each column. In all specifications, various factors are considered to control for country
and year fixed effects. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in parentheses. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.4. Robustness Checks in Transition Regressions
C.4.1. Using Other Regression Models
One concern about the results is that it may be sensitive to the regression model
used. To address this issue, the following linear regression model is employed:
Democracyit =αDemocracyit−5+β0SCi+β1SC2i +β2Eduit−5+
β3EduGiniit−5+β4Xit−5+β5λi+β6Time+ εi,
(C.1)
where Democracyit = 1 if country i is democracy at time t, and 0 if it is autocracy.
Democracy data is from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b). One five-lagged
Democracy is controlled due to the high correlation between the current and previ-
ous political regime.3 Other variables are the same with the previous probabilistic
model except that the corresponding five-lagged values are used in these variables.
Various country fixed factors and time effects are also controlled. The inverted-U
links between state development and democratization are quite significant, which
are displayed in Table C.4.1.
C.4.2. Using IVs and Other Democracy Indicators
There could be some other possible concerns in the linear regression model. First,
there could be a serious endogeneity issue. Second, the results may be sensitive to
the democracy indicators used.
Following the growth regression strategy, foreign democracies are used to build
IVs4 and the regression results by controlling for fixed factors (country and time)
are reported in Table C.4.2. They are quite similar to the results in Table C.4.1,
indicating that the endogeneity concern is not a serious issue.
3I don’t use annual data to do regressions. By doing so, several lagged democracy variables
have to be controlled, but it is not convenient to use IV method to deal with these dynamic terms in
subsequent regressions.
4The average level of ten-lagged and fifteen-lagged foreign democracies in the same region
(QOG) are used.
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Using other democracy indicators (including FH, POL, BMR, CGV, and ACE), I run
the OLS regressions by controlling education structure, education inequality, time
effects, as well as various fixed factors. The results are reported in Column (1)–(5)
in Table C.4.3, which are consistent with the results using democracy indicator from
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b), although some of hump-shaped relationships
are not significant. Next, the 2SLS regression results are displayed in Column (6)–
(10), which are quite similar to the OLS ones. Therefore, I can confirm that the
results are insensitive to various indicators of democracy and the endogenous issue
is not serious.
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Table C.4.1.. Regressions on Democratization by Controlling Country Fixed Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sec. Urbani- GDP Oil All (no All (no
Democracy from: PS Enroll 3 Edu Edu Gini -zation GDP per & Pop. Dummy GDP per) GDP)
SC 0.377** 0.409** 0.575*** 0.480** 0.458** 0.450** 0.487** 0.445** 0.455**
(0.178) (0.174) (0.204) (0.190) (0.189) (0.190) (0.188) (0.195) (0.196)
SC2 -0.354* -0.369* -0.629*** -0.440** -0.419* -0.454** -0.452** -0.449** -0.414*
(0.204) (0.201) (0.215) (0.214) (0.214) (0.214) (0.211) (0.220) (0.221)
L5.Democracy 0.793*** 0.783*** 0.784*** 0.777*** 0.789*** 0.780*** 0.778*** 0.777*** 0.787***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.036) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031)
L5.Secondary 0.027 0.009 -0.018 -0.027 -0.021 -0.013 -0.023 -0.02 -0.028
(0.017) (0.028) (0.045) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
L5.Primary -0.016 -0.067 -0.019 -0.032 -0.048 -0.007 -0.036 -0.026
(0.043) (0.104) (0.040) (0.046) (0.045) (0.040) (0.047) (0.049)
L5.Tertiary 0.018 0.028 0.014 0.024 0.010 0.022 0.003 0.017
(0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017)
L5.EduGini -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
L5.Urbanization 0.024 0.028 0.034
(0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
L5.GDP per -0.013 -0.016
(0.013) (0.016)
L5.GDP -0.003 -0.002
(0.014) (0.018)
L5.Pop. 0.019 0.018
(0.014) (0.016)
Oil Dummy -0.038 -0.041 -0.023
(0.039) (0.045) (0.043)
Latitude -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance to Coast/River 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tropics Land (%) -0.028 -0.027 -0.022 -0.020 -0.007 0.011 -0.006 0.028 0.002
(0.111) (0.117) (0.197) (0.109) (0.103) (0.112) (0.107) (0.117) (0.105)
Tropics Pop. (%) 0.094 0.098 0.080 0.092 0.058 0.042 0.075 0.032 0.054
(0.106) (0.109) (0.196) (0.109) (0.107) (0.114) (0.107) (0.118) (0.109)
Colony Dummy -0.097** -0.087** -0.087** -0.058 -0.053 -0.047 -0.057 -0.042 -0.049
(0.040) (0.044) (0.038) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046)
Executive Constraint 0.034 0.032 0.018 0.028 0.014 0.019 0.020 0.024 0.022
(independence) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Language -0.029 -0.031 0.074* -0.020 -0.015 -0.024 -0.018 -0.032 -0.023
Fractionalization (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Religion -0.053 -0.028 0.032 0.005 -0.004 -0.027 -0.001 -0.023 0.005
Fractionalization (0.048) (0.056) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.059) (0.059)
Ethnic -0.067 -0.073 -0.136* -0.062 -0.022 -0.016 -0.039 -0.021 -0.032
Fractionalization (0.061) (0.062) (0.068) (0.061) (0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.060) (0.062)
Muslims Pop. (%) -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Buddhist&Confu. -0.001* -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001
& Pop. (%) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Adjusted R2 0.808 0.802 0.806 0.810 0.806 0.806 0.810 0.806 0.805
Observations 673 649 397 609 574 574 609 574 574
Note: This table presents OLS regressions by controlling for various fixed factors. The dependent variable equals 0 when the country is autocratic while
1 when the country is democracy. Democracy is from PS. The main independent variables are State Capacity (StateHist), its square, education indicators
(including primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment rate), and education inequality. Urbanization ratio, GDP per capita, natural resource (oil dummy),
country size (measured by GDP and population) are controlled for further robustness checks. 5-lagged variant variables are used. The Data Appendix gives
detailed variable sources. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.4.2.. IV Regressions on Democratization by Controlling for Country Fixed Factors
Democracy from: PS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sec. Urbani- GDP Oil All (no All (no
IV (QOG) Enroll 3 Edu EduGini -zation GDP per & Pop. Dummy GDP per) GDP)
SC 0.375** 0.417** 0.503*** 0.494*** 0.470** 0.484** 0.509*** 0.497** 0.471**
(0.166) (0.167) (0.181) (0.181) (0.190) (0.206) (0.183) (0.220) (0.197)
SC2 -0.355* -0.380* -0.470** -0.457** -0.438** -0.498** -0.476** -0.511** -0.435**
(0.193) (0.196) (0.204) (0.205) (0.210) (0.232) (0.207) (0.249) (0.220)
L5.Democracy 0.802*** 0.776*** 0.761*** 0.765*** 0.786*** 0.754*** 0.756*** 0.727*** 0.777***
(0.069) (0.078) (0.083) (0.084) (0.126) (0.141) (0.082) (0.150) (0.131)
L5.Secondary 0.025 0.008 -0.023 -0.028 -0.023 -0.011 -0.023 -0.012 -0.028
(0.019) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) (0.038) (0.041) (0.036) (0.042) (0.038)
L5.Primary -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 -0.03 -0.05 -0.009 -0.041 -0.026
(0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.052) (0.054) (0.049) (0.055) (0.053)
L5.Tertiary 0.018 0.020 0.014 0.024 0.007 0.021 -0.003 0.017
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.014) (0.026) (0.019)
L5.EduGini -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.002* -0.003* -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
L5.Urbanization 0.022 0.025 0.032
(0.029) (0.032) (0.031)
L5.GDP per -0.016 -0.017
(0.019) (0.022)
L5.GDP -0.002 0.005
(0.024) (0.030)
L5.Pop. 0.020 0.015
(0.019) (0.023)
Oil Dummy -0.038 -0.048 -0.022
(0.039) (0.056) (0.046)
Latitude -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance to 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coast/River (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tropics Land (%) -0.029 -0.024 -0.019 -0.017 -0.009 0.022 0.000 0.056 0.004
(0.109) (0.118) (0.113) (0.113) (0.116) (0.139) (0.115) (0.161) (0.123)
Tropics Pop. (%) 0.093 0.096 0.091 0.091 0.059 0.036 0.073 0.019 0.053
(0.104) (0.109) (0.110) (0.111) (0.109) (0.126) (0.113) (0.141) (0.113)
Colony Dummy -0.094** -0.089* -0.063 -0.06 -0.054 -0.052 -0.061 -0.049 -0.052
(0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.050) (0.049)
Executive Constraint 0.032 0.036 0.028 0.032 0.017 0.027 0.027 0.038 0.026
(independence) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.038) (0.043) (0.031) (0.045) (0.040)
Language -0.032 -0.035 -0.02 -0.024 -0.02 -0.034 -0.024 -0.045 -0.028
Fractionalization (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.046) (0.039) (0.049) (0.043)
Religion -0.047 -0.025 0.004 0.008 0.003 -0.026 0.002 -0.031 0.008
Fractionalization (0.049) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.061) (0.066) (0.059) (0.075) (0.066)
Ethnic -0.065 -0.078 -0.060 -0.066 -0.025 -0.027 -0.048 -0.034 -0.035
Fractionalization (0.063) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.068) (0.067)
Muslims Pop. (%) -0.001* -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Buddhist&Confu. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
& Pop. (%) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
First Stage (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0049 0.0002 0.0126 0.0167 0.0058
Sargan test (p-value) 0.9306 0.9042 0.6693 0.5848 0.4734 0.6765 0.5024 0.4589 0.3512
Adjusted R2 0.805 0.799 0.806 0.806 0.802 0.803 0.806 0.802 0.802
Observations 665 641 601 601 567 567 601 567 567
Note: This table presents 2SLS regressions by controlling for various fixed factors. The dependent variable equals 0 when the country is autocratic while 1 when
the country is democracy. Democracy is from PS. The main independent variables are State Capacity (StateHist), its square, education indicators (including
primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment rate), and education inequality. Urbanization ratio, GDP per capita, natural resource (oil dummy), country size
(measured by GDP and population) are controlled for further robustness checks. 5-lagged variant variables are used. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable
sources. Sargan test is implemented for overidentification issue and the p-value is reported. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.5. Further Robustness Checks for Transition
Regressions
The transition regression models used are the same except that I explore SC, SC2,
and SC3 (or only SC) instead of SC and SC2 in regressions. The results are displayed
in Table C.5.3-Table ??. In most cases, there are no significant and robust linear
relationships between state development and democratization. By controlling for
SC, SC2, and SC3, state development related coefficients are significant in some
regressions. However, it turns out that it is a good model when I further carefully
analyze the values of these coefficients.
Suppose the coefficients of SC, SC2, and SC3 are βSC, βSC2 , and βSC3 , respectively.
In all the regressions with some significant estimated βˆSC, βˆSC2 , and βˆSC3 , I find that
ˆβSC > 0, βˆSC2 < 0, and βˆSC3 > 0. Additionally, βˆSC+ βˆSC2 < 0 and βˆSC2 + βˆSC3 < 0.
It is easy to verify that two turn points (A1 and A2) of the function f (SC) = βSCSC+
βSC2SC2+βSC3SC3 are A1 =
−βSC2−
√
β 2
SC2
−3βSCβSC3
3βSC
and A2 =
−βSC2+
√
β 2
SC2
−3βSCβSC3
3βSC
.5
Therefore, between these two points, f ′(SC) < 0. Since
−βSC2−
√
β 2
SC2
−3βSCβSC3
3βSC
< 0
and
−βSC2+
√
β 2
SC2
−3βSCβSC3
3βSC
> 16, f ′(SC)< 0 in the whole range of SC (from 0 to 1).
This indicates that only controlling for SC could be a better regression model. But I
have shown that the coefficients of SC are insignificant in almost all regression when
only SC is controlled. So, I ignore these two cases and conclude that incorporating
both SC and SC2 is an appropriate regression model.
5For all these coefficients, β 2SC2 −3βSCβSC3 > 0.
6This inequality could be obtained because βSC > 0 and βSC +βSC2 < 0.
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Table
C
.5.2..C
ross-C
ountry
R
egressionson
the
L
ikelihood
ofSuccessfulD
em
ocratic
Transition
by
C
ontrolling
for
State
D
evelopm
ent
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
A
vg.
U
rbanization
O
il
G
D
P
A
ll
A
ll
D
em
ocracy
from
:PS
Schooling
E
duG
ini
U
rbanization
G
D
P
per
&
G
D
P
per
D
um
m
y
&
Pop.
(no
G
D
P
per)
(no
G
D
P)
SC
0.017
-0.364
-0.621
0.243
-0.075
-0.433
0.389
0.184
0.187
(0.651)
(0.689)
(0.727)
(0.801)
(0.856)
(0.696)
(0.832)
(0.932)
(0.932)
A
vg.Schooling
1.081***
0.545
0.262
-0.109
-0.347
0.457
-0.091
-0.725
-0.722
(0.380)
(0.671)
(0.721)
(0.860)
(0.844)
(0.686)
(0.861)
(0.910)
(0.908)
E
duG
ini
-0.023
-0.027
-0.041
-0.049*
-0.026
-0.041
-0.061**
-0.062**
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.026)
(0.027)
(0.020)
(0.026)
(0.030)
(0.030)
U
rbanization
0.465
0.697
0.721
0.775
(0.324)
(0.532)
(0.583)
(0.602)
G
D
P
per
0.116
-0.212
-0.083
(0.281)
(0.390)
(0.367)
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-1.031*
-1.730*
-1.702*
(0.609)
(0.952)
(0.943)
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D
P
0.127
-0.032
(0.260)
(0.358)
Pop.
-0.169
-0.098
-0.138
(0.342)
(0.397)
(0.170)
Pseudo
R
-sq
0.257
0.298
0.321
0.297
0.321
0.318
0.299
0.373
0.373
O
bservations
64
59
59
49
49
59
49
49
49
N
ote:
T
his
table
presents
cross-section
probitestim
ates
only
controlling
SC
.T
he
dependentvariable
equals
0
foralw
ays
autocratic
countries
and
takes
on
the
value
1
ifa
country
w
as
non-dem
ocratically
governed
before
1973,butperm
anently
abandoned
autocratic
rule
betw
een
1973
and
2010.T
he
m
ain
independentvariables
are
State
C
apacity
(StateH
ist),its
square,average
schooling
year,and
education
inequality.
U
rbanization
ratio,G
D
P
per
capita,naturalresource
(oildum
m
y),
country
size
(m
easured
by
G
D
P
and
population)are
controlled
forfurtherrobustness
checks.T
he
D
ata
A
ppendix
gives
detailed
variable
sources.Standard
errors
robustagainstatthe
country
levelare
reported
in
parentheses.*
p
<
0.1,**
p
<
0.05,***
p
<
0.01.
236
Table C.5.3.. Cross-Country Regressions on the Likelihood of Successful Democratic Transition by Controlling
for Country Fixed Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Urbanization GDP
Democracy from: PS Avg. Schooling EduGini Urbanization GDP per &GDP per Oil Dummy &Pop.
SC 0.004 2.06 1.39 5.470* 4.669* 1.752 3.751
(1.281) (1.657) (1.706) (3.133) (2.789) (1.898) (3.593)
Avg. Schooling 1.722*** 0.663 0.586 0.236 -0.245 0.152 -0.332
(0.583) (0.838) (0.838) (0.878) (0.977) (0.739) (1.099)
Latitude -0.015 -0.031 -0.047* -0.070** -0.128*** -0.024 -0.093**
(0.015) (0.020) (0.024) (0.034) (0.049) (0.023) (0.039)
Distance to Coast/River 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tropics Land (%) 1.112 2.237 0.599 6.595 4.731 5.919* 6.673
(2.657) (2.692) (3.172) (4.023) (4.072) (3.352) (4.598)
Tropics Pop. (%) 0.444 -0.246 1.777 -4.549 -2.266 -4.190 -3.763
(2.775) (2.579) (3.126) (3.913) (4.307) (3.351) (4.703)
Colony Dummy -1.172* -1.224 -1.688* -0.227 -1.946 -1.176 -0.537
(0.696) (0.825) (0.990) (0.901) (1.598) (0.880) (1.035)
Executive Constraint -1.035 -0.727 -0.794 -0.424 -2.071 -1.509 -0.809
(independence) (0.827) (0.942) (0.945) (1.170) (1.834) (1.093) (1.419)
Language Fractionalization 1.191 1.653 1.291 0.725 -0.194 2.600 0.394
(0.894) (1.247) (1.274) (2.122) (3.573) (1.601) (3.344)
Religion Fractionalization -2.281** -2.543** -1.775* -5.900** -6.504*** -4.057*** -6.660***
(0.945) (1.024) (1.053) (2.544) (2.203) (1.544) (2.487)
Ethnic Fractionalization -1.009 -0.841 -2.044 2.974 3.015 -0.058 2.148
(1.299) (1.596) (1.979) (3.799) (5.438) (2.173) (5.746)
Muslims Pop. (%) -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.021 -0.016 -0.007 -0.014
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018)
Buddhist&Confu. -0.020** -0.050*** -0.041** 0.042 0.024 -0.072*** 0.068
Pop. (%) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.073) (0.082) (0.022) (0.081)
EduGini -0.039 -0.030 -0.058* -0.076* -0.077** -0.072
(0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.045) (0.032) (0.047)
Urbanization 1.022 2.957*
(0.639) (1.527)
GDP per -0.281 -1.254**
(0.424) (0.610)
Oil Dummy -2.963***
(0.857)
GDP -0.113
(0.454)
Pop. 0.586
(0.539)
Pseudo R-sq 0.431 0.483 0.513 0.489 0.545 0.549 0.501
Observations 58 54 54 45 45 54 45
Note: This table presents cross-section probit estimates by controlling for various fixed factors and SC. The dependent variable equals 0 for always
autocratic countries and takes on the value 1 if a country was non-democratically governed before 1973, but permanently abandoned autocratic rule
between 1973 and 2010. The main independent variables are State Capacity (StateHist), its square, average schooling year, and education inequality.
Urbanization ratio, GDP per capita, natural resource (oil dummy), country size (measured by GDP and population) are controlled for further robustness
checks. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable sources. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.6.. Cross-Country Regressions on the Likelihood of Successful Democratic Transition by Controlling
for SC3, SC2, SC, and Other Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP
Democracy from: PS Avg. Schooling EduGini Urbanization GDP per Oil Dummy &Pop.
SC 15.083* 19.997* 29.342** 24.064* 16.839* 22.139
(8.264) (10.837) (12.996) (12.435) (10.029) (14.714)
SC2 -26.085 -36.791 -61.424* -47.039 -30.94 -37.095
(21.018) (27.575) (31.603) (32.061) (25.831) (48.454)
SC3 11.065 19.200 35.124 28.276 15.198 14.603
(15.119) (19.700) (21.954) (23.758) (18.658) (39.568)
Avg. Schooling 1.356** 0.098 -0.558 -0.197 -0.264 -2.069
(0.622) (0.846) (0.788) (0.822) (0.779) (2.362)
EduGini -0.053* -0.050* -0.069** -0.091*** -0.128*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.072)
Urbanization 1.567**
(0.722)
GDP per -0.271
(0.396)
Oil -2.718***
(0.922)
GDP -0.156
(0.429)
Pop. 1.614
(1.453)
Latitude -0.024 -0.033 -0.066* -0.058 -0.010 -0.200
(0.018) (0.023) (0.039) (0.044) (0.025) (0.198)
Distance to Coast/River 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Tropics Land (%) 1.104 2.480 0.921 7.164 6.281* 14.535
(2.662) (2.736) (2.997) (4.575) (3.794) (11.945)
Tropics Pop. (%) 0.103 -1.114 0.697 -6.710 -5.251 -11.893
(2.770) (2.726) (3.041) (4.650) (3.981) (11.109)
Colony Dummy -1.845** -1.781** -2.829** -0.875 -1.516* -3.339
(0.767) (0.826) (1.302) (0.986) (0.820) (2.453)
Executive Constraint -0.536 -0.481 -0.408 -0.501 -1.211 -3.587
(independence) (0.932) (0.984) (1.022) (1.049) (1.086) (4.089)
Language 1.153 2.018* 1.042 0.504 3.584* -6.203
Fractionalization (1.018) (1.226) (1.393) (1.469) (2.014) (10.925)
Religion -1.599 -2.006 -1.312 -6.188** -3.596* -12.393
Fractionalization (1.173) (1.511) (1.837) (2.428) (1.998) (10.703)
Ethnic -1.653 -1.405 -2.779 4.394 -1.381 12.135
Fractionalization (1.562) (1.919) (2.087) (3.717) (2.537) (17.060)
Muslims Pop. (%) -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.026 -0.011 -0.025
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.039)
Buddhist&Confu. -0.021** -0.049*** -0.041** 0.075 -0.070*** 0.282
Pop. (%) (0.009) (0.017) (0.018) (0.077) (0.023) (0.281)
Pseudo R-sq 0.500 0.557 0.609 0.546 0.600 0.575
Observations 58 54 54 45 54 45
Note: This table presents cross-section probit estimates by controlling for various fixed factors and SC, SC2, and SC3. The
dependent variable equals 0 for always autocratic countries and takes on the value 1 if a country was non-democratically
governed before 1973, but permanently abandoned autocratic rule between 1973 and 2010. The main independent variables are
State Capacity (StateHist), its square, average schooling year, and education inequality. Urbanization ratio, GDP per capita,
natural resource (oil dummy), country size (measured by GDP and population) are controlled for further robustness checks. The
Data Appendix gives detailed variable sources. Standard errors robust against at the country level are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.7. The Roles of Political Regimes in Academic
and Information Freedom
Economic prosperity is inseparable from the general human capital. General hu-
man capital is one of the important sources for innovation and adoption of new
production and organization techniques. To cultivate the high quality of general
human capital, it is crucial to encourage individual initiative and independent think-
ing during schooling and to remove the propaganda-based curriculum that aims to
indoctrinate pupils with a heavy dose of obedient and patriotic conditioning. In
addition, information freedom, such as freedoms of speech and press, enhances the
diffusion of new ideas among the masses, as well as enables better comparisons
of different ideas, both of which can improve the quality of human capital and are
central elements in processes of technological change (Knutsen, 2015).
Here, I provide some empirical evidence on the roles of democracy (PS) in academic
and information freedom. In the following dynamic panel regression model, the de-
pendent variable Freedomit is the indicator that measures academic or information
freedom, which is extracted from V-Dem Project.7 Four of its lagged levels are
controlled as well as four lagged per capita GDP to capture the dynamic process of
freedom and the dynamic effects of general development. The set of country and
time dummies are also included. This model is estimated by the within estimator.
Freedomit = β1Democracy+
4
∑
j=1
α jFreedomit− j +
4
∑
j=1
ϕ jyit− j +λi+δt + εit .
The results are displayed in Table C.7.1, including both OLS results and correspond-
ing 2SLS ones. Clearly, democracy improves academic freedom, media freedom,
and freedom of speech. At the same time, it also reduces the censorship and media
bias.
7See the explanations of these indicators in the Data Appendix.
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C.8. Data Sources
The indicator from Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002): StateHist.8
Indicators from World Development Indicators (2015 Edition): Enrollment Rates
(including primary, secondary, and tertiary), Fertility Rate, GDP per capita,
Government Spending Share of GDP, Inflation Rate, Investment Rate, Life
Expectancy, Population, Regional Area (WDI), Trade Share of GDP, Urban-
ization Rate.
Indicators from Quality of Government Data Set: Regional Area9, Average School-
ing Years in the Population (15 Years Old and Above).
Indicators from V-Dem Project: Colonial Origin, Educational Gini10, Ethnic
Fractionalization11, Freedom of Academic and Cultural Expression12, Free-
dom of Discussion for Men13, Freedom of Discussion for Women14, Freedom
of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information Index15, Government
Censorship Effort in Media16, Harassment of Journalists17, Language Frac-
8It is a 0-1 index that increases in the following factors: the amount of time a government existed
above the tribal level during the years 1 to 1950 CE; the amount of time this government was locally
based rather than foreign-based; and the percentage of the territory of the modern country that was
ruled by this government.
9There are 10 areas, including Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia);
Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic); North Africa & the Middle
East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus); Sub-Saharan Africa; Western Europe and North America
(including Australia & New Zealand); East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia); South-East Asia;
South Asia; The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zealand); The Caribbean (including Belize,
Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic).
10Gini coefficient of educational inequality estimated from average education data using the
method suggested by Thomas, Wang and Fan (2001) and Checchi (2006).
11The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics.
12It measures the degree of academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to
political issues.
13It measures the degree of men openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public
spaces.
14It measures the degree of women openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public
spaces.
15It combines 9 freedom indicators to measure the degree of government respect press and media
freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere,
as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression.
16It measures the degree of governments attempt to censor the print or broadcast media.
17 It measures the degree of individual journalists harassed by governmental or powerful
nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.
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tionalization18, Media Bias19, Media Self-Censorship20, Print and Broadcast
Media Critical21, Print and Broadcast Media Perspectives22, Religion Frac-
tionalization23, Share of Muslims Population24.
Indicators from Acemoglu et al. (2019): Distance to Coast or River, Latitude,
Share of Tropics Population, Share of Tropics Land.
Indicators from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b): Democracy25, Executive
Constraints at Independence26, Share of Confucian and Buddhist Population.
The indicator from Cervellati et al. (2014): Oil Dummy.27
Alternative Democracy indicators are from Acemoglu et al. (2019), Boix, Miller
and Rosato (2013), Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), Freedom House, and
Polity IV.
18It reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not
belong to the same linguistic group.
19It measures the degree of media bias against opposition parties or candidates.
20It measures the degree of self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the
government considers politically sensitive.
21It measures the degree of the major print and broadcast outlets criticize the government.
22It measures the degree of the major print and broadcast media that represent a wide range of
political perspectives.
23It reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not
belong to the same religious group.
24Muslims as a percentage of the population in 1980.
25I mainly use it as the main indicator to measure democracy. It is a dichotomous indicator,
which equates to 1 if the country had permanent democratization and the year after or if it is
always democratic country, and equates to 0 if the country is autocracy. Other cases (including the
countries experienced political setbacks, the countries with stable intermediate between autocracy
and democracy, the countries with borderline democratization) are set as missing values.
26Average value during the first ten post-independence years. If the data for the first 10 years
after independence is missing, I average over the first ten years of available data. The measure is
normalized to lie between 0 and 1.
27It is equal to 1 if it is the current and the former OPEC member, 0 otherwise.
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